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This dissertation examines the relationships between the physical environment and the 
history of public housing in Washington, D.C. from the 1940s to the 1960s 
The environmental features of public housing complexes, as well as those of the 
landscape around them, significantly shaped the outcomes of the National Capital 
Housing Authority’s (NCHA) projects. The scale of public housing construction during 
that period entailed sweeping and dramatic transformations in the landscape. At the same 
time, the NCHA found itself constrained by material and financial pressures coming from 
a variety of bureaucratic and institutional sources. Those pressures limited the NCHA’s 
ability to respond to environmental stresses at various public housing sites. In the absence 
of adequate responses from the NCHA, the environment played a significant role in 
determining the outcomes of the District of Columbia’s public housing program. The 
physical nature of the NCHA’s choice of sites, as well as the materials that it used, turned 
 
public housing complexes into sites of environmental injustice rather than the decent, 
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“Decent, Safe, and Sanitary?” Public Housing Transforms the Metropolitan 
Landscape 
 
 The public housing program for Washington, D.C. altered the city’s landscape in 
significant ways. The designers, planners, and builders of the National Capital Housing 
Authority (NCHA) undertook an ambitious program to build new, non-commercial 
dwelling units across the city during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Most of those units 
were built on the opposite side of the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers from the more 
densely populated core of the city around the National Mall, Capitol Hill, and the largely 
residential areas to the north. By building new units, however, the NCHA did more than 
just furnish new living spaces for impoverished residents of the District of Columbia. It 
also remade large swaths of the city. In order to construct decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing, the NCHA had to remake a terrain that was often rolling, rugged, run through 
with ravines and creeks, and moderately forested. Public housing design and construction 
remade the environment of eastern Washington, D.C.1 
 In order to build public housing, the NCHA had to build a new envirotechnical 
system in eastern Washington, D.C. that could support hundreds of families. I argue that 
the envirotechnical landscape that the NCHA built gave rise to significant environmental 
obstacles that undermined the Authority’s ability to deliver on its promise of decent, safe, 
and sanitary housing. The reasons for that failure can be categorized in two distinct, but 
                                                        
1 By eastern Washington, D.C., I mean parts of the city to the east of the Anacostia and Potomac 
Rivers, which were formidable geographical features separating the densely populated downtown 
core from other parts of the District of Columbia until the mid-twentieth century. I do not mean to 
confuse the political boundaries of Washington’s quadrants, which divide the city into eastern and 
western sides at the Capital Building, with the geographical boundaries created by the Anacostia and 
Potomac Rivers. Much of the existing literature about the environmental history of Washington, D.C. 
or the history of planning in the nation’s capital tends to focus on the densely populated downtown 
core. Literature that does address eastern Washington, D.C. is usually about the history of places 
within half of a mile of the banks of the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers. My dissertation broadens the 
environmental history of Washington, D.C. by centering the story of spaces “on the other side of the 
river” that historians have overlooked. For histories of what I refer to as eastern Washington, D.C., 
see John R. Wennersten, Anacostia: The Death and Life of an American River (Baltimore: The 
Chesapeake Book Company, 2008); Carl Abbott, Political Terrain: Washington, D.C., from Tidewater 
Town to Global Metropolis (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Frederick R. 
Gutheim, Worthy of the Nation: The History of Planning for the National Capital (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977); Brett Williams, “A River Runs Through Us,” American 
Anthropologist 103, no. 2 (June, 2001): 409-431. 
 
2 
related, ways, which I call envirotechnical obstacles. By the 1950s and 1960s, the 
envirotechnical landscape of public housing featured envirotechnical obstacles that stood 
in the way of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. The NCHA’s inability to overcome 
those envirotechnical obstacles meant that its program did more to entrench a regime of 
environmental injustice across eastern Washington, D.C. than to provide better housing 
conditions for the city’s impoverished residents. 
 The first envirotechnical obstacle consisted of the sites that the NCHA selected. 
In the early 1940s the NCHA often built in areas that were rolling and rough, with tree-
lined ravines leading down to creeks, streams, and the Anacostia and Potomac 
riverfronts. To support housing on a large scale, those sites would have to be substantially 
modified. Prior to the NCHA’s interventions, the builders of the previous envirotechnical 
regime—predominantly black smallholders and their families—had constructed 
communities that conformed, in large part, to the topography of the area. Their homes 
were perched on hill lines, with unpaved roads running sinuously through the region. The 
NCHA, on the other hand, sought to build a simplified landscape, in keeping with the 
neat gridded streets and attached homes of Northwest Washington. The process of 
building the simplified landscape created new environmental constraints, which 
undermined the long-term stability of its housing stock. The environmental features of 
some of the NCHA’s sites, such as uneven elevations and seasonal deluges, presented 
persistent problems for the NCHA and its tenants. 
 In the postwar period, the envirotechnical obstacles of siting took a slightly 
different form. One building, described below, was constructed on uneven land on a 
floodplain, below a seventy-foot embankment. However by the late-1950s the NCHA no 
longer had an abundance of open space on which to build. In part because of its efforts to 
remake the urban environment in the early 1940s, the NCHA had successfully extended 
roads and pipes into eastern Washington, D.C. Siting posed envirotechnical obstacles in 
the postwar period that were related to the rapid development of the region. The NCHA 
was limited to polluted and dangerous sites for its building program in the late-1950s. It 
built one complex nearly adjacent to an open-burn dump and another next to a major 
roadway. Siting in the postwar period posed envirotechnical obstacles related to 
complexes’ proximity to noxious features of the urbanized landscape.  
 
3 
 Second, the materials that the NCHA used in its complexes were stressed by 
external environmental factors. The materials that the NCHA used to build its complexes 
were pieces within a larger envirotechnical system. Despite being manufactured 
components, they were deeply tied to and embedded within their surroundings. The 
landscape of public housing was a hybridized space. It was neither wholly human nor 
natural, but instead a complex rearrangement of the two. Ultimately, the NCHA proved 
incapable of maintaining the relationship between the manufactured components of 
public housing complexes and their surroundings, which led to the decline of its housing 
stock. 
 The difficulty that the NCHA faced in addressing those two envirotechnical 
obstacles entrenched deep divides in access to environmental amenities across eastern 
Washington, D.C. Environmental racism exists when communities of color face a 
disproportionate number of environmental burdens compared to predominantly white 
communities. Across eastern Washington, D.C. African Americans—the primary 
residents of public housing since the beginning of the NCHA’s work—were brought into 
closer proximity to air pollution, water pollution, waste, and deteriorating landscapes than 
white residents as a result of public housing policies.2 Prior to the spate of public housing 
construction during the 1940s and 1950s black Washingtonians across the city had been 
exposed to more environmental burdens and nuisances than their white counterparts. Yet 
the NCHA’s projects concentrated greater numbers of poor black residents in and around 
sensitive and dangerous sites. This constituted a significant envirotechnical obstacle to 
the success of the NCHA’s program.  
 In Washington, public housing construction constituted an effort to bring the 
power of the local and federal governments to bear on the problem of poor quality 
                                                        
2 The NCHA integrated its properties in 1953, one year before Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas. Soon after doing so, white residents began to move to suburban communities or private 
housing stock elsewhere in the city. For example, at Highland Dwellings, covered extensively in this 
dissertation, the number of white families in the previously segregated complex declined from 350 to 
108 between June of 1952 and October of 1959. The number of black families increased from zero to 
226 during the same period. See: “Statement of Walter E. Washington, Executive Director, National 
Capital Housing Authority, Before The United States Commission on Civil Rights, April 13th, 1962”; 
Folder “Question as to Need for Regulations to Provide for the Nondiscriminatory Use of Housing 
Facilities P. 1-140, Entry P 101: Transcripts of Hearings on Nondiscriminatory Housing and Homes 




housing. The question of housing for reformers in the early-twentieth century went 
beyond the domestic living space itself, however. Proper housing included decent 
sanitation; proper access to clean water, ventilation, sunlight, and greenspace; as well as 
structurally sound dwelling units. The massive transformations that the NCHA made to 
the landscape of eastern Washington, D.C. were meant to support these environmental 
features of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Due to the envirotechnical obstacles that 
the NCHA encountered during that process, however, public housing in fact came to 
perpetuate unjust housing conditions. After the rapid departure of working-class white 
residents, African Americans became the primary group to bear the burden of unjust 
housing conditions within the NCHA’s complexes.  
 To make clear the role of the environment in undermining its pursuit of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing, I focus on five of the NCHA’s projects that were built 
between 1940 and 1960. Barry Farms, which was built in a historic black farming 
community, was planned in 1940; construction began at the site in 1941. Lincoln Heights, 
planned and built between 1941 and 1945, sits on top of a hilly and rugged section of 
northeast Washington. In the third chapter I study Highland Dwellings, which was 
initially intended for white families only, which was built between 1942 and 1944. The 
complex rapidly became majority-African American by the late-1950s. During that racial 
shift, the complex suffered from a number of deadly fires. The consequences of those 
fires were exacerbated by the NCHA’s choice of materials.  
 After the history of Highland Dwellings, my chronology shifts to the postwar 
planning and building period. The NCHA went through a new spate of construction in the 
mid-1950s that was touched off by the start of urban renewal elsewhere in the District of 
Columbia. Although Congress passed the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act in 
1945, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA) waited until 1952 to 
announce an ambitious plan to redevelop a large swath of Southwest D.C.3 Two business 
owners challenged the RLA’s plans to take their properties through eminent domain. In 
1954, the Supreme Court ruled in Berman v. Parker that the RLA’s could take the 
businesses, with just compensation, in the interest of public use. That ruling cleared the 
                                                        
3 Wendell E. Pritchett, “The ‘Public Menace’ of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent 
Domain,” Yale Law & Policy Review 21, no. 1 (2003), 32. 
 
5 
way for the RLA and urban renewal programs across the country to proceed.4 The NCHA 
would be brought into the RLA’s plans as a partner, providing public housing for the 
thousands of displaced residents.  
 In the fourth chapter, I describe the construction of Kenilworth Courts, which 
began in 1957. That complex was sited very close to an open burn landfill. The final case 
study in this dissertation is Sheridan Terrace, where construction began in 1958. I 
selected these complexes because the NCHA documented their progress closely. 
Furthermore, the local press covered the construction process, resident move-ins, and the 
deterioration of the projects extensively. Both of the projects were built as the NCHA 
scrambled for space to house residents displaced by urban renewal. The Authority’s 
redevelopment of eastern Washington in the early 1940s had proven fruitful. Space was 
increasingly limited for the types of large projects that the NCHA had pursued during the 
war years. Initially both the NCHA’s leadership and reporters hailed all of its projects as 
examples of the decent, safe, and sanitary modern amenities. By the 1950s, however, the 
press began to publish bleak accounts of the conditions at some of the complexes. By the 
late-1960s, public housing in the District of Columbia had apparently failed to live up to 
the NCHA’s promise of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings. Eroding slopes, 
deteriorating materials, fire, smoke, and the loss of a child’s life in a trash dump near 
Kenilworth Courts brought to light the envirotechincal obstacles that had emerged from 
the NCHA’s work. 
 These case studies also reveal that envirotechnical obstacles lingered throughout 
the NCHA’s early building program. In some cases, the types of changes that the NCHA 
made to the urban landscape amplified the effects of those environmental obstacles. 
Some postwar projects suffered from erosion, flooding, and a slew of other issues, much 
as the wartime projects had. This does not mean, however, that the NCHA’s approach to 
public housing construction during the postwar period was the same as it had been during 
the early 1940s. The environmental history of public housing is complicated. The 
NCHA’s work was shaped in part by the intersections of politics, bureaucratic struggles, 
the economics of the wartime and postwar eras, and racist planning policies. These 
factors conditioned the NCHA’s ability to respond to the very active environmental 
                                                        
4 Ibid., 1. 
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changes at its sites. Ultimately those environmental forces worked to undermine the 
Authority’s ability to erect decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Central to my narrative, 
however, is the active role that the environment played in the history of public housing. 
Other pressures located in the realms of bureaucratic conflicts, interpersonal struggles, 
and finances, contoured the responses—or unresponsiveness—of the NCHA to apparent 
envirotechnical obstacles at its sites. Thus much of this story is told by describing the 
institutional history of the NCHA and its leadership. Still, as described in the following 
chapters, the NCHA left an indelible mark on the landscape of the District of Columbia. 
Many tenants lived in spaces that the Authority had engineered to support its vision of 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Many tenants, then, encountered firsthand the 
envirotechnical obstacles that emerged from the NCHA’s interventions in and on the 
landscape. 
 
The Envirotechnical Framework: Nature and Artifice Intertwined in Eastern Washington, 
D.C. 
 
 I use the insights of envirotechnical history to better understand the environmental 
history of public housing in Washington, D.C. Envirotechnical history offers a way to 
conceptualize the types of hybridized landscapes represented by the Rhône River, the 
industrialized city, or indeed the eastern portion of the District of Columbia.5 Sara B. 
Pritchard’s concept of the envirotechnical system informs, in part, my investigation of 
public housing. For Pritchard, envirotechnical systems are “inextricably embedded 
environments and technologies that continually reshape individual parts of the system 
and the whole.”6  
                                                        
5 Sara B. Pritchard’s Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011) challenges the notion that the Rhône River was natural up to a 
certain point during the 1940s, becoming unnatural only after the large capital investments made in 
the River during the postwar period. Pritchard and Thomas Zeller naturalize the process of 
industrialization in their chapter from the edited collection The Illusory Boundary: Environment and 
Technology in History. They write that “[n]aturalizing industrialization…highlights the ways in which 
industrial processes were embedded within, and thus dependent upon, natural resources, 
environmental processes, and ecosystems.” See Sara Pritchard and Thomas Zeller, “The Nature of 
Industrialization,” in The Illusory Boundary: Environment and Technology in History, ed. Martin Reuss 
and Stephen H. Cutliffe (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2010), 70. 
6 Pritchard, Confluence, 19-20. Pritchard’s history of the Rhône built on the important work of 
Richard White, who used the concept of energy flows along the Columbia River to dissolve the 
boundaries between the artificial and the natural. White’s account captures a broad picture of the 
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 Pritchard’s definition speaks to two core aspects of the envirotechnical system. 
First, Pritchard draws attention to the hybridized form of the envirotechnical system, 
which consists of natural and artificial components working in tandem. The system 
eludes categorical analysis as wholly natural or technological. The same is true for the 
landscapes that smallholding families in eastern Washington, D.C. built as well as the 
ones that the NCHA later constructed in the same places. Second, an envirotechnical 
system is dynamic. It is no more static than a running river like the Rhône. The NCHA 
proved to be incapable of responding in a significant way to the envirotechnical obstacles 
at its complexes; the obstacles were products of the dynamism of the envirotechnical 
system. As water at the complexes moved and soil shifted, and as the wind carried smoke 
and fire, the envirotechnical obstacles to the NCHA’s goals mounted. The dynamism of 
an envirotechnical system emerges from the ways that different components of the 
system interact.7  
 The NCHA tried to rearrange the landscape of eastern Washington, D.C. to 
support decent, safe, and sanitary housing. How well did the NCHA’s envirotechnical 
system help in that pursuit? In eastern Washington, D.C., the NCHA built a new 
envirotechnical system with parts that often worked disharmoniously. At Lincoln 
Heights, heavy rainfall damaged the roofing material, leading to cave-ins that were 
                                                                                                                                                                     
history of the Columbia River and its uses through the perspective of energy. See Richard White, The 
Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
7 In Confluence, Pritchard brings nature into the forefront, as an active agent of historical change, and 
as something that played a role in reshaping the Rhône during the postwar period. In that regard she 
“naturalizes” technology, showing how the development of a hydraulic system was in fact deeply 
intertwined with the natural features of the Rhône. The development of the river as a hydraulic 
system was conditioned and shaped by both the river itself and the contests between different 
agencies and groups to implement their vision for the river’s uses. The envirotechnical system 
represents a hybridization of both the technological and environmental domains; the two shape each 
other in tandem. See: Sara B. Pritchard, Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the 
Rhône (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2-14. I use the envirotechnical framework to 
add to the history of development in eastern Washington, D.C. Erecting buildings, laying sewers, 
constructing drainage, grading slopes, and maintaining the integrity of public housing complexes was 
not a straightforward process whereby human actors subdued nature. In fact, it was a complex 
process, where various constraints on the NCHA’s building program often left more room for nature 
to act, which in turn prompted responses (or, more often, non-responses) from the human managers 
of the public housing landscape. Although it was more developed by the late-1950s, and lacked the 
obviously “natural” features of the agricultural communities of the 1940s, eastern Washington, D.C. 
continued to experience environmental changes. Whether that meant erosion, flooding, or pollution, 
the changing environmental conditions of eastern Washington, D.C. still played important roles in the 
outcome of the NCHA’s public housing project. The landscape of public housing was neither wholly 
natural nor artificial, but instead was a complex hybridization of both. 
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addressed with heavier coats of bitumen.8 Water flooded and pooled in several of the 
complexes, and at Barry Farms seeped into old gas lines, which cut off heat to the 
building in the autumn of 1976.9 At Highland Dwellings, several fires threatened the lives 
and property of residents; the devastating consequences of the fires were exacerbated by 
improper building practices.10 Kenilworth Courts suffered due to its proximity to a 
landfill. Sheridan Terrace residents dealt with exhaust from automobiles as well as land 
subsidence and flooding. In each case study, the envirotechnical system broke down in 
crucial ways. Those ways can be attributed to the siting of public housing complexes, the 
materials used in building those projects, and the disproportionate distribution of 
environmental burdens that residents of public housing endured. The landscape of public 
housing was riven with envirotechnical obstacles. 
 Envirotechnical history is a useful framing for a history such as this, which 
describes the institutional constraints and responses of the NCHA as it worked to pursue 
its Progressive ideals of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Historians such as Sara 
Pritchard in Confluence and Richard White in The Organic Machine: The Remaking of 
the Columbia River, center the role of bureaucracies and institutions in managing 
envirotechnical systems. Pritchard incorporates the role of bureaucracies in her 
description of envirotechnical regimes. The envirotechnical regime consists of “the 
institutions, people, ideologies, technologies, and landscapes that together define, justify, 
build, and maintain a particular envirotechnical system as normative.”11  
 In the chapters about Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights, I describe the historical 
processes that led to an overthrow of one envirotechnical regime by another; namely, the 
NCHA’s work to take control of areas formerly inhabited and worked by smallholding 
African American families. This is where my study can add a small piece to the literature 
about envirotechnical systems and envirotechnical regimes. Pritchard and White describe 
a co-evolutionary process in the transformations of the Rhône and Columbia Rivers, 
                                                        
8 P.W. Clogston to John Ihlder, “Roof Sheathing at Lincoln Heights,” July 30th, 1945; Lincoln Heights 
Dwellings 1943-1945, Box 1, Entry P 23: Records Regarding Public Housing Dwellings, 1943-1959, 
RG 302, NARA. 
9 Richard E. Price and Juan Williams, “Water Gets in Line, Barry Farms Loses all Gas for Heating,” The 
Washington Post, October 14th, 1976. 
10 Connie Feeley, “Housing Project Lacks Fire Walls,” The Washington Post, December 14th, 1957. 
11 Pritchard, 23. 
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wherein bureaucracies grew along with the envirotechnical systems in those areas. The 
histories of Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights show both continuities and ruptures. The 
roles of water, soil, and trees on the properties remained much the same as they had when 
Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights were farming communities. But the NCHA graded and 
terraced the landscape, building new infrastructures that had not been there before. Those 
long established natural processes at the two sites interacted in complex ways with the 
new envirotechnical system, creating obstacles that the NCHA was hard-pressed to 
sufficiently address.  
 Locally, the NCHA overthrew the existing envirotechnical regime in eastern 
Washington, D.C., replacing it with the NCHA’s preferred spatial and material 
arrangements. Prior to the NCHA’s interventions, smallholding black families would 
often tend to some animals and gardens, but also frequently commuted across the 
Anacostia River for labor in the more densely developed downtown areas.12 After the 
NCHA’s work, however, eastern Washington, D.C. was integrated into the infrastructural 
networks that had been established during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries on the other side of the river. The NCHA was a public housing authority, but its 
goal was also to build homes that could meet middle-class standards of cleanliness, 
decency, and safety. This meant that the NCHA’s influence extended beyond the home 
itself, as it coordinated with other city agencies to bring vital infrastructures to the 
communities it was building. The NCHA’s efforts helped pave the way for increased 
development on the eastern side of the city. It was an agent of urban renewal, and the 
environmental history of urban renewal is a little-explored part of metropolitan 
environmental history. 
 The NCHA accomplished the overthrow of the previous envirotechnical regime in 
part through the courts’ approval of eminent domain, with which the NCHA laid claim to 
dozens of acres throughout eastern Washington, D.C. But this history is not centrally 
concerned about the legal fights between local citizens and the NCHA’s planners as 
much as it is about the ways that the environment of eastern Washington shaped the 
outcome of the NCHA’s plans. The NCHA removed trees, tried to terrace the rolling 
terrain, rerouted and covered rivers and streams, and laid out large grassy fields to 
                                                        
12 Williams, 415. 
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support middle-class standards of domesticity. Materially, the NCHA connected its 
complexes to the infrastructures that already ran throughout western Washington, D.C.; it 
built new sewers to eliminate the outdoor privy, new pipes to replace the community 
pumps and wells, and new roads for commuters to move between the complexes and their 
workplaces. But these transformations also created new envirotechnical obstacles, which 
residents of public housing complexes faced with dwindling support from the NCHA 
beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Remaking the City in Their Image: The Environmental Legacy of Urban Renewal 
 
 Metropolitan environmental history has yet to dedicate much space to the history 
of urban renewal. I contend that the spate of urban redevelopment that took place 
following the Second World War dramatically remade the urban environment, and in turn 
the environment shaped the outcomes of the efforts of the NCHA, which was one agency 
involved in urban renewal. Old neighborhoods with substandard housing were 
demolished to make way for new office complexes, middle-class neighborhoods, and 
public housing developments. Thousands of residents in the densely populated urban 
center were displaced by these changes, and the NCHA desperately sought land on which 
to build and house the displaced. Many white residents whose neighborhoods were 
demolished in the course of urban renewal fled to the suburbs, while public housing 
accommodated many black families. The racial and demographic movements that urban 
renewal accelerated led to both suburbanization and the concentration of poverty in 
public housing sites. There was an environmental side to this story, as white residents left 
substandard housing in the urban core and many black families moved into public 
housing that was often near environmental nuisances or quickly deteriorated during the 
1950s and 1960s. Urban renewal entrenched deep environmental as well as racial divides 
in postwar cities. 
 The vast majority of the literature in metropolitan environmental history focuses 
on the dramatic transformations in the urban landscape that industrialization engendered. 
This makes sense, as during the mid- to late-nineteenth centuries, industrialization 
transformed cities from compact, walkable places into much larger and more densely 
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populated metropolises.13 The environmental changes taking place in US cities during 
that period were tied to other changes in demographics, politics, and the metropolitan 
economy.14  
 While there have been many high-quality histories of cities that focus 
predominantly on metropolitan environmental changes in the twentieth century, there are 
few that describe the history of the mid-twentieth century urban environment 
specifically.15 Those that do tend to emphasize the history of suburban 
                                                        
13 Joel Tarr provides a succinct history of the stages of transformation and growth that American 
cities experienced during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in The Illusory Boundary. See Joel 
Tarr, “The City as an Artifact of Technology and the Environment,” in The Illusory Boundary: 
Environment and Technology in History, eds. Martin Reuss and Stephen H. Cutcliffe (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2010): 145-170. 
14 There have been, generally, three major ways that metropolitan environmental historians have 
approached the environmental history of cities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The first is by studying the history of engineering and infrastructures. The expansion of 
infrastructures during those two centuries was driven by increasing pollution, as well as population 
stresses on the resources available in the immediate surroundings of a city. The expansion of those 
infrastructures created deep links between cities and their hinterlands, and the two exerted 
transformational pressure on each other. Examples include: William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: 
Chicago and the Great West (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991); Joel Tarr, The 
Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Pollution in Historical Perspective (Akron: University of Akron 
Press, 1996); Martin Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform, and the Environment (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Martin Melosi, The Sanitary City: Environmental Service in 
America from Colonial Times to the Present (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008); David 
Soll, Empire of Water: An Environmental and Political History of the New York City Water Supply 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); Carl Smith, City Water, City Life: Water and the Infrastructure 
of Ideas in Urbanizing Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
The second way of studying industrial-era metropolitan environmental history is through the lens of 
the new environmental politics that changing cityscapes produced during that period. See, for 
example: David Stradling, Smokestacks and Progressives: Environmentalists, Engineers, and Air Quality 
in America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Matthew Klingle, 
Emerald City: An Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2007). The final way that metropolitan environmental historians have approached their subject is 
through the lens of environmental justice. See: Harold Platt, Shock Cities: The Transformation and 
Reform of Manchester and Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Matthew Gandy, 
Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002); Dawn Day 
Biehler, Pests in the City: Flies, Bedbugs, Cockroaches, and Rats (Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press, 2013); Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial 
Pollution in Gary, Indiana (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
15 Exceptions to this include Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial 
Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1985 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Sylvia 
Hood Washington, Packing Them In: An Archaeology of Environmental Racism in Chicago, 1865-1954 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004); selected pieces from Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, 




environmentalism.16 Adam Rome, for example, wrote about the interrelated histories of 
suburbanization, suburban environmental change, and a nascent environmental 
movement in The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of 
American Environmentalism. He contended that the use of mass production techniques on 
environmentally sensitive sites in the suburban United States during the 1950s sparked 
the environmental movement of the 1960s.17 As he put it,  
 
[t]he adoption of mass production techniques greatly intensified the 
environmental impact of homebuilding. For the first time, builders put hundreds 
of thousands of homes in environmentally sensitive areas, including wetlands, 
steep hillsides, and floodplains. Builders also began to use new earth-moving 
equipment to level hills, fill creeks, and clear vegetation from vast tracts. The 
result was more frequent flooding, costly soil erosion, and drastic changes in 
wildlife populations.18 
 
The histories of Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights, Highland Dwellings, Sheridan Terrace, 
and Kenilworth Courts reveal that the scale of planning for public housing in the District 
of Columbia, as well as the environmental aftereffects for residents, were not dissimilar 
from private construction efforts taking place in Montgomery County, Prince George’s 
County, or Northern Virginia. But public housing, as opposed to the construction taking 
place over the District of Columbia line, was meant to be a non-commercial alternative to 
the private housing and rental markets. Like private developers, public housing planners 
built hundreds of homes during the second half of the 1940s and 1950s. Unlike private 
developers, they were not interested in building cheap tract housing that could be put on 
the market quickly. The NCHA put care into the design and aesthetic appeal of their 
complexes, even if other political and economic factors undermined the construction 
                                                        
16 See, for example, Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of 
Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2012). Although delving into a far deeper history than that of suburbia, in Car Country: An 
Environmental History, Christopher Wells describes the deep political and social histories of the 
automobile, which ultimately led to the mass suburbanization of the post-World War Two period. See 
Christopher Wells, Car Country: An Environmental History (Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press, 2012). 
17 Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American 
Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
18 Ibid., 3. 
 
13 
process. Progressive reformers within the NCHA wanted to provide housing that 
mimicked the standards of middle-class dwellings elsewhere in the city. In doing so, they 
selected sites that had to be extensively graded and terraced, were relegated to using 
substandard materials during the Second World War, and also retrenched environmental 
inequalities into the landscape. Furthermore, my perspective is a bit different than 
Rome’s portrayal of the environmental consequences of suburban development. 
Deploying the envirotechnical framework, I am more interested in how the home and its 
materials were situated within a larger envirotechnical system, and the complex ways that 
the physical materials within public housing interacted with their surroundings. My use 
of the two categories of environmental obstacles centers the environmental issues that 
NCHA planners dealt with, while describing the ways in which those planners were 
politically and economically constrained in different ways during the mid-twentieth 
century. 
 The NCHA’s program involved remaking large swaths of the city in relatively 
short periods of time. The Authority did its best to grade and terrace parts of eastern 
Washington, D.C., but in doing so also laid the groundwork for future environmental 
obstacles at its public housing sites. Just a cursory description of the NCHA’s work 
demonstrates the degree of change that the Authority would bring to the region. For one 
thing, it had to cut down many of the trees that once flourished on and in the proximity of 
its sites. The region had gone through one spate of deforestation during the Civil War, 
during which land erosion increased dramatically, filling the Anacostia with silt.19 During 
the 1940s, however, cutting down trees was less a matter of defending the District of 
Columbia against rebellious armies, and had more to do with Ihlder’s desire for 
complexes with a good deal of open greenspace. In other words, the visions that public 
housing planners had for decent, safe, and sanitary housing required tree removal on a 
moderate scale. Furthermore, extant gullies, streams, creeks, and ravines needed to be 
filled as the NCHA leveled and terraced the property. Another substantial part of the 
construction of a new envirotechnical system at the NCHA’s sites involved stringing 
wires, laying asphalt, and burying pipes, which further altered the complexes and the 
areas around them. In certain circumstances, the envirotechnical system broke down 
                                                        
19 Williams, 415. 
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when the natural and manufactured components of it interacted poorly. Because of the 
size of these complexes, the vulnerability of their residents, and the various economic and 
political pressures on the NCHA, any break down of the envirotechnical system could 
prove devastating to the Authority’s goal of providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing.  
 While the environmental history of industrialization and suburbanization left 
indelible marks on the metropolitan landscape, the environmental legacy of urban 
renewal has received far less attention by scholars. Like the post-industrial reforms of the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, urban renewal was prompted in part by 
planners’, engineers’, and reformers’ concerns about a deteriorating urban environment. 
Through the demolition of problem neighborhoods and the construction of public 
housing, citizens of mid-twentieth century cities across the country hoped to remediate 
and rehabilitate the cityscape. They introduced and executed plans to do so on a massive 
scale. Urban renewal was not a surgical intervention into dilapidated communities; it was 
like a meat ax hacking through swaths of the city.20 In the District of Columbia, the 
Southwest Urban Renewal Area (SURA) alone constituted 560 acres, nearly all of which 
was demolished and rebuilt between 1952 and 1970.21 The National Capital Housing 
Authority redeveloped about 100 acres across eastern Washington, D.C. Public housing, 
which went hand-in-hand with urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s. The environmental 
legacy of public housing—which was an accessory to urban renewal—merits a place in 
the literature on metropolitan environmental history. 
 
Public Housing and Environmental History: The Envirotechnical Landscape as an Active 
Agent in Public Housing Outcomes 
 
 Historians have asked questions about siting, the material elements of public 
housing, and the racialization of space in the metropolitan landscape in the literature 
about public housing. Yet, due to the nature of the discipline, public housing historians 
usually answer those questions by investigating the sociopolitical milieu of public 
                                                        
20 See, for example, Robert Moses’s well-known comments about building highways in New York City. 
In The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York, Robert Caro quotes Moses as once saying 
“when you operate in an overbuilt metropolis, you have to hack your way with a meat ax.” See Robert 
Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 
849. 
21 Francesca Russello Ammon, “Commemoration Amid Criticism: The Mixed Legacy of Urban Renewal 
in Southwest Washington, D.C.,” Journal of Planning History 8, no. 3 (August, 2009), 185. 
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housing Authorities during the mid-twentieth century. Often, public housing historians 
answer questions about siting, the materials used in public housing, and racial injustice 
by studying the interactions between local, state, and federal governments, or by looking 
at racial and demographic changes at the level of the neighborhood or block, for example. 
By doing so, they have created useful and engaging narratives that help answer the 
question of what went wrong with public housing in the United States. The 
envirotechnical approach, however, foregrounds the environment as something that—in 
tandem with race, politics, and economics—physically shaped the outcome of the District 
of Columbia’s public housing initiative. 
 Historians of public housing specifically, and urban renewal more generally, 
frequently discuss the matter of siting public housing. The process of siting was riven 
with political and racial tensions, and there is a good deal of agreement that in the 
outcome of struggles between genuine reformers, like Chicago’s Elizabeth Woods, and 
conservative or reactionary politicians and citizens who were wedded to the status quo, 
the latter came out as the victors. Arnold Hirsch refers to public housing siting as a means 
to build “the second ghetto,” in which impoverished black residents were concentrated in 
sites of extreme poverty. Public housing therefore became a means to shore up the racial 
boundaries between blacks and whites within metropolitan spaces. He writes that this 
second ghetto was “[b]orn of the struggles between planners and politicians, racists and 
liberals, ethnics and institutions… none could have done it alone.”22 Those struggles 
“gave old enclaves a permanence never seen before.”23  
 As one of the earlier historical treatments of the question of siting in public 
housing Hirsch’s assessment has come under a great deal of scrutiny. Some historians, 
like N.D.B. Connolly, have agreed with Hirsch’s assessment of the political and social 
vulnerabilities of the public housing siting process, though places the blame for the 
eventual failure of public housing on other factors. His book A World More Concrete: 
Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida asks who won and who lost in 
the process of urban renewal, finding that the racial boundaries of south Florida were 
shored up in large part because of the privileged position of predominantly (though not 
                                                        
22 Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 258. 
23 Ibid., 275. 
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solely) white middle- and upper-class residents. Connolly moves the focus of his 
narrative away from politics, however, and towards the market system as the prime force 
undermining reform efforts.24 
 Overwhelmingly, however, when writing about siting, public housing historians 
are writing about the economic, political, and social dimensions of siting, which, while 
important, are enhanced by close examination of the physical qualities of the landscape. 
There are a few exceptions in the literature, but they are brief. In his study of the Boston 
Housing Authority, Lawrence Vale writes that “[m]any areas failed to be developed or 
redeveloped as public housing for a variety of reasons. Some fell short on technical 
grounds, found to require excessive fill or extensive use of pilings. In other cases, 
technical reasons seem to have been excuses to withdraw from an area seen by competing 
real estate interests as likely to attract private development.”25 Writing about Pruitt-Igoe 
in St. Louis, Joseph Heathcott writes that although beliefs about housing reform 
stretching back to the nineteenth century and continuing into the New Deal planning era, 
“suggested a direct causal relationship between the human environment and the behavior 
of humans within that environment[,]” ultimately that policy direction was interrupted by 
the housing crunch during and after the Second World War, and the turn to high-rises to 
meet that need.26 Pressures from political and economic stakeholders at the top and 
reactionary white residents on the bottom shaped the site selection process for public 
housing. Most historians of public housing acknowledge that these factors mattered, to 
different degrees. 
 But my study of siting moves in a different direction. The site itself—and the 
transformations that the NCHA made on that site to support housing—was not simply a 
passive backdrop but an active agent of historical change. At key points the 
envirotechnical system of Washington’s public housing program broke down. The 
NCHA’s ability and capacity to respond to the envirotechnical obstacle of siting was 
contoured by the different political, economic, and bureaucratic circumstances during the 
                                                        
24 See N.D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
25 Lawrence J. Vale, From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 254. 
26 Joseph Heathcott, The City Remade: Public Housing and the Urban Landscape in St. Louis, 1900-1960, 
Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, August, 2002, 431. 
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1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. By tying the environmental qualities of the sites that the NCHA 
selected for public housing to the NCHA’s relationship with other federal and local 
bureaucracies, I believe that it is possible to provide a novel perspective on the reasons 
why public housing did not succeed.  
 Some historians, such as D. Bradford Hunt, have concluded that public housing 
was a “blueprint for disaster.” He argued that  
 
[a]t its core, public housing, as conceived by reformers in 1937 was a blueprint 
for disaster and could not have survived the postwar housing boom without 
fundamental changes. The need for these changes was actually recognized early 
on, but they were never seriously pursued. The crime was therefore not the effort 
to better house the poor but the failure by those in power to alter course and to fix 
evident mistakes.27 
 
To put that statement into an envirotechnical context, the Authority’s leadership was 
consistently made aware of the obstacles that the builders and eventual residents of public 
housing faced. Contractors wrote to the NCHA board—and its chief executive John 
Ihlder specifically—about erosion, flooding, and heavy rainfall at the Barry Farms and 
Lincoln Heights sites. The Authority did little to rectify the problem of frequent fires at 
the Highland Dwellings complex. Later, in the 1950s, a soil mechanics engineer found 
evidence of slippage during construction at Sheridan Terrace. Smoke emanated from a 
major landfill and large roadway toward the residents of Kenilworth Courts and Sheridan 
Terrace. It might have been possible for the NCHA to successfully confront those 
environmental forces, but it was consistently constrained by other agencies throughout 
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, and by its financial situation in the postwar period, as 
detailed below. Without the support, time, and funding necessary to confront the pressing 
envirotechnical obstacles at its sites, the NCHA was unable to fulfill its goal for housing.  
 Those obstacles were more than simple nuisances. They undermined the 
NCHA’s ability to construct decent, safe, and sanitary structures. As plaster corroded and 
units flooded, residents dealt with vermin, unsafe greenspace, exhaust, smoke, and dust. 
The envirotechnical obstacles at the NCHA’s sites made public housing dwellings often 
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unpleasant and sometimes dangerous places to live. By focusing on the envirotechnical 
obstacles of siting, materials, and injustice, and centering the environment as an active 
agent of historical change at the NCHA’s properties, it is possible to foreground the role 
of the environment, and the NCHA’s struggles—and failures—to create livable and 
viable homes for the most vulnerable residents of the District of Columbia. 
 Not all historians of public housing accept Hunt’s argument.28 The first decade 
of the twentieth century produced valuable scholarship on the social history of public 
housing. Those historians successfully challenged the notion that public housing was a 
complete failure and that housing authorities simply locked desperate residents into three 
generations of poverty and despair. Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, for example, focuses on the 
idea of community in American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto. He 
demonstrates that amidst the poor conditions of the Robert Taylor homes in Chicago, 
residents successfully defined their own idea of what it meant to live in a community. 
Despite the decay around them, that community offered vital support for residents who 
struggled to participate in the postwar American pursuit of prosperity. African Americans 
rooted themselves in the national citizenry through the pursuit of community in the 
Robert Taylor Homes, showing that the suburban domestic ideal was not a prerequisite 
for the development of a resilient urban neighborhood.29 
 Nicholas Dagen Bloom also revised the traditional narrative about the rapid 
decline of public housing into an abysmal state with Public Housing that Worked: New 
York in the Twentieth Century. While acknowledging that public housing was in large 
part failed to successfully meet its goals in cities across the United States, Bloom portrays 
the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) as an exception, due to its management 
practices, which “broadly defined, are the most important factors in the long-term shape 
                                                        
28 Most prominent among those voices of disagreement would be Lawrence J. Vale, who states in 
Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities that in fact 
public housing consisted of many different programs with different degrees of success, and 
furthermore that the concentration of poverty in public housing was actually an historical aberration 
that emerged in the 1960s-1980s. See Lawrence J. Vale, Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the 
Design Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 3-6. 
29 Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, American Project: The Rise and Fall of an American Ghetto (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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of public housing communities.”30 Bloom blames patronage systems, poor selection and 
training, and a range of other reasons for the relative decline of other public housing 
programs across the country. 
 Both Bloom and Venkatesh offer important insights into the nature of the local 
community within public housing complexes. Their histories focus on the lived 
experiences of residents and how they strove for better living conditions—socially and 
materially—in the midst of decay. They also write about life in the high-rises and 
superblocks that characterized post-war housing planning across the United States. 
Washington, D.C. is different, however. The height limitations that were historically 
adopted to preserve the appearance of the city did not permit the construction of high-
rises or superblocks.31 Except for Sheridan Terrace, the complexes that followed were all 
built across sprawling grounds, but consisted of dozens of two-story attached homes. 
Managers in Washington, D.C. did not have to contend with broken elevators or 
stairwells, the concentration of thousands of people in single buildings, or the other 
problems of high-rise public housing. Rather, the managers in the District of Columbia 
dealt with eroding slopes, flooding in and around its buildings, fires, smoke, soot, and 
ash. Height restrictions in the District of Columbia ensured that it would not contain 
high-rise complexes on the same scale as other cities.32 
 In The Politics of Public Housing: Women’s Struggles Against Inequality, 
Rhonda Y. Williams provides a striking oral history of Baltimore’s experiment with high-
rise public housing complexes. She reveals that public housing was not an entirely failed 
program by focusing on the lives and activism of black women in the projects. Black 
women found in public housing opportunities for political education and activism, as well 
as a change to move out of tenuous or dangerous living situations in private housing.33  
                                                        
30 Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth Century 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 2. 
31 Sheridan Terrace was the closest approximation to the high-rise in other cities, but it had only 
seven stories. 
32 Washington’s public housing program was not completely different, however. Other major cities 
also erected sprawling complexes consisting of townhouses or attached dwellings during the 1940s 
and 1950s. The “Cabrini” in Cabrini-Green, for example, referred to the two-story town homes that 
were built there in the early 1940s. See Vale, Purging the Poorest, chapter four. 
33 Rhonda Y. Williams, The Politics of Public Housing: Women’s Struggles Against Inequality (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5. 
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 As Williams demonstrates, the New Deal was a moment when citizens could 
press claims on the federal government. Although their opportunities were highly 
circumscribed by the racism inherent in the distribution of benefits within New Deal 
programs, Williams shows that black women did indeed successfully press their claims. 
However, the relationship between the federal state and the residents of public housing 
was a mixed bag. While the New Deal and Great Society programs clearly sparked the 
political education and engagement of public housing tenants, the state became the 
“landlord, paternalistic authority, guarantor of decency, and provider of rights.”34 Thus 
black women in public housing consistently had to fight for the rights of their 
communities to self-development against a paternalistic federal state and reactionary 
opponents to federal support for impoverished urbanites.  
 Williams describes both the successes of black women’s political education and 
engagement in public housing complexes as well as the limitations that they faced. But 
the extent to which residents of public housing in Washington, D.C. could press their 
claims against the NCHA was complicated by two factors. First, because the District of 
Columbia had nothing resembling a city government until the 1970s, there were few 
agencies that exercised direct authority over the NCHA, and no politicians who 
represented local constituencies to hold the Authority accountable for inaction in the face 
of envirotechnical obstacles. Second, the NCHA did not first develop as a housing 
authority. As demonstrated below, John Ihlder had to fight for that power. Rather, the 
NCHA was at first dedicated to clearing slums from the urban core. Ihlder himself came 
to direct the NCHA as a capstone to his long career in Progressive housing reform efforts. 
He helmed the NCHA until 1952, and his paternalistic conception of housing reform and 
public housing construction guided his work throughout that time. As demonstrated 
below, residents often had to appeal directly to Congress to rectify the environmental 
problems that they faced.  
 The social histories above are three examples of the value that the experiences of 
public housing residents add to the literature. By centering the environment of public 
housing, I hope to provide another dimension to the history of life on the ground in the 
NCHA’s complexes. The environment in and around public housing complexes set the 
                                                        
34 Ibid., 6. 
 
21 
context in which residents formed communities.35 It also produced visible and tangible 
features around which residents could organize and test the strength of their power 
against that of the local housing authority. By the 1960s, residents were able to directly 
confront the NCHA executive director about conditions in their homes. In that way, the 
environment played an active role in the political education of public housing tenants and 
showed the limitations of the NCHA’s power. 
 But the main focus of this dissertation is on the planners and administrators of 
the NCHA. I am interested in the ways in which the environment undermined the 
NCHA’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. While I draw on the experiences of 
residents to corroborate the apparent physical deterioration of public housing, ultimately I 
am interested in the factors that gave the environment such a significant role in altering 
the course of Washington’s public housing program from that envisioned by the NCHA’s 
leadership. While the social historians of public housing mentioned above show that 
public housing was far from a complete failure, the early planners of public housing 
reached a different conclusion. The environment posed particular challenges, which made 
success—the construction of decent, safe, and sanitary housing—elusive. 
 The question of how successfully the NCHA dealt with envirotechnical obstacles 
at its sites over time can be answered in a comparison of pre-war units with those built 
during and after the conflict. There has been one extensive study of a public housing 
complex in the District of Columbia. In her PhD dissertation for the University of 
Maryland-College Park, Kelly Anne Quinn wrote about the Langston Terrace Dwellings, 
built in Northeast Washington for black families. She points to Langston Terrace as an 
early success for the Alley Dwelling Authority. Built in 1938, Langston Terrace was 
designed by black professionals for the increasing number of black families migrating to 
the District of Columbia during that period.36 Quinn’s main focus was on the social 
influences of the built environment and community formation at Langston Terrace. Like 
most public housing histories, the environmental dimension is secondary to other ways of 
understanding history. She does briefly touch on the question of siting in an 
envirotechnical context when she writes that “[i]n form and site strategy, Robinson’s plan 
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36 Kelly Anne Quinn, Making Modern Homes: A History of Langston Terrace Dwellings, A New Deal 
Public Housing Program in Washington, D.C., Ph.d. Diss., University of Maryland-College Park, 1.  
 
22 
for Langston responded to the natural topography and physical context of the 13 acre 
parcel in Northeast.”37 According to Quinn, architect Hilyard Robinson relied on the 
naturally sloping topography of the site to provide vistas overlooking the Anacostia River 
to the east.38  
 Quinn portrays Langston Terrace as a success. It provided a model of how public 
housing could work in harmony with the envirotechnical obstacles of a given site (in this 
case, uneven grades). But by the Second World War, the political and economic realities 
that the NCHA faced were different than they had been during the New Deal period. 
While trying to continue with the older design forms—like Langston Terrace—that were 
celebrated in western Washington, D.C., the NCHA also faced pressure from the federal 
government to build quickly and a dearth of quality construction materials. This resulted 
in a proliferation of envirotechnical obstacles that largely pertained to siting, materials, 
and environmental injustice, as explored in later chapters. My dissertation builds on 
Quinn’s by extending the history of public housing into the 1940s and 1950s. This adds a 
significant environmental component to the history of public housing in the District of 
Columbia, as the NCHA embarked on ambitious, large-scale projects east of the river that 
had not theretofore been attempted. Furthermore, the NCHA grappled with distinctive 
envirotechnical obstacles at the same moment that external political and economic 
pressures affected the physical construction process. In light of Quinn’s dissertation, my 
work demonstrates that although the ADA might have had some early successes, the 
dramatically different circumstances of the 1940s and 1950s gave the environment an 
active role in undermining the quality of the Authority’s housing stock. 
 
Environmental Justice: The NCHA as a Contributor to the Unequal Distribution of 
Environmental Burdens 
  
 Like most American cities, Washington exhibited patterns of racial segregation 
that overlapped with the distribution of environmental burdens. Prior to the National 
Capital Housing Authority’s efforts, poor people of color had lived scattered throughout 
the residential and commercial core of Washington. In the 1920s, the decade before the 
NCHA started its work, there were three large black enclaves surrounding the downtown 
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core: Southwest, Foggy Bottom, and along North Capital Street and Florida Avenue.39 In 
the same decade in parts of the District of Columbia to the east of the rivers, more 
prosperous families—though by no means wealthy or self-sufficient—held property that 
had been allocated through the Freedmen’s Bureau. As noted above, the land that they 
farmed was often marginal, and those families often still had to commute into the city for 
work. Further north, near the eventual location of Kenilworth Courts, white families 
generally owned homes in the highlands, which were far from the marshy banks of the 
Anacostia River. African Americans were relegated to spaces lining the river or quite 
close to it, which were prone to flooding and the nuisances and dangers of mosquitoes.40  
 Since the 1990s, historians and geographers have done much to explain why 
maps of environmental burdens project neatly onto patterns of racial segregation in 
metropolitan spaces. Their work has revealed that in the United States, a patchwork of 
regulations, municipal codes, and reactionary citizen organizing maintained longstanding 
racial and environmental boundaries. As geographer Laura Pulido points out, the value of 
black land can only be considered in relation to white land, which is seen as more 
valuable within a system that privileges white people. Hence, environmental racism need 
not be tied to specific acts, but is manifested in the subtle ways that white privilege 
inflates the value of white lands.41 Since they are less valuable pieces of land, dumps, 
landfills, scrapyards, and other odious features of the metropolitan landscape that require 
large spaces can generally be found closer to communities of color rather than white 
neighborhoods. Environmental racism, therefore, is not a specific and discrete action, but 
rather informs the distribution of environmental burdens in poor communities of color 
rather than in white communities across the metropolitan region. This was the case for 
eastern Washington, D.C., where white residents expressed animosity towards nearby 
blacks and prevented their free movement through the region. Whites occupied the more 
valuable tracts of land in the higher elevations while limiting black property owners to 
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less valuable and potentially unhealthy spaces in the marshes and floodplains closer to 
the riverbanks. Kenilworth and Barry Farms were two such spaces. 
 Historian Sylvia Hood Washington shows that the deep roots of racism in the 
laws, policies, and customs of the United States have informed not just the market value 
of black lands and white lands, but also where certain people could live, play, and work 
in metropolitan spaces since the country’s founding. Especially after industrialization, 
environmental burdens followed the customary segregation of American cities; whites 
would not tolerate such nuisances, and paths of resistance for people of color proved 
ineffective in the face of white privilege in the United States.42 Eventually, Hood 
contends, the white civic body justified the segregation and exclusion of nonwhites from 
society by claiming that they were, unclean or impure. In turn, then, nonwhite 
communities—isolated and ostracized from the civic body because of fears of alien 
uncleanliness—were picked by the white civic body to take on the polluted, noxious, and 
toxic industries and places because of their association with disease.43 The circular logic 
of disease and race played a significant role in shaping the development of the modern 
American city.  
 This sort of reasoning—that there was some connection between impure people 
(usually nonwhite residents) and unclean neighborhoods was commonplace during the 
Progressive period. This matters because Progressive Era ideas about the cleanliness of 
certain spaces informed the ways that the public housing program developed in 
Washington D.C. As demonstrated in the following chapter, the NCHA’s early efforts to 
remediate the unclean and unsanitary alleys of Washington were guided by Progressive 
ideas about race and cleanliness. As the NCHA received an expanded mandate to build 
public housing in 1938, it carried that ideology into its efforts. While new public housing 
complexes were indeed improvements over the alley dwellings, they also segregated 
mostly nonwhite residents far away and out of sight of the neighborhoods west of the 
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rivers. Hence, patterns of segregation and environmental racism that had existed in the 
downtown core of the District of Columbia prior to the Second World War were repeated 
on much grander scales after the conflict, as thousands of African Americans were moved 
into isolated and segregated complexes, some of which were cut off from the rest of the 
city by large, multi-lane highways and parkways. Furthermore, many of those complexes 
were located in environmentally sensitive areas, which placed a special burden on public 
housing tenants. During the 1940s and 1950s, the NCHA did not simply segregate 
Washington along racial lines, but also along environmental lines. When the mostly black 
residents of public housing were not dealing with the envirotechnical obstacles of the 
sites they lived on, they had to contend in some cases with smoke, fumes, ash, soot, and 
automobile emissions.  
 The placement of public housing, and its position near noxious or noisome 
infrastructures, speaks to the longstanding pattern of racial segregation in the American 
metropolis and the ways that environmental burdens map closely onto black 
communities. Although the NCHA may have hoped to use the open spaces across the 
rivers to improve the surroundings, and therefore the health of African Americans, in fact 
those communities were turned into dumpsites for the city’s environmental burdens. 
Kenilworth Courts was situated nearly adjacent to a large open-burn landfill. In addition, 
like Barry Farms and Sheridan Terrace, Kenilworth Courts was hemmed in by major 
roadways, which separated the complex from the rest of the neighborhood. The proximity 
of some of the complexes in eastern Washington to polluted sites rendered them blighted 
and dirty, despite the NCHA’s stated goals.  
 Carl Zimring adds historical as well as geographical breadth to the history of 
environmental racism in metropolitan spaces in his monograph Clean and White: A 
History of Environmental Racism in the United States. Zimring demonstrates that 
changing social perspectives among white Americans that saw foreigners, aliens, and 
nonwhite people as polluting the civic body correlated to similar ideas about the role of 
industrialization in polluting city spaces. For example, during the Progressive Era, new 
racial sciences categorized races in terms of health and purity. This analysis fell into 
general usage, and whites—who held the bulk of political and economic power across the 
United States—began to see themselves as cleaner, which was always defined in relation 
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to other unclean groups. Restrictions on homeownership and neighborhood occupancy 
reinforced both segregation and beliefs about the inherent cleanliness of whites. 
Occupations too became structured around these racial conceptions, as Asians, African 
Americans, and certain European immigrants were restricted to dirty jobs.44 These 
policies influenced the ways that metropolitan space was organized into the 1960s and 
1970s. As Zimring puts it, “[r]acial residential segregation intensified in the twentieth 
century, and waste handling and disposal businesses clustered in non-white residential 
areas.”45  
 Taken together, Washington and Zimring reveal how the circular logic of 
Progressive Era racial science worked to limit nonwhites to dirty and polluted sections of 
the metropolis, vis-à-vis white residents. Of course, there were paths of resistance that 
nonwhites could pursue, but, often, overarching economic or political circumstances 
rendered those efforts either futile or far less effective than those of white residents. For 
example, in Gary, Indiana, a cross-class and cross-racial coalition elected Richard 
Hatcher mayor in 1967. He became a spokesperson for the nascent environmental 
movement, choosing not to chide white voters for an environmentalism that ignored the 
environmental issues plaguing impoverished black voters, including “poor sanitation, 
crowded housing, and vermin.”46 Yet industry struck back against the mayor’s 
environmental agenda, exploiting divisions in Gary’s social fabric to convince the 
working and middle classes that environmental legislation could come at the cost of 
steady employment. After serving for nearly two decades as mayor Hatcher was unseated 
by a candidate who promised a friendlier relationship with U.S. Steel (later the USX 
Corporation), the top employer in Gary.47 This resulted in the retrenchment of racial and 
spatial divisions in the city, which ultimately maintained the unequal distribution of 
environmental burdens in black neighborhoods rather than white ones. While tactics of 
political resistance worked for a time in Gary, they were unable to forge a more equitable 
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environment for African Americans as corporate pressure consistently bore down on any 
environmental legislation. 
 Washington offers more examples of resistance in Packing Them In, including 
the efforts of the Chicago Urban League to recruit 163 city blocks and five public 
housing projects in a metropolitan conservation program.48 Yet the reader is left 
considering the immense difficulties that nonwhite residents faced in trying to address the 
structural, citywide, environmental racism that for decades had dictated which races lived 
where and what environmental features would be located in those neighborhoods. 
Considering the difficulties of enacting environmental reform at the metropolitan level in 
most cases of environmental racism, it seems that the most effective work towards 
remediation occurs within neighborhoods and blocks. Indeed, this mode of resistance 
plays out in my narrative, as some tenants worked to organize their complexes in the 
1980s and 1990s. Evidence of resistance to environmental deterioration among residents 
appeared in the case of Kenilworth Courts, where longtime tenant Kimi Gray organized a 
tenant management organization that helped push back against some of the 
environmental nuisances that residents experienced on a daily basis. Other forms of 
resistance come through interviews with the press and Congressional testimony.  
 Largely free to chart the course of public housing development along with other 
planning agencies, the NCHA both amplified the environmental inequalities that it found 
and expanded them across the metropolitan region. By building housing complexes like 
Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights—both black projects built on formerly black 
agricultural lands—the NCHA repeated the pattern that had existed since Reconstruction 
of allocating sensitive and somewhat marginal lands to African Americans, to the benefit 
of white property owners. The NCHA concentrated hundreds of families on these sites, 
where it was unable to adequately address the envirotechnical obstacles that undermined 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Furthermore, as it built housing in rapidly developing 
eastern Washington, D.C., it increasingly relied on the few open spaces available, which 
were often located near environmental nuisances.  
 Progressive Era ideas about housing, urban space, race, and the environment 
were bound together in ways that tied racial characteristics to certain spaces. Reformers 
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understood white communities to be cleaner than black communities. One solution—
which was put forward by Ihlder—was to simply remove poor African Americans from 
the city center and move them to neighborhoods that were designed to be less densely 
populated than the alleys and consisting of housing that would be appropriate for middle-
class residents. But those new homes were built in African American neighborhoods that 
were themselves products of racial and environmental segregation. By repeating the 
patters of black and white settlement throughout eastern Washington, D.C., the NCHA 
created an envirotechnical regime that conflicted with its pursuit of decent, safe, and 
sanitary housing. African American families who were moved out of the alleys 
confronted new sets of environmental burdens in some public housing complexes as a 
result of the surrounding landscape. The NCHA perpetuated patterns of environmental 
racism in the District of Columbia in the materials it chose and the sites it selected.  
 
The Historical Significance of Washington, D.C. 
 
 The federal capital has served as both a testing ground for new national policies 
and as a model city since it was first planned in the late-eighteenth century. Debates over 
the plan of the federal city in the 1790s were generally about how best to represent the 
United States, its system of government, and its ideals to individuals encountering the 
capital.  Ultimately, Pierre Charles L’Enfant designated two sites for buildings: a hill on 
top of which the meeting place for federal representatives would meet; and the 
President’s house, lined with gardens and fountains to welcome visitors. The plan for the 
City of Washington was meant to impart the ways that the United States tried to retain the 
local ideals of its system of government within the federal capital. The meeting place for 
local representatives and the inviting nature of the President’s home emphasized that the 
United States was a nation of citizens equal in stature, even though citizenship was highly 
circumscribed by contemporary standards. 
 The significance that Washington’s planners and residents attached to their 
surroundings remained throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a 1947 
editorial in The Washington Star, John Ihlder wrote about how visitors perceived the state 
of the capital. He compared the architectural beauty to the nearby blighted 
neighborhoods, stating that “[w]hen a visitor to Washington leaves Union Station, he gets 
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an inspiring view of the Capitol, symbol of a very great and a very rich nation…. But, 
almost at once, as he journeys to the center of the city, he gets glimpses of the edge of a 
slum which extends far to the north and west.”49 Similarly, in 1959 Jean White, a staff 
reporter for the Washington Post, expressed some of the anxieties that Washingtonians 
felt about Nikita Khrushchev’s pending visit. Unlike Ihlder’s imagined visitor, 
Khrushchev was real, and was being driven from east to west. White wrote that 
“Khrushchev will get a small slice of America without any decorative icing on his 25-
minute auto trip into the Nation’s Capital” along Suitland Parkway. She went on to 
mention the tidy middle-class homes and churches that lined the route before referencing 
some of the “slums and slum clearance projects” taking place in Southeast and Southwest 
Washington. White also noted that Khrushchev would be able to see “the still-
uncompleted public housing development, Sheridan Terrace.”50 White concludes by 
writing that Khrushchev’s trip would end with glimpses of the monumental edifices of 
downtown Washington and the National Mall. White clearly expressed some anxiety 
about the appearance of blight on Khrushchev’s route, but hoped that the appearance of 
buildings in the downtown section of the federal city would stand apart from some of the 
neglected communities in southern Washington.  
 Residents of Washington have long been invested in their city’s appearance. 
Washington was meant to both exemplify the successes of the American system of 
government and educate visitors about the virtues of that system. Public housing, 
therefore, was seen by most reformers as a way to bring certain neighborhoods up to the 
standards that the built environment of Washington, D.C. was supposed to project. Public 
housing advocates and planners often spoke of their goals by making reference to the 
ways that public housing, in tandem with urban renewal, could transform the cityscape by 
erasing the alley dwellings and inculcating proper moral and social values in the new 
residents of public housing projects. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, 
Washingtonians expressed anxiety about the proliferation of blighted alley communities 
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in the shadow of the Capital Building.51 Many of those same Washingtonians likely 
expected that public housing could remedy the blighted conditions that seemed, to those 
residents, especially out of place in the capital of the United States.  
 But Washington, D.C. is also a distinctive location for political reasons. One 
reason why the NCHA was such an influential force on the metropolitan landscape was 
because of the political power structure in Washington, D.C. Congress, consisting of 
elected representatives who were not beholden to the voters of the federal capital, could 
be a complicating factor in the NCHA’s plans. Legislators consistently allocated money 
to the NCHA for maintenance and operations during the postwar period, although its 
appropriations declined over time, as discussed in chapter one. Most of the pressure on 
the NCHA came from other metropolitan agencies, which influenced where it built and 
how much housing was needed, rather than from politicians. Political pressures shaped 
the outcomes of the NCHA’s work, but in ways that were different than in other cities, 
where local and state politicians clashed each other and with public housing planners.  
 The paradox that the NCHA’s tenants faced was their proximity to Congress—
which gave them the ability to testify directly to the federal government—and the 
simultaneous absence of a local government that could participate in the housing 
planning process.52 As Chris Myers Asch and George Derek Musgrove wrote in 
Chocolate City: A History of Race and Democracy in the Nation’s Capital, the District of 
Columbia in the mid-twentieth century was “the voteless capital of a democracy, a seat of 
government highly sensitive to shifts in national politics, a city situated in the South but 
torn politically between North and South.”53 Although living in the shadow of the 
Capital, the NCHA’s tenants were disenfranchised and were largely governed by the 
whims of Congress or—more often—its agents, like the NCHA. Public housing tenants 
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were, however, able to press their needs through activist organizations, which met with 
mixed success during the 1960s.54 Despite the absence of local and federal representation, 
by the 1960s residents of public housing were better able to confront the unelected 
leadership of the NCHA. As discussed below, part of their political education came from 




 The first two chapters are meant to set the stage for the work that the NCHA did 
in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The first chapter provides an institutional history of the 
NCHA until the mid-1950s. The purpose of that chapter is twofold. First, I intend to 
describe the ideological and institutional origins of the NCHA. By providing a brief 
biography of John Ihlder, I show how Progressive ideologies guided the early housing 
reform efforts of the Authority. Emerging first as the Alley Dwelling Authority (ADA), 
Ihlder intended to remove blighted communities and rehabilitate alleys across the District 
of Columbia. In 1938, the ADA was authorized to begin building public housing in 
tandem with its alley rehabilitation projects. The Second World War provided the ADA 
with an expanded mandate—to build housing across eastern Washington, D.C. to 
accommodate the influx of wartime workers—but also pressure from the United States 
Housing Authority to build quickly. This dual mandate shaped the NCHA’s ability to 
adequately account for envirotechnical obstacles at its housing sites. After the Second 
World War, the NCHA dealt with dwindling Congressional appropriations. By the late-
1950s, however, the Authority again had to construct housing to accommodate 
demographic shifts in the District of Columbia, as thousands of residents displaced by 
urban renewal sought new homes. Once again, the NCHA had a mandate to build housing 
on a large scale. It did not, however, have the funds necessary to adequately address 
envirotechnical constraints at its sites. 
                                                        
54 Ibid., 348. The 1960s marked a moment when residents of NCHA properties were better able to 
press their claims to a decent, safe, and sanitary environment. For one thing, the NCHA leadership 
changed. With Ihlder and Ring gone, the NCHA turned to Walter Washington. Douglas Martin, “Walter 
Washington, 88, Former Mayor of Washington, Dies,” The New York Times, October 28th, 2003. 
Washington was raised in the District of Columbia, and he was active in various community 
organizations before he took over the leadership of the NCHA. Ibid., 352. Furthermore, the Civil 




 The second chapter describes the landscape of eastern Washington, D.C. Rolling, 
rugged, and tree-lined, the terrain and topography of eastern Washington, D.C. had long 
limited private developers’ interest in housing construction. Smallholding black farmers 
had made most of the modifications to the landscape prior to the NCHA’s intervention. 
They built an envirotechnical regime capable of providing them with basic dietary 
staples. When the NCHA encountered that landscape in the early 1940s, they saw a 
location that lacked the modern amenities and infrastructures necessary to support decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. Chapter two concludes with a brief description of how the 
NCHA made sense of the landscape of eastern Washington, D.C. 
 The following chapters proceed roughly chronologically, focusing on five case 
studies: Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights, Highland Dwellings, Kenilworth Courts, and 
Sheridan Terrace. The first three complexes were built during and immediately after the 
Second World War. The latter two were built in the late-1950s, with some work 
continuing on Sheridan Terrace into 1960 and 1961. Although the conditions under 
which the NCHA planned and built its complexes during the war years and in the postwar 
period were in many ways different, the NCHA confronted similar problems in the siting 
and later management of the postwar complexes.  
 Chapter three focuses on Barry Farms. The history of the site reveals clearly the 
extent to which the NCHA’s work represented a rupture with past land uses and 
settlement patterns. Although it had been sparsely populated for generations prior to the 
NCHA’s work, within just two years the Authority transformed the site into a modern 
urban neighborhood. The process of doing so necessitated the overthrow of the previous 
envirotechnical regime. Between the Civil War and the 1940, the black farmers who had 
long lived in the area had arranged the streams, forests, and the level grounds that they 
could find to wrest a modest living from the landscape. The NCHA entered the region in 
1940, and developed an ambitious plan to strip many of the trees and re-grade much of 
the site in order to accomplish two goals. First, the new envirotechnical system that the 
NCHA was building was meant to support new housing on a scale large enough to relieve 
some of the pressure on existing city neighborhoods as a result of Washington’s 
demographic expansion. Second, the NCHA desired decent, safe, and sanitary housing. 
This meant that the homes needed modern infrastructures, but also plenty of greenspace. 
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Ultimately, the envirotechnical obstacles engendered by the site led to a substantial 
deterioration of the quality of the housing stock at Barry Farms. Soil did not stay in place, 
but slipped and ran-off during heavy rains. Gas lines failed as water pooled in the lower 
elevations of the buildings. Terraced slopes eroded, damaging both the local greenspace 
as well as the vistas that the NCHA hoped to engineer. The new envirotechnical system 
that the NCHA built was riven through with envirotechnical obstacles that deteriorated 
the quality of life and health of Barry Farm’s black residents. 
 Lincoln Heights experienced many of the same problems as those at Barry 
Farms. In chapter four I describe how the NCHA overthrew the previous envirotechnical 
regime built by local black farmers and built on top of it a new landscape, meant to 
support a large housing tract. During construction, however, the NCHA’s contractors 
noticed several material issues that would later plague the complex. In addition to erosion 
and soil slippage, Lincoln Heights also crumbled as rainwater penetrated the bitumen 
coating on the roofs. The gypsum boards that the contractors reluctantly used for building 
the complex’s roofs were not suitable for an area with such heavy seasonal rains. The 
material deficits of the Lincoln Heights complex—which were products of the wartime 
economy—amplified the role of the environment as it stressed the NCHA’s buildings. 
Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms both represent the dual envirotechnical obstacles of 
siting and materials. Combined, the transformation of the NCHA’s sites and the poor 
materials it used gave rise to the third envirotechnical obstacle: the large-scale movement 
of black families out of substandard alley dwellings and into substandard housing. The 
NCHA’s housing stock would continue to fall apart as materials failed and the site shifted 
and changed in response to natural and technological forces. Black families would be the 
ones to suffer from the failures of the NCHA’s new envirotechnical system. 
 In the fifth chapter I relate the history of Highland Dwellings. The Highland 
Dwellings complex suffered less from the first envirotechnical obstacle—that of siting—
and far more from the second, which was the critical failure of the materials used in its 
construction. The residents of Highland Dwellings—which was restricted to white 
families until 1953—suffered through a rash of fires in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, 
which claimed several lives. The press found that responsibility for the fires was not with 
the residents, but rather with the NCHA, which ignored the District of Columbia building 
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code at the time that Highland Dwellings was under construction. As was the case for 
Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights, the NCHA ignored the building code at Highland 
Dwellings because the FPHA requested that housing construction continue at a rapid clip. 
The failure of the materials within Highland Dwellings, and their inappropriate placement 
within the complex did not effectively mitigate fires or prevent their spread to adjacent 
apartments and buildings.55  
 Environmental historians consider fire to be a significant agent of historical 
change in urban areas. Fires have also offered opportunities for planners, engineers, and 
policymakers to rebuild parts of the city in ways that would prevent or mitigate future 
infernos. Highland Dwellings shows not just how the materials used in the wartime 
complexes allowed environmental forces—in this case, fire—to largely undermine the 
safety of dwelling units, but also how the NHCA turned away from major repairs or 
renovations in order to mitigate future disasters. The reasons for the NCHA’s restraint in 
the face of devastating conditions at Highland Dwellings are complex and explored 
throughout this dissertation. Yet, Highland Dwellings offers an example of the NCHA’s 
general inability to genuinely confront the envirotechnical obstacles at public housing 
complexes.  
 After chapter five, my narrative shifts into the postwar construction period. 
Kenilworth Courts, which constitutes the focus of the sixth chapter, is located in upper 
Northeast Washington, D.C., close to the banks of the Anacostia River. Its history clearly 
shows the legacy of environmental injustice that the black tenants of the NCHA routinely 
faced. Black residents in Kenilworth had long been restricted to the low-lying and marshy 
areas of the Kenilworth neighborhood, and the public housing complex there largely 
conformed to those historical patterns. More significant, however, was the NCHA’s 
decision to build Kenilworth Courts nearly adjacent to an open burn landfill. In 1968, 
after the death of a local child in one of the afternoon trash burns the District of 
Columbia’s sanitary engineers finally decided to close the antiquated dump. After doing 
so, the city worked to turn the former dumpsite into a city park. This process, however, 
disturbed the residents of Kenilworth Courts as the smoldering incinerator ash that was 
                                                        
55 As described in chapter three, the NCHA built Lincoln Heights with a simple asbestos sheet 
between units, as opposed to the masonry wall called for in the District of Columbia building code. 
Asbestos could not withstand the intense heat and size of the fires at Highland Dwellings. 
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used to landscape the park was first deposited almost adjacent to their homes. The history 
of Kenilworth Courts clearly demonstrates that even as the NCHA envisioned its purpose 
as providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing, the sites that it selected were themselves 
products of a long historical linkage between African Americans and insalubrious 
environments. Although the NCHA hoped to rectify those circumstances, it in fact 
perpetuated the historical environmental burden placed upon black Washingtonians. 
 In chapter seven, I focus once again on the envirotechnical obstacles engendered 
by siting. Sheridan Terrace, which is the subject of that chapter, was built well after the 
wartime restrictions on building materials passed. It was designed as a series of large 
apartment complexes, sinuously aligned along Suitland Parkway, which had been built 
over a covered sewer during the 1940s. Despite the improved material circumstances of 
the postwar period, Sheridan Terrace experienced many of the same problems as Barry 
Farms and Lincoln Heights. Inside of the complex, floors and walls became warped and 
plaster fell from the ceiling. Outside, the terraces around the buildings slowly eroded. A 
soil mechanics expert who the NCHA invited to assess the construction found evidence 
of slippage at one of the buildings. The accumulated damage that stemmed from the local 
environmental pressures meant that the residents of Sheridan Terrace came to live in 
unsanitary and deteriorating homes.  
 In addition to the envirotechnical obstacles posed by the siting of Sheridan 
Terrace, residents contended with automotive exhaust from the Suitland Parkway, which 
ran adjacent to their homes. The Parkway was a heavily trafficked corridor through 
Southeast Washington. This meant that Sheridan Terrace, like the other complexes 
described in this dissertation, contributed to the balance of environmental burdens 
weighing on poor black Washingtonians. The envirotechnical obstacles that the NCHA 
encountered undermined its ability to provide decent, safe, or sanitary housing to its 






Reconciling Changing Political and Economic Realities: A Brief History of the 
NCHA and its Efforts to Build Decent, Safe, and Sanitary Housing in the Mid-
Twentieth Century 
 
 The National Capital Housing Authority was first established as the Alley 
Dwelling Authority in 1934.56 John Ihlder, who would serve as the first chair of the ADA 
and the NCHA until 1952, was a prominent housing reform activist. This chapter will 
explore Ihlder’s early life and works as a means to understand the ideology that guided 
the NCHA’s work. Decent, safe, and sanitary was not simply a motto; it was a way of 
perceiving good housing versus poor housing. For Ihlder and his fellow housing 
reformers, good housing was more than just the provision of decent homes. They saw 
housing as inextricable from its surroundings. Ihlder was interested less in simply 
building homes than furnishing new neighborhoods. By revealing what exactly Ihlder 
meant by decent, safe, and sanitary, the environmental stresses that the NCHA grappled 
with—and their role in undermining the goals of the NCHA planners and the vision of its 
founder—become much clearer. 
 This chapter also provides a brief overview of some of the early institutional and 
political relationships that would later constrain the NCHA’s ability to respond to 
envirotechnical obstacles at its complexes. The Authority’s relationship with Congress, 
the RLA, and the National Capital Parks and Planning Commission were important 
factors that contoured the achievements and limitations of the public housing program in 
Washington, D.C.57 According to the envirotechnical model, the contests among different 
bureaucracies over the transformation of the metropolitan landscape during and after the 
war years were significant aspects of the operation of the envirotechnical system. For the 
NCHA, its changing relationships with Congress and other local and federal agents of 
urban renewal determined how effectively it could address envirotechnical obstacles at its 
sites. 
                                                        
56 Alley Dwelling Act of 1934, Public Law 207, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 12th, 1934), U.S. Statutes at 
Large 465, 930. 
57 Congress established the National Capital Parks and Planning Commission in 1926 to oversee all 
planning activities in the District of Columbia. See Frederick Gutheim, Worthy of the Nation: The 





A Progressive’s Progress: John Ihlder Encounters the Housing Reform Movement, 1900-
1934 
 
 John Ihlder was the primary author of the ADA’s enabling legislation. He had 
spent his early career involved in a number of housing activist organizations, usually in 
leadership positions. New Deal housing organizations were full of reformers who had cut 
their teeth in Progressive Era movements. Mary Kingsbury Simkovich, for example, 
emerged from the Settlement Movement of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries to become the head of the National Public Housing Conference, which pushed 
for a national public housing program in the earliest days of Roosevelt’s first 
administration.58 Like Simkovich, Ihlder’s work throughout the 1910s and 1920s shaped 
the way that he built the District of Columbia’s housing program.59  
 The young Ihlder first became interested in housing reform in 1900, when he 
graduated from Cornell University and took a job as a reporter for The New York Evening 
Sun, covering housing in New York City. After he interviewed famed social reformer and 
documentarian Jacob Riis, Ihlder decided to become more involved in housing issues.60 
By 1911, Ihlder was the Secretary of the National Housing Committee, and arranged for 
speakers like Jane Addams—a prominent social worker, activist, and founder of the 
                                                        
58 Gail Radford, Modern Housing for America: Policy Struggles in the New Deal Era (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 89. The Settlement Movement emerged in the last years of the 
nineteenth century of the US as an attempt, among private citizens, to bridge the yawning gap 
between the economic, social, and medical conditions of the poor and more prosperous citizens. 
Settlement homes often provided social services and instruction for poor immigrants. See Michelle 
Chen, “From Windows to Gateways on the Lower East Side: The Henry Street Settlement from the 
Progressive Era to the Great Society,” The Historian 75, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 760-780. 
59 The idea that a line runs through the Progressive, New Deal, and postwar eras is not a new one. 
Robyn Muncy traced the continuities among those periods though the life and work of Josephine 
Roche, who became the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under Franklin Roosevelt’s 
administration after implementing pro-labor policies as the majority shareholder in a Colorado coal 
company. Roche made important contributions to New Deal era health and welfare policies, which 
were implemented, partially, under the Johnson administration’s Great Society program. See Robyn 
Muncy, Relentless Reformer: Josephine Roche and Progressivism in Twentieth-Century America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
60 Eve L. Barsoum, “Colonial Georgetown: The Power of Myth,” in Re-Creating the American Past: 
Essays on the Colonial Revival, ed. Richard Guy Wilson (Charlottesville and London: University of 
Virginia Press), 185. Most of what is preserved about John Ihlder’s personal life refers to his zeal for 
housing reform. Colleagues left few memories in print that did not pertain to his professional life. My 
research revealed one photograph, attached to his obituary, that shows a man who could easily be 
confused for any other bureaucrat brought to the District of Columbia during the New Deal.  
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Settlement Movement in the United States—to visit the Committee.61 In his obituary, The 
Washington Post stated “John Ihlder…was almost synonymous with public housing in 
the Washington area. After serving as field secretary for the National Housing 
Association and organizing housing movements in Philadelphia, Boston, and Pittsburgh 
he came to Washington in the depths of the great depression with a burning zeal for 
wiping out its slums.”62   
 After traveling throughout the northeastern United States helping to establish 
housing reform organizations, Ihlder finally made his way to the federal capital. He 
settled into a comfortable row house on P Street NW in Georgetown, and immediately 
began making significant contributions to the legislative history of public housing. He 
acted as “the principal author of the Washington Alley Dwelling Act,” which was signed 
into law by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1934. That law would empower the ADA—
among the nation’s first urban renewal agencies—to re-plat streets, demolish substandard 
dwellings, and to care for the residents of those alleys  “in the interest of public health, 
comfort, morals, safety, and welfare.”63 Ihlder would serve as the head of the ADA and 
its successor agency, the NCHA, for eighteen years. Through his efforts, Ihlder bridged 
the ideological and political foundations of Progressive Era housing reform efforts to the 
institutional and physical workings of the New Deal and post-Second World War housing 
authorities. He was a guiding force behind the operation of the NCHA from 1934 until 
1952.64 
 When the Alley Dwelling Authority was first authorized in 1934, it was given a 
fairly specific mandate to simply clean the alleys and to demolish or rehabilitate 
insufficient alley homes.65 The law reflected Congress’s apprehension about allowing a 
                                                        
61 Letter from Jane Addams to John Ihlder, October 18th, 1911; Jane Addams Digital Collection, 
Ramapo College of New Jersey, https://digital.janeaddams.ramapo.edu/items/show/9859 (accessed 
March 5th, 2020). 
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63 District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Act of 1934. 
64 “John Ihlder,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 21st, 1958. 
65 For background literature on the alley rehabilitation movement in Washington, DC, see: James 
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39 
public agency to build housing. When the bill first mentions housing construction, buried 
on the second page after several stipulations and rules, it stated that the ADA could, 
through low-interest loans, promote home construction, but the agency was not permitted 
to contract out projects on its own.66 Thus the ADA’s first forays into housing 
construction were small in scale. Generally, the ADA concerned itself with improving the 
conditions of blighted areas by rehabilitating a few homes in scattered sites.  
 But the ADA’s approach to alley clearance was not simply a cosmetic issue. It 
approached its work through the ideological lens of earlier Progressive reform efforts. A 
number of different sources contributed to the mainstream of housing ideology in the 
early twentieth century. The urbanist Alexander von Hoffman lists among those 
intellectual currents ideas about “the formation of individual character, the importance of 
home life, spiritual redemption, the nature of poverty, the causes of crime and vice, and 
the sources of disease[,]” which converged to give rise to a “moral environmentalist 
approach to the urban poor.”67 This vision tied housing intimately to its surroundings, 
elevating the issue from one of proper housekeeping and property upkeep to one of 
improving the health and vitality of whole blocks and neighborhoods. To Progressive 
reformers like Ihlder, the home was not separate from its surroundings. To save the city 
and preserve its neighborhoods, the local government had to be empowered to coordinate 
development on at least a neighborhood scale. 
 Within this moral environmentalist outlook, the slum or blighted community 
threatened the health of the surrounding neighborhoods. In Progressive reformers’ minds, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Landscapes: Explorations in Slumland, eds. Alan Mayne and Tim Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); James S. Paige and Margaret M. Reuss, Safe, Decent, and Affordable: Citizen 
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Borchert, 13; Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, Discontinuance of Dwellings in the 
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66 District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Act of 1934. 
67 Alexander von Hoffman, “The Origins of American Housing Reform,” Joint Center for Housing 
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blight was connected to vice, delinquency, and disease. As blight spread it carried those 
asocial and insalubrious qualities to the rest of the urban environment. By 1936, as the 
federal government debated the contours of a national housing program, the slum was 
well defined by housing reform activists. Von Hoffman quotes James Ford, a professor at 
Harvard University during the 1930s, when he stated that “[t]he slum is a residential 
area…in which the housing is so deteriorated, so substandard or so unwholesome as to be 
a menace to the health, safety, morality, or welfare of the occupants.”68  “Ford’s 
definition[,]” von Hoffman writes, “contained a striking assumption that a man-made 
physical environment, the slum, had the power to influence many aspects of the human 
condition, including both physical well-being and social behavior. The definition 
identified poor housing as the root cause of the deleterious residential environment and, 
by implication, called for housing reform to counter the threats that the environment 
posed.”69 Housing reform, in the minds of New Deal era planners, had the ability to also 
dramatically transform neighborhoods. By removing the alley dwellings, Washington’s 
reformers hoped to salvage and improve the appearance of surrounding areas, which 
could then instill better morals and health in the local populations.  
 It is important to note that despite the planners’ declared interest in alleviating 
the plight of poor residents of the District of Columbia, their brand of reform was heavily 
paternalistic. The roots of paternalistic approaches to urban reform stretch deep into the 
early nineteenth century, and were shared across the English-speaking world. For 
example, in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, wealthy and civic-minded urbanites were 
caught up in enthusiasm for washing the bodies of the poor. As water systems 
proliferated across the United States, reformers viewed dirty bodies as inherently harmful 
to the health and wellbeing of the urban whole. Reformers also saw dirt as corrupting and 
dangerous to the health of the social body. Hence, washing the bodies of the poor and 
cleaning dirty parts of the city were healthful for the moral and physical health of the 
individual and society at large.70 Over successive decades, the complex connections that 
reformers drew between bodies, dirt, blight, and crime melded into the moral 
environmentalist ideas of Progressive reformers. 
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 Ihlder had been steeped in this moral environmentalist outlook as a consequence 
of his formative years reporting on, and getting involved with, philanthropic housing 
reform efforts. His later writings revealed the extent to which he had been steeped in the 
prevailing reform ideology. For example, referring to a project to construct garages in 
some of the Capital’s blighted alleys, Ihlder wrote that the “projects were an expression 
of the Authority’s desire to test the theory of removing rot spots in otherwise good 
neighborhoods[.]” “So in these instances”, the report continues, “it merely cut out the 
rotten core, hoping that the sounder areas would care for themselves.”71 Ihlder’s vision 
was to dramatically remake portions of the city. Since he would eventually have to seek 
out land that was rolling, hilly, and forested, his efforts would also engender significant 
envirotechnical obstacles, considering the scale of the projects he would oversee.  
 
From the ADA to the NCHA: The New Deal, World War Two, and New Directions in 
Washington’s Housing Program, 1938-1945 
 
 By the time of the New Deal period, the paternalistic approach lingered in 
municipal policy, as Ihlder’s remarks reflect. But during the preceding decades, reformers 
wed the paternalistic thinking of Progressivism to a technocratic faith in expertise. The 
planners of the NCHA and other local and national projects during the 1930s and 1940s 
were increasingly divorced from the concerns of local communities, and more interested 
in sweeping programs and projects. The New Deal empowered them to take up those 
tasks. Without any local policymakers to contest its vision, the ADA—and later, the 
NCHA—would be uniquely positioned relative to other urban renewal agencies and 
public housing authorities to roll out its siting and planning in the late-1930s and 1940s.  
                                                        




An excerpt from the National Capital Housing Authority’s ten-year report to Congress, published in 1944. 
The caption for this image—which was a part of a brief pictorial history of the NCHA’s work between 
1934 and 1944—captures the way that Ihlder thought about the spread of blighted conditions. National 
Capital Housing Authority, Report of the National Capital Housing Authority for the Ten-Year Period 
1934-1944 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1944), 218. 
 
 The first legislative step towards the large-scale projects of the 1940s came in 
1938, when Congress passed an amendment to the authorizing legislation for the ADA. 
Prior to that amendment, “the Authority could not build housing on the less expensive 
outlying sites, but was confined to the built-up sections of the city and was therefore 
dependent upon private builders to provide elsewhere for the overflow population from 
densely populated areas[.]”72 Furthermore, the ADA could only pursue smaller projects 
because it had a Congressional allocation of $500,000, equivalent to a little more than 
$9.5 million in 2019. Also, prior to 1938, Congress considered the ADA to be more of an 
urban renewal agency, which worked to reclaim blighted communities. Providing 
housing was not its primary objective, despite John Ihlder’s hopes and intentions. 
Therefore, between 1934 and 1938, the Authority’s directors worked to expand the 
organization’s mandate and budget.73  
 In 1937, Congress passed the Wagner-Steagall Act. It allowed states and 
localities across the country to build low-income public housing with federal funding and 
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73 Ibid., 25-33. 
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assistance.74 The law’s preamble stated explicitly that part of its goal was to remedy “the 
acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower income[.]”75 
Wagner-Steagall was a marked departure from earlier housing construction efforts, which 
often relied on philanthropic donations from private citizens and were small in scale, 
perhaps consisting of a city block.76 The problem for the ADA, however, was that it was 
not considered to be a public housing authority, and so the newly available federal funds 
were not released to Ihlder and his planners. So, between 1937 and 1938, Ihlder and his 
board worked with Nathan Straus, the son of the founder of Macy’s Department Store 
and the first head of the United States Housing Authority, and Congress to amend the 
1934 Alley Dwelling Act in the hopes of allowing the ADA to function as a public 
housing organization. All the while, Roosevelt granted the ADA emergency funds 
through executive orders issued to the Public Works Administration.77 In 1938, Congress 
passed the proposed amendments, allowing the ADA to function as Ihlder had intended. 
According to the NCHA’s first ten-year report, “[t]he approval of the 
amendments…meant that the Authority must immediately plan a considerably expanded 
program.”78 
 The first project that the NCHA undertook with its new and expanded mandate 
was the Fort Dupont project, on “a rugged, hilly, and heavily wooded site of 
approximately 60 acres” on East Capital Street across the Anacostia River from 
downtown Washington.79 The ADA would go on to build four other projects prior to the 
United States’ entry into the Second World War. Two were in Navy Yard, in a built-up 
section of the city’s waterfront. One was in a still fairly undeveloped section of 
Northwest D.C., near Howard University and the African American neighborhoods along 
North Capital Street and Florida Avenue. The last, the Frederick Douglass Dwellings, 
were built just about a mile to the south of Fort Dupont in eastern Washington. All told, 
the pace of construction prior to 1941 was much slower than it would be during the war. 
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This was in part because in late-1941, Congress authorized the ADA to begin building 
housing for wartime workers in the nation’s capital.80 Ultimately, between 1935 and 1945 
the NCHA had built homes for 7,577 low-income families.81 
 By 1942 housing planners in the District of Columbia and the surrounding 
counties in Maryland and Virginia had made a good deal of progress on housing 
construction. This was partially a function of the numerous different agencies that had 
been empowered to construct housing for defense industry workers as a result of the 
Lanham Act. The Department of the Navy, the FPHA, and the Alley Dwelling Authority, 
among other agencies, participated in wartime housing construction. The new 
developments were meant “to ease Washington’s serious shortage of homes for 
families.”82 Most of the Alley Dwelling Authority’s projects, as opposed to those of the 
Departments of War and the Navy, were permanent homes, meant to last after the end of 
military conflict abroad.
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This map shows new public housing developments being constructed in 1942. From The Washington Post, 
October 25th, 1942. Permanent housing is marked with a square, whereas temporary housing is shown with 
diamonds. Triangles and circles denote dormitory-style housing. Almost all of the housing east of the rivers 
was supposed to be permanent. 
 
 The ADA was responsible for the construction of at least twenty-five public 
housing complexes across the city of Washington during the first two years of the war. 
Those complexes were expected to house, in total, 5,459 families to ease the stress that 
the city’s rapidly growing population placed on the housing market.83 Between 1930 and 
1950, the number of residents of the District of Columbia swelled from 486,869 to 
                                                        
83 Figure derived from image above. See Ibid. 
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802,178.84 The population of the nation’s capital, then, increased by 60.7% between 1930 
and 1950. Reformers in the capital had long considered the private rental housing stock 
for impoverished residents inadequate. The ADA had to acquire land, and acquire it 
quickly, to house the growing population of the District of Columbia. Eastern 
Washington, D.C. offered swaths of land that lacked concentrated developments and 
large numbers of people.  
 The spate of construction during the Second World War marked two turning 
points in the history of the NCHA. First, with a mandate to build homes en masse, the 
NCHA was able to speedily acquire sites and begin the necessary work to make them 
suitable for public housing. This marked the rise of significant envirotechnical obstacles 
to the NCHA’s program. The NCHA purchased sites that were across the Anacostia, on a 
rolling and rugged landscape that had numerous creeks and gullies running throughout. 
The region was also far more forested than much of western Washington, D.C., owning 
to its uneven terrain, and sparsely populated. As anthropologist Brett Williams writes, 
“[t]he residents of Barry Farms/Hillsdale could have lived in only a few rural outposts in 
the District of Columbia beyond its suffocating Black Belt[.]”85 By 1940, Suitland 
Parkway had segregated the undeveloped Barry Farms community from the more 
populated Hillsdale area.86 Ihlder was well aware of the topographical difficulties of the 
region. Commenting on Lincoln Heights, he stated in a letter to a colleague that  
 
Lincoln Heights is illustrative [of the difficulties] of constructing public housing. 
The site was suggested to us by the NCP&PC because, due to topography, land 
division, street layout, land titles, etc., it was impracticable for private 
development.87 
                                                        
84 Tables showing the population of the 100 largest cities in the United States from 1840 to 1990 are 
available online. See Cambell Gibson, “Population of the 100 Largest Cities and other Urban Places in 
the United States: 1790 to 1990,” Population Division Working Paper No. 27, Population Division, U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 
https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html (accessed 
September 25th, 2019). 
85 Williams, 417. 
86 Ibid., 420. 
87 John Ihlder to the Members of the National Capital Housing Authority, February 5th, 1945; Lincoln 
Heights Dwellings 1943-1945, Box 1, Entry P 23: Records Regarding Public Housing Dwellings, 1943-




The NCHA would have to grade and terrace its sites to accommodate housing on the 
scale that Ihlder desired and to conform with his vision for decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing. It built many of those projects in environmentally sensitive areas near the 
Anacostia River, or on rolling hills further to the east. Those areas happened to be in or 
near predominantly black neighborhoods.  
 The second turning point had to do with problems of political economy during a 
major and prolonged military crisis. The Second World War strained domestic supply 
chains, and the NCHA was forced to build with less suitable materials. Ultimately, the 
poor functioning of the materials that the Authority acquired for its wartime projects led 
to the deterioration of its dwelling units. Furthermore, the NCHA’s decision to ignore the 
District of Columbia building code—with the support of the FPHA—for its Barry Farms, 
Lincoln Heights, and Highland Dwellings facilities, and to avoid bringing outside experts 
in to assess the environmental qualities of the sites, meant that the NCHA would face two 
significant envirotechnical obstacles after the war. 
 The material situation during the Second World War was compounded by a 
changing financial situation for the NCHA. Until 1938, Congress directly appropriated 
funds to the ADA. Between 1934 and 1938, the Authority received a total of $500,000 
from the legislature and $365,496.80 from the President’s emergency funds.88 The money 
was intended for alley rehabilitation, since the ADA had not yet been authorized to build 
low-income housing.89 Although the Authority was allowed to disburse the funds as it 
saw fit, in order to demonstrate the practicability of alley rehabilitation the ADA treated 
the funds as low-interest loans, to be repaid at three percent interest. The ADA intended 
to use the revenue it received from the sale of rehabilitated properties to pay back its 
“loan”. Ultimately, the ADA was nearly able to repay the principal, but could not pay the 
interest.90 
                                                        
88 National Capital Housing Authority, 178. $865,496.80 in 1938 would be worth a little less than $16 
million in 2020. 
89 Funding for alley rehabilitation fell under Title I of the Alley Dwelling Act. The revised Alley 
Dwelling Act of 1938 would include Title II or the low-income housing construction part of the ADA’s 
responsibilities. Money was allocated separately for the two programs. 
90 National Capital Housing Authority, 178. 
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 The 1938 revisions to the original Alley Dwelling Act that allowed the Authority 
to build low-income housing unlocked a new source of funding: the United States 
Housing Authority. The USHA provided loans to localities across the country that began 
starting their own public housing programs. The ADA was approved for loans totaling 
$15,063,000, plus an additional $1,743,000 for Langston Terrace from the Public Works 
Administration.91 Under the Lanham Act, for the years 1940-1944, the ADA was granted 
an additional $19,014,000 in loans from the USHA.92 
 Clearly, the ADA had a greatly expanded budget as it entered the 1940s. This 
budget conditioned the scale of the NCHA’s envirotechnical program. It was given a 
mandate to build on a far larger scale than it had previously, and access to the funds to do 
so. Despite these new advantages, the NCHA also faced pressure to work quickly, which 
placed stress on the Authority’s staff to perform necessary preparatory work.  
 Ihlder mentioned that his staff was under great pressure in his ten-year report to 
Congress.93 For one thing, Ihlder confronted the question of how was the NCHA to 
handle a massive building program with such a small staff. The answer, Ihlder found, was 
to look to other federal and local offices to assist in its work. The NCHA would be 
responsible for finding sites, appraising them, and ensuring that the economic 
development of the sites was in accordance with sound city planning and good housing 
policy. The USHA would ensure that the economical development of the site was in 
compliance with the US Housing Act of 1937. The National Capital Parks and Planning 
Commission (NCPPC) would make sure that the NCHA’s plans conformed to the general 
plan for the District of Columbia. Finally, the Board of Commissioners of the District of 
Columbia would inspect the site to ensure that the NCHA conformed to all rules about 
land use, public services, construction and building code, drainage, sanitary services, 
street and highway grading, gas lines, electrical lines, structural design, structural 
materials, and plumbing.94 Of the four agencies involved in assessing the NCHA’s plans 
and construction—including the NCHA itself, which was responsible for selecting the 
                                                        
91 $15,063,000 in 1938 would be worth about $275 million in 2020. 
92 $19,014,000 in 1940 would be worth about $348 million in 2020. The ADA’s figures come from its 
ten-year report. See National Capital Housing Authority, Report of the National Capital Housing 
Authority for the Ten-Year Period 1934-1944 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1944), 1. 
93 Ibid., 32. 
94 Ibid., 35-36. 
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sites and materials that would surround and constitute public housing—the Board of 
Commissioners was responsible for inspecting the envirotechnical development of public 
housing sites.  
 Yet during the Second World War the Board of Commissioners played a very 
small role in the NCHA’s projects. At its three wartime developments, the NCHA 
ignored the District of Columbia building code, and did not allow its inspectors to visit 
public housing sites. The FPHA backed up the NCHA as it resisted the Board in order to 
ensure continued progress at its housing sites. Therefore the officials who were most 
responsible for monitoring and inspecting the development of a new envirotechnical 
regime in eastern Washington, D.C. were barred from doing so. Construction and grading 
would proceed only under the eyes of the NCHA and its contractors. Ccorrespondence 
between the two, as well as Ihlder’s public reports, revealed the scale of the 
envirotechnical obstacles that the Authority faced. Even with its increased funding, in its 
pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing, the NCHA encountered significant 
envirotechnical obstacles. The pressure that the FPHA placed on the NCHA to build, and 
its role in blocking inspections from the Board of Commissioners, hampered the NCHA’s 
ability to redress and mitigate the effects of those obstacles. 
 
Postwar Housing Construction: Urban Renewal and the Development of Eastern 
Washington, D.C. 
 
 The end of the Second World War altered the context in which the NCHA 
administered its envirotechnical program. The model that I employ in the chapters that 
follow center the functioning of the hybridized landscape of public housing. On those 
landscapes, the environment was an active agent of historical change; political and 
economic issues developments shaped the NCHA’s ability to respond to environmental 
changes. After the Second World War, the political pressures on the NCHA to build 
housing abated at the same time that better materials became more widely available. This 
did not result in better quality housing. Instead, siting remained a significant 
envirotechnical obstacle to the NCHA’s program. Kenilworth Courts, although not 
exhibiting the structural problems that plagued other complexes, was built nearly adjacent 
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to an open-burn dump. Its residents suffered from the smoke, soot, and ash that drifted 
from the trash heaps as they were burned. Sheridan Terrace was built after much of 
Southeast DC had been developed. Like Kenilworth Courts, its residents suffered from 
smoke—in this case, exhaust from passing automobiles on Suitland Parkway. Sheridan 
Terrace also exhibited structural issues that would have been familiar to residents of the 
wartime projects: flooding, erosion, and leaking buildings. 
 Siting remained an envirotechnical obstacle in the postwar period for a few 
reasons. For one thing, the NCHA had successfully helped to transform much of eastern 
Washington, D.C. into an urban area that resembled the rest of the city. Residential 
neighborhoods, commercial strips, and industrial zones along the Anacostia River 
replaced many of the small agricultural communities nestled in the hills and valleys of the 
region. This meant, however, that space was at a premium, and less available as years 
went by. This was not too much of a problem for the NCHA during the mid-1950s. 
Ihlder’s retirement in 1952 and the end of the war seven years prior had slowed the pace 
of construction. But after Berman v. Parker opened the floodgates of urban renewal in 
1954, the NCHA once again had a mandate to build housing on a large scale. Thousands 
of residents were to be displaced from the SURA alone, and most could not afford to seek 
private rentals. Hence, the NCHA looked for sites on which to build, but encountered 
spaces that were far from ideal. The institutional relationship between the RLA and the 
NCHA helps explain, in part, why the NCHA scavenged for sites in the late-1950s. 
 Furthermore, the NCHA’s financial situation in the late-1950s was different than 
it had been during the war years. The NCHA increasingly relied on bond issuances for 
new developments, rather than direct loans from the federal government.95 Congress also 
restricted its appropriations to the NCHA. From 1934-1938, the Appropriations 
Committee had allocated $500,000 to the Authority. During that period, the ADA was 
allowed only to rehabilitate existing alleys, not to build new housing. Between 1945 and 
1961, Congress allocated a total of $598,290 for the operation and maintenance of 
                                                        
95 National Capital Housing Authority, Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended on June 30th, 1962 
(Washington: G.P.O., 1962), 24. By 1962, as a result of bond issuances, the NCHA had a total 
indebtedness of $67,555,000, equivalent to about $573,500,000. 
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existing properties.96 By 1962, the NCHA was in charge of forty-six properties across the 
District of Columbia.97 The financial constraints that the Authority encountered in the 
postwar period would significantly undermine the NCHA’s ability to respond to 
envirotechnical obstacles at its sites. 
 As opposed to the history of some other public housing authorities, the history of 
the NCHA is marked by continuity in the vision of its leadership. John Ihlder left his post 
in 1952 on good terms and was succeeded by James Ring, who had long facilitated the 
operation of the Authority and was in a good place to pursue the types of developments 
that Ihlder had long promoted. Ring, in turn, was succeeded by Walter Washington in 
1961, who had long worked within the NCHA and was familiar with the deep social and 
economic fractures between different groups in Washington, D.C.98 In Chicago, on the 
other hand, the racial and economic reforms that the Chicago Housing Authority’s first 
leader, Elizabeth Wood, pursued were abandoned after the Authority was brought under 
the control of the city council.99 The NCHA was marked by a consistent vision and a 
legacy of leadership that was cultivated under John Ihlder. Thus the postwar and wartime 
projects were understood and largely planned in similar ways.100  
 There were more similarities than differences in the planning and construction 
that took place in the 1940s and 1950s, even as the external pressures of institutional 
politics and finances changed. Each of the following chapters takes care to describe not 
just the different environmental conditions of each of the complexes bur also their 
                                                        
96 All of the budget figures are available from FRASER, a product of the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Branch, which compiled historical US budget. See FRASER, Budget of the United States Government, 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/budget-united-states-government-54?browse (accessed May 14th, 
2020). The federal government did contribute substantial sums to the NCHA for debt services during 
the same period. 
97 National Capital Housing Authority, Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended on June 30th, 1962, 27. 
98 Douglas Martin, “Walter Washington, 88, Former Mayor of Washington, Dies,” The New York Times, 
October 28th, 2003. Washington was born in the District of Columbia. His first job after obtaining his 
law degree was with the National Capital Housing Authority, where he would have worked under 
John Ihlder for about four years. Washington would helm the NCHA for five years between 1961 and 
1966, before President Lyndon Johnson appointed him to serve as the President of the Board of 
Commissioners. Washington would later work as the Chairman of the New York City Housing 
Authority before returning to the District of Columbia when Johnson appointed him to the position of 
Mayor-Commissioner.  
99 Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 238. 
100 Sheridan Terrace is an outlier in this history, however, because it consisted of a series of large 
apartment buildings. Still, it was planned and designed according to principles that resonated with 
those for the earlier complexes. 
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histories as the NCHA built and administered a new envirotechnical system in eastern 
Washington, D.C. First, however, it is necessary to describe the landscape that the NCHA 








Hills, Valleys, and Creeks: The Historical Landscape of Eastern Washington, D.C. 
 
 Until the 1940s, eastern Washington, D.C. was less densely populated than its 
counterpart on the opposite side of the Anacostia. There were a few neighborhoods 
nestled among the hills and ravines, and St. Elizabeth’s hospital stood on a ridge 
overlooking the Anacostia River, but the NCHA, in partnership with the National Park 
Service and the National Capital Parks and Planning Committee would be the main 
drivers of urban development in the region beginning in the 1930s and 1940s.101 
Smallholding families and individuals played the primary role in transforming large 
sections of eastern Washington before that period. With some exceptions, developers 
showed little interest in the area until after the Second World War, by which time the 
NCHA and other agencies had extended infrastructure deeper into the region. The 
NCHA’s efforts to modify parts of the landscape to accommodate public housing and to 
build out the necessary infrastructures to support large housing developments were key 
parts of the postwar transformation of eastern Washington, D.C. 
 
Tidal Flats and Wooded Ridges: The Different Geographies of Western and Eastern 
Washington, D.C. 
 
 Most tourists and visitors to the District of Columbia are familiar with the flat 
landscape of the National Mall and the numerous museums, galleries, and federal offices 
lining the park. Heading north from the Mall, the city remains remarkably level until 
Florida Avenue. The curving and crooked street defies the neat plan that Pierre L’Enfant 
submitted to President George Washington on June 22nd, 1791.102 The reason for Florida 
Avenue’s distinctive shape is that it marks the former boundary between the City and the 
County of Washington. That boundary was more than political; in fact, Florida Avenue 
                                                        
101 St. Elizabeth’s Hospital opened in 1855, one year after the construction of Uniontown. Years later, 
Dr. Charles Nichols reminisced about the opening ceremony “on a wooded ridge overlooking the city 
of Washington.” See: Thomas Otto, St. Elizabeth’s Hospital: A History (Washington, D.C.: United States 
General Services Administration, National Capital Region, 2013), 1. St. Elizabeth’s was an in-patient 
psychiatric hospital. 
102 Frederick Gutheim, Worthy of the Nation: The History of Planning for the National Capital 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977), 28. 
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runs along the base of the Wicomico-Sunderland escarpment, which once represented a 
prohibitive geological barrier to further development in the north.103 At that point, the 
elevation increases drastically over the course of just a few yards. 
 
 
A topographical map of Washington with Florida Avenue NW labeled in the middle of the image. The map 
contours represent ten-foot changes in elevation. Note how north of Florida Avenue the elevation increases 
dramatically. Map acquired from Open Data D.C., “Topography - 10 Foot Contours,” 
https://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/topography-10-foot-contours (accessed January 11th, 2020). 
 
 To the west and north of the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers, respectively, the 
District of Columbia includes one dramatic change in elevation as the landscape declines 
from the large Appalachian escarpment to the tidal planes of downtown Washington. To 
the east of the rivers, however, the terrain is far more varied in elevation.  
 
 
                                                        
103 Ibid., 19. 
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A map from the same source showing the location of the Barry Farms complex to the West and Sheridan 
Terrace towards the middle. Both complexes were adjacent to the former Stickfoot Creek, discussed in 
chapter two. The creek was paved over and replaced by Suitland Parkway, which curves through the 
middle of the map. Map acquired from Open Data D.C., “Topography - 10 Foot Contours,” 
https://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/topography-10-foot-contours (accessed January 11th, 2020). 
 
The large variance in elevations across the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers helps account 
for the relatively low level of development in eastern Washington until the mid-twentieth 
century. The natural landscape of that region rises and falls over the course of hundreds 
of small hills and valleys. Creeks begin from headwaters in the higher parts of the eastern 
region near the District of Columbia’s border with Maryland and flow towards the 
Anacostia and Potomac Rivers, carving small ravines and gullies on their ways. Most of 
the eastern section of the city, before its rapid development in the mid-twentieth century, 
resembled rural Appalachia more than the flat, low-lying sections of Washington to the 
south of Florida Avenue or the slightly inclined and hilly sections of upper Northwest 
Washington.  
 In the mid-nineteenth century, some developers began to purchase tracts from the 
plantation owners who once held much of the land in the eastern part of the District of 
Columbia. The developers established communities like Uniontown, which became a 
whites-only commuter town for working-class residents.104 Still, there was only sparse 
development in eastern Washington, D.C. during the nineteenth century. Rolling hills, 
ravines, and gullies hampered the extension of sanitary and transportation infrastructures 
into much of the east until the first decades of the twentieth century. 
 





Excerpt from a topographical map of Washington, D.C. from 1864. Uniontown is visible as the small 
network of streets adjacent to the Eastern Branch, a name for the Anacostia River which was in use 
predominantly before the twentieth century. Notice how the major roads conform to the landscape, running 
within the ravines, gullies, and depressions between the hills of Eastern Washington, D.C. Library of 
Congress, “Topographical map of the District of Columbia and adjacent areas in Virginia, showing 
fortifications,” https://www.loc.gov/item/2005625089/ (accessed January 12th, 2020). 
 
 After the Civil War, Oliver O. Howard, a colonel in the Union Army who had 
served with distinction during the conflict, embarked on a new and radical experiment in 
democracy that would change the landscape dramatically. As detailed in chapter three, 
while serving as the head of the Freedmen’s Bureau Colonel Howard purchased about 
375 acres of an estate belonging to the Barry family. James Barry, the family patriarch, 
had died during the Civil War. In the aftermath, his heirs opted to sell parcels of their 
land to the federal government. Howard then leased the land to newly freed slaves. He 
allowed the renters to work their plots and pay off the price of the properties over the 
course of a year or two. Over the ensuing decades, the community grew into a 
smallholding black neighborhood nestled in the hills to the east of the Anacostia River. 
The black smallholders who built their farms on the Barry family plot built a new 
envirotechnial regime in eastern Washington, D.C. They rearranged the landscape in 
order to support small-scale farming and dairy production. The public housing complex 
built there in the early 1940s would be named for that community, even as it ushered in a 
dramatic change in both the demographics of the region as well as the degree of control 
that locals could exercise over their surroundings. 
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 In the early 1910s, the Army Corps of Engineers embarked on an ambitious plan 
to reshape the Anacostia River. During that decade, the Corps began dredging operations 
to make the river navigable for larger ships further upstream. It deposited the dredged 
material on the riverbanks in order to dry the swamps and marshes that had long lined the 
banks. The dredging operation accomplished three goals. First, it helped to straighten and 
deepen the Anacostia, allowing for more river traffic in eastern Washington, D.C. 
Second, it eliminated the marshes and swamps that had served as breeding grounds for 
mosquitos, which at best were pests and at worst contributed to the spread of disease. 
Finally, by depositing silt along the riverbank, the Corps helped produce more real estate 
and parkland for the city.105 
 Concurrent to the Army Corps’ activities, the Department of Health in 
Washington started to take an interest in the welfare of residents east of the river. For 
decades those residents had contended with sewage spilling from the more densely 
populated parts of Washington on the opposite bank. Health officials and Progressive 
reformers began to see residents of eastern Washington as innately conditioned to greater 
degrees of exposure to cholera and other health problems.106 In fact, the sewer outflow 
from James Creek, close to the Navy Yard south of the Capital Building, shuttled sewage 
downstream to communities along the Anacostia and Potomac shores that were recreation 
and fishing spots for southeastern Washington’s black residents, especially those in Barry 
Farms.107  
 In the early twentieth century, the eastern District of Columbia, along with 
sections of the central city along the riverbank, increasingly became regional sacrifice 
zones, as heavy industries and the federal government looked for spaces on which to 
                                                        
105 John R. Wennersten, Anacostia: The Death and Life of an American River (Baltimore: Chesapeake 
Book Company, 2008), 102-103. 
106 Ibid., 79-83. For a detailed historical treatment of the longstanding correlation of non-whiteness 
with dirtiness and insalubrity, see Carl Zimring, Clean and White: A History of Environmental Racism 
in the United States (New York: NYU Press, 2015). 
107 Wennersten, 89. Sewage treatment as a concept emerged much later than sanitary sewer 
infrastructures. The question of who should bear the responsibility for cleaning the water—
upstream or downstream communities—was disputed in the political and public health arenas from 
the 1910s until the 1930s. See Melosi, The Sanitary City and Joel A. Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate 
Sink: Urban Pollution in Historical Perspective (Akron, OH: The University of Akron Press, 1996). 
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build noxious but necessary structures.108 In 1906, about half of a mile to the south of the 
Kenilworth neighborhood, the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO) opened a 
large, coal-fired power plant.109 In the next year, the Firth Sterling Steel Company, which 
made casings for artillery shells, opened on the western edge of what would become the 
Barry Farm public housing complex. The company operated until the 1920s, when it was 
demolished to make way for an expansion of the Bolling Naval Air Base, situated on the 
banks of the Potomac.110 In 1942, the Kenilworth Municipal Dump opened just to the east 
of the Kenilworth neighborhood, in upper northeast. The prevailing winds carried dust, 
ash, and smoke towards the rest of eastern Washington, D.C.111  
 In all of these cases, noxious industries and activities were built adjacent to low-
income African American communities. New freeways and parkways, built as suburban 
developments proliferated in southern Prince George’s County and sections of Maryland 
just over the District of Columbia border, wound throughout eastern Washington. These 
conduits would bring increased traffic and automotive exhaust near the Sheridan Terrace, 
and Kenilworth Courts complexes beginning in the 1940s and 1950s. The residents who 
were most affected by the location of noxious industries and facilities in eastern 
Washington, D.C. were African American homeowners. Since they had been relegated to 
the cheaper and less pleasant land along the rivers, they were in the path of most of the 
pollutants that spread from the landfills, power stations, and roadways. This was part of 
the cycle whereby black land became less valuable, in the eyes of developers, than white 
land, and so the city’s planners and industries built where most African Americans made 
                                                        
108 The term “sacrifice zone” is used by environmental historians to describe, for the most part, low-
income communities on the borders of manufacturing areas where “residents are exposed to 
disproportionately elevated levels of hazardous chemicals”, often byproducts of local industrial 
activities. In its original, Cold War context, the term “National Sacrifice Zone” refers to a site that was 
polluted by the mining and processing of uranium as the United States worked to build its nuclear 
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minority communities on the borders of polluted sites. See Steve Lerner and Phil Brown, Sacrifice 
Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United States, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2010), 2-3. 
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their homes. In turn, whites viewed black communities as inherently unclean or 
unsanitary. 
 When the NCHA began to build housing complexes in eastern Washington, D.C., 
it encountered a landscape that was slowly becoming a dumpsite for the metropolitan 
region. There were some communities that remained isolated from these environmental 
developments—Lincoln Heights and Highland Dwellings were not located near noxious 
facilities—but African American residents in Barry Farms, Kenilworth Courts, and 
Sheridan Terrace faced increasing threats to their health and welfare as environmental 
burdens proliferated in the region. The NCHA concentrated more and more African 
Americans near those threats as it expanded its housing stock. Siting matters greatly in 
the environmental legacy of public housing in eastern Washington, D.C.; it maintained 
longstanding patterns of environmental racism and segregation in the region, but also 
amplified the consequences of that form of injustice by locating hundreds of families near 
dumps, highways, and other nuisances. 
 
Surveying and Appraising: Two Approaches to Mapping the Landscape of Public 
Housing 
 
 Before work began at its projects, the NCHA sent out two different groups to 
assess the landscape and the extant infrastructures. Appraisers went onto the sites that the 
Authority was interested in purchasing and recorded information about the terrain, 
elevation, extant infrastructures, and condition of the properties there. Surveyors went 
into the field and created uniform plots that adhered to the general plan for the District of 
Columbia. They also mapped the existing roads, sidewalks, pipes, and wires, and helped 
plan for further extensions of those infrastructures. Of the two sources, the appraisers 
were able to capture a more comprehensive description of the NCHA’s eventual 
properties. In their reports, the appraisers included details about the slope of the plots, the 
ruggedness of the terrain, the overall elevation of the NCHA’s land, and features like 
creeks and ravines. Both the surveyors and the appraisers offered simplified depictions of 
the properties that the NCHA acquired. Since their work was a necessary prerequisite to 




 From the founding of the District of Columbia until the 1950s, the District of 
Columbia Office of the Surveyor conducted all land surveys for the courts, private 
landowners, and both the metropolitan and federal governments. While the Office of the 
Surveyor was allowed to collect fees from private landowners for its services, it was 
ordered to perform services for the local and federal governments free of charge.112 The 
city code did not allow private surveyors to conduct legitimate surveys for any District of 
Columbia properties.113 Therefore, there was only one office tasked with surveying the 
entire District of Columbia for the courts, landowners, and developers. By the time that 
the NCHA began its efforts to remake large sections of eastern Washington, D.C., the 
Office of the Surveyor was overworked, underfunded, and extremely behind in 
conducting the many surveys requested throughout the year.  
 During the 1930s, workers flocked to Washington, D.C. to find a job in the 
expanding federal government. This incentivized developers to invest in real estate in the 
areas surrounding the densely populated downtown core of the city south of Florida 
Avenue as well as the less developed parts of the city to the north. The Office of the 
Surveyor bargained with lawmakers for additional funding in increasingly exasperated 
tones throughout the late-1930s and into the 1940s to respond to the developers’ demands 
for surveys. In 1936, the Chief Surveyor, Edward A. Dent, voiced his concerns to Senator 
Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma about a potential budget reduction of $6240, equivalent to 
about $115,000 in 2020.114 Dent claimed that the loss of funding would lead to the 
elimination of one field party. The field parties were responsible for conducting the 
surveys and consisted of an engineer who oversaw the operation, a transit man who 
operated the instrument, and two chainmen who would drive pegs and cut timber when 
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necessary.115 Dent claimed that even with five field parties working full time, the Office 
of the Surveyor was still two weeks behind in its work.116 If Congress went forward with 
the proviso to reduce funding for surveying, Dent worried that it would “prevent the 
accomplishment of a large portion of the survey work for the District of Columbia and 
Federal Government.”117 
 After Dent finished responding to Thomas’s queries, Melvin Hazen spoke up to 
defend the Office of the Surveyor. Hazen had worked in the office in for several decades 
before becoming the President of the District of Columbia Board of Commissioners in 
1933.118 Hazen estimated that 75 percent of the surveyors’ time was spend on local and 
federal government projects. This estimate made sense considering the expansion of 
federal agencies during the 1930s. At that point, Dent made one further comment on the 
scope of responsibilities for the Office of the Surveyor. He stated “we really do more than 
make surveys. It is really a city-planning office besides a surveying office.”119 Hazen 
concluded the hearing by saying that the proviso to reduce funding “would ruin the 
office, I assure you. It would ruin the office.”120 In the end, the Subcommittee decided to 
reduce funding by 500 dollars, equivalent to about 9,000 dollars in 2020.121 
 The fights over funding continued throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. 
Throughout those years, the Office of the Surveyor struggled to retain staff members who 
often left for more lucrative jobs elsewhere in the federal government. In the 1938 
appropriation hearings, Dent claimed that his office had lost six individuals, equivalent to 
one-and-a-half field parties. In response, Representative Ross Collins of Mississippi said 
“do not ask us for more money.”122 Instead, Collins hoped that Dent could use some of 
the new agencies established during the New Deal. He questioned the Chief Surveyor to 







121 District of Columbia Appropriation Bill for 1938, Public Law 172, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 29th, 
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122 House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, District of Columbia Appropriation Bill 
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see if his office had “any CCC or WPA workers,” before finally asking “[y]ou have no 
alphabetical men at all?” Dent flatly replied, “[n]o.”123 
 Dent, perhaps exasperated by the slow pace of surveying in the District of 
Columbia and Congressional intransigence, did not seek re-appointment to the position of 
Chief Surveyor. Francis F. Healy replaced him in 1941. Healy would soon learn about the 
frustrations of the appropriations procedure. In 1941, Healy requested an additional 5,000 
dollars for his office. He justified his request in a statement that read, in part, “[t]he 
Surveyor’s Office has found it extremely difficult to function efficiently on the current 
appropriation….The creation of many new Government agencies has placed a greatly 
increased burden on the office which it never contemplated that it should perform with 
the present office and field force.”124 In the five years that had passed since 1936, the 
Office of the Surveyor had gone from two weeks behind schedule to six weeks, and paid 
61 workers out of 65 below the average wages for their government classification 
level.125 The District of Columbia Board of Commissioners had received complaints from 
both builders and citizens about the slow pace of surveying. According to one surveyor, 
“[t]he people want to get their construction started and they cannot do a thing until we 
make the survey.”126 Yet, the situation continued to deteriorate. In 1944, the Office of the 
Surveyor was down to only three field parties, having lost two since the year before.127 
By 1945, Healy estimated that the work assigned to his office had increased by sixty 
percent over the preceding year.128 
 Between 1936 and 1945 there was consistently more work and less money for the 
Office of the Surveyor. The number of workers available decreased as they transferred to 
other, better-paid posts. These factors conspired to greatly delay surveying in the District 
of Columbia, which was a necessary first step in the planning process for any 
construction project. By District law, builders could not seek out private engineers to 
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survey properties. Hence, the problems in the Office of the Surveyor were bottlenecks in 
the building process. This must have proven frustrating for the executives in the National 
Capital Housing Authority, which began to acquire properties on which to expand its 
housing stock throughout eastern Washington, D.C. beginning in 1940. According to The 
Washington Post, between those years, the Alley Dwelling Authority was planning or in 
the process of building twenty-two new projects.129 The Army, Navy, Public Building 
Authority, and the USHA, among other agencies, were also involved in erecting 
permanent and temporary housing during the first months of the Second World War. All 
together, there were fifty-four publically funded housing projects planned between 1941 
and 1942.130 If the Office of the Surveyor was solely dedicated to housing and used all 
five of its field parties for that purpose, and was able to operate in a timely manner, it 
would have taken a total of twenty-two weeks to survey every single site. The record 
shows, however, that the city’s survey teams were overburdened with public, private, and 
court-issued demands for surveys. The Office of the Surveyor had to work quickly at 
each site in order to move through its backlog as efficiently as possible.  
 The Office of the Surveyor did produce plots and maps for the National Capital 
Housing Authority at all of its sites. Its maps guided the NCHA as it began the work of 
transforming the properties it acquired into modern residential blocks. 
 
Plat for a square at the Barry Farms site. District of Columbia Property and Permit Center, Office of the 
Surveyor Land Record Management System, Squares 5865 and 5866, https://dcraonline-
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rms.dcra.dc.gov/SurDocsPublic/ (accessed March 6th, 2020). Nearly all of the historical surveys and maps 
from the historical activities of the Surveyor’s Office have been uploaded to the SurDocs system, available 
online.131 Some documents that have not been linked to individuals squares, as well as some that are listed 
alphabetically rather than by number have not yet been uploaded. Regardless, the author was able to find 
the digitized survey maps from the original mapping done for the NHCA when it purchased four out of the 
five sites studied in this dissertation. Maps from the other three sites follow. 
 
Highland Dwellings. District of Columbia Property and Permit Center, Office of the Surveyor Land Record 
Management System, Square 5156, https://dcraonline-rms.dcra.dc.gov/SurDocsPublic/ (accessed March 6th, 
2020) 
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Kenilworth Courts. District of Columbia Property and Permit Center, Office of the Surveyor Land Record 




Lincoln Heights. District of Columbia Property and Permit Center, Office of the Surveyor Land Record 
Management System, Square 5192, https://dcraonline-rms.dcra.dc.gov/SurDocsPublic/ (accessed March 6th, 
2020). 
 
 The maps showed where pipes ran beneath the site, and the shape of the plots and 
squares that would be furnished to the Authority. The appraisers’ reports, however, reveal 
slightly more about the features of the surrounding landscape. When the NCHA started 
planning the purchase of plots in eastern Washington, it reached out to local appraisers to 





Ravines and hills at the Highland Dwellings site in 1940 Hillside Dwellings, DC-1-13, December 16th, 
1943; Folder “Site Approval Sheet Project D.C. 1-13,” Box 5, Series: Land Acquisition Project Files 
USHA, DC-1-9 (Washington DC) to DC-1-16 (Washington, DC); RG 196, NARA II.  
 
 The appraisers also provided written reports about the conditions of the terrain 
and topography of the NCHA’s properties. The reports are discussed in greater detail in 
the subsequent chapters, but it is important to highlight their role in assisting the NCHA’s 
executives in making sense of the landscape of eastern Washington, D.C. At a time when 
the Authority’s board was figuring out how to manage several projects simultaneously, 
the appraisers and surveyors were the individuals who traversed the area, left the roads 
that ran around the perimeter of the sites, and entered the woods. The appraisal reports 
and the Office of the Surveyor’s publications provide important information about two 
things. First, these records captured the appearance and uses of the landscape of eastern 
Washington, D.C. prior to the NCHA’s intervention. They also offered a preliminary 
depiction of how the NCHA wished to change the landscape. The Office of the Surveyor 
showed the NCHA neat and uniform squares that could help the Authority determine 
where to place its buildings. As some of the first ways that the NCHA engaged with and 
made sense of the landscape of the properties that it acquired, the reports and surveys are 
valuable sources.132  
                                                        






Early Attempts, First Obstacles: Barry Farms and the Construction of a New 
Envirotechnical Regime, 1867-1981 
 
 Between 1940 and 1943, the ADA constructed a new envirotechnical regime at 
Barry Farms. Although the Authority was interested in the economic function of the site, 
its leadership also recognized the need to support housing in conformity with the 
principles of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings.133 In order to fulfill its goals, the ADA 
needed to transform what had once been a smalholding agricultural community into a 
residential neighborhood. The Authority’s plans would bring denser housing 
developments, new sewer and water pipes, electrical lines, and roads running along the 
boundaries of neatly plotted squares. In order to support such extensive modifications, as 
well as the construction of housing on the scale that the ADA envisioned, the Authority 
would first have to grade the area and remove trees in order to make way for new housing 
and infrastructures. In the end, the ADA built a new envirotechnical regime at the Barry 
Farms site. No longer oriented towards the needs of the smallholding African American 
farmers that once lived there, Barry Farms would instead serve the ADA’s goal to 
provide and manage decent, safe, and sanitary housing. 
 Yet the construction of a new envirotechnical regime at the Barry Farms site 
brought with it a number of new envirotechnical obstacles that the ADA had not 
necessarily foreseen. The most prominent envirotechnical obstacle at Barry Farms was 
tied to siting. The ADA dramatically remade the landscape of Barry Farms as a means to 
support stable and sanitary housing, rather than the previous envirotechnical regime, 
which had served smallholding families and property owners. In grading and terracing 
the Barry Farms site, the ADA also laid the foundations for the later decline of its public 
housing program. The natural features of the new envirotechnical system—the land, 
elevation, soil, and hydrology—interacted poorly with the physical and technological 
changes to the area, such as leveling, terracing, and the infrastructures underneath and 
throughout the complex. During the early 1940s, the wartime construction process both 
revealed the presence of significant envirotechnical obstacles and undermined the ADA’s 
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ability to effectively respond to them. After the Second World War, budget tightening 
and the spread of diminishing resources for public housing across an expanding stock 
meant that the NCHA continued to leave envirotechnical obstacles at the Barry Farms 
site unaddressed. Ultimately, the problem of siting at the Barry Farms complex 
undermined the NCHA’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Residents of Barry 
Farms were left largely alone to contend with erosion, flooding, and polling water, which 
made for increasingly unpleasant and even dangerous conditions. 
 The Barry Farms area was home to different envirotechnical systems at different 
times. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to trace how different groups altered the Barry 
Farms site in order to create new envirotechnical systems. The most significant groups in 
this history were African American homeowners who desired self-sufficient 
communities, and the ADA, which wanted to build decent, safe, and sanitary housing. In 
altering the sites, the farmers and the planners confronted and responded to different 
environmental conditions that emerged as consequences of their actions.  
 As the ADA worked to overthrow the previous envirotechnical regime and 
replace it with new housing developments, it also made deeper connections between the 
Barry Farms site and the rest of the City of Washington. Planners and engineers had tried 
in vain over the course of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to provide new 
infrastructures that could deliver clean water and remove wastes from Barry Farms. The 
area’s uneven topography and complex lines of ownership undermined those efforts. But 
after 1940, the ADA was empowered to remake large sections of eastern Washington, 
D.C., and it did so with a greatly expanded budget. It was capable of turning Barry Farms 
from a distinct and separate envirotechnical space into a connected part of the District of 
Columbia. The ADA contributed significantly to changes in the landscape of eastern 
Washington, D.C. 
 Public housing sites were not static places, but were instead envirotechnical 
systems that shaped and reshaped the landscape, necessitating responses from the ADA. 
As land subsided and eroded, or as water flooded and pooled, the ADA considered 
various possible courses of action. Often, though, it was unable to act given the political 
and economic forces that it faced at different times. Yet the ADA’s interventions into the 
soil, terrain, trees, creeks, and ravines of the Barry Farms site left legacies of physical 
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changes that continued to undermine the structural stability of its complexes over the 
course of the 1950s and 1960s. The combined environmental, technological, and 
infrastructural changes at Barry Farms led to a new envirotechnical arrangement, in 
which “inextricably embedded environments and technologies…continually reshape[d] 
individual parts of the system and the whole.”134  
 Ultimately, the ADA did not adequately address the envirotechnical obstacles that 
its envirotechnical system engendered. This placed a special burden on tenants of the 
Barry Farms complex. Living on almost thirty-three acres that were cordoned from the 
rest of the community by Suitland Parkway and the Anacostia Freeway, the 450 or so 
families in Barry Farms would be left to contend with the mounting deterioration and 
discomfort caused by the environmental obstacles at the site. By the 1960s, the 
breakdown of the NCHA’s envirotechnical system was apparent to residents of Barry 
Farms and the press alike. Twenty years later, Barry Farms was easily one of the direst 
places to live in the District of Columbia. Environmental obstacles at the site rendered 
John Ihlder’s vision for decent, safe, and sanitary housing unfulfilled. 
 
Building Barry’s Farm: Emerging Envirotechnical Systems Along the Anacostia, 1619-
1790 
 
 Over the course of the past four hundred years, the landscape of Barry Farms had 
been host to several different envirotechnical regimes. First, the indigenous peoples of the 
Chesapeake Bay farmed and fished along the banks of the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers, 
which supported villages of a few hundred people. By the time that Europeans first 
explored the region, beginning during the first decade of the seventeenth century, the 
Nacotchank people predominated in the region. The Europeans supplanted the indigenous 
communities of the tidewater region during the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. With an eye towards commercial agriculture, they overthrew the envirotechical 
regime of the indigenous peoples. Instead, Europeans cleared the forests from large plots 
of land, and with enslaved laborers built tobacco plantations throughout the upper 
Chesapeake. The area that would become Barry Farms was one such plantation among 
many. The creeks, streams, and rivers of the region—as well as their eventual connection 
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to the Chesapeake Bay and the transatlantic trade routes—made the region desirable from 
the point of view of the plantation owners.135 
 Plantations proliferated throughout the Chesapeake region, including around the 
cities of Georgetown, Maryland and Alexandria, Virginia, which would become parts of 
the District of Columbia in 1790. It was fairly easy for enterprising voyagers from 
England to set up tobacco plantations. If there was an ample supply of fresh land and 
enough labor to care for the crops, tobacco could provide a quick and rewarding return on 
investment.136 By 1695, improving economic conditions in England meant that fewer 
indentured servants were willing to try their luck in the colonies.137 Seeking continued 
profits, plantation owners turned to the transatlantic slave trade. Removed from their 
homes and transported to a distant continent, the slaves were forced to work the 
plantations for their entire lives.138 Those enslaved families built an envirotechnical 
regime overseen by white descendants of the original colonists, who themselves had 
displaced the indigenous peoples of the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers. 
 The envirotechnical system that emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries also featured significant envirotechnical obstacles. Tobacco is an exhaustive 
crop. It places significant demands on nutrients in places where it is planted, and renders 
that soil less viable for other crops long after it is removed. Hence, plantations 
consolidated and expanded over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
By the start of the Civil War, most plantations consisted of several hundred acres, of 
which only a few dozen might be in cultivation at any given time. The Barry Plantation, 
part of which would become the site of the Barry Farms public housing complex, was 
about 350 acres, of which only twenty or thirty acres was in cultivation at any time.139 
For this reason, the enslaved laborers were often forced to cut down woodlands in order 
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to make way for new tobacco fields. This led to a great deal of deforestation in the hills 
above the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers. 
 In his monograph Anacostia: The Death and Life of an American River, historian 
John R. Wennersten describes the envirotechnical obstacles that emerged as the 
landscape around the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers was built to support tobacco 
production. First, with fewer trees to hold the soil along ridges and hills in place, flooding 
became a threat to communities closer to the riverfronts. Major floods occurred in 1724, 
1738, and 1771, which destroyed dozens of buildings and ruined thousands of bundles of 
tobacco.140 Envirotechnical obstacles that emerged from the transforming landscape 
disrupted the normal flow of commerce along the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers. 
Furthermore, because tobacco tends to loosen the soil, “[t]housands of tons of topsoil 
could be carried away in a single rainstorm.”141 Plantation owners had demanded that 
their slaves remake the landscape in order to support tobacco farming on a large scale. In 
turn, the landscape itself became unstable, threatening commercial activity along the 
riverfront. 
 Over the course of the eighteenth century, siltation rendered the upper reaches of 
the Anacostia River increasingly difficult for large ships to navigate. Once a mighty port 
town, Bladensburg, Maryland, was only inches deep at low tide by the end of the 
eighteenth century. Merchants and shippers looked further down river for new ports, 
which explains in part the rise of Georgetown, Maryland and Alexandria, Virginia.142 
Those two cities were incorporated into the new federal territory with the Residence Act 
of 1790.143 George Washington, who originally proposed the location of the federal 
capital, wanted a city that was both the center of federal power and a strong commercial 
city in its own right; he believed that Alexandria and Georgetown could drive the 
development of the District of Columbia.144 
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 The development of the western and eastern portions of the District of Columbia 
proceeded unevenly. Pierre Charles L’Enfant, who Washington had selected to make the 
first plan of the city, focused on the western portion of the city, closer to the extant city of 
Georgetown. He quickly developed an appreciation of the area’s “streams and marshes, 
its uncertain and fragile river edges, the few really commanding heights of land, the 
ridges and terraces, and the strategic importance of a few feet in elevation. These factors 
had already determined the drainage, roads, and stream crossings, the existing and 
prospective settlement, and the siting of many individual plantation houses.”145 Many of 
those few really commanding heights of land and ridges and terraces were located 
predominantly in the eastern portion of the territory, on the opposite side of the Anacostia 
from where L’Enfant made his initial survey. 
 Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the plantation owners 
built an envirotechnical system that stretched across the tidewater region. The history of 
the Anacostia region shows how this large-scale transformation dramatically shaped local 
environments. The planters instructed their slaves to tear up hundreds of acres of forests 
on their many plantations and replace them with tobacco fields. In doing so, the planters 
created an unstable landscape. Seasonal rains brought thousands of pounds of topsoil 
cascading into the rivers and creeks, which over successive decades rendered them 
unsuitable for transportation. These envirotechnical obstacles—the unanticipated 
negative consequences of the operation of the system—influenced, in part the political 
and economic terrain of the region. Merchants moved closer to the large tidewater rivers 
as smaller streams and creeks struggled with silted shipping lanes. Washington, D.C. was 
similar in many ways to the other towns and cities surrounding it. Its position as the 
federal capital, however, would continue to distinguish its envirotechnical history from 
that of other localities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 
From Barry’s Farm to Barry Farms: The Collapse of the Plantation System and the Rise 
of Black Smallholders in Eastern Washington, D.C., 1854-1920 
 
 During the next seventy years Washington grew into a medium-sized tidewater 
city. Unlike Baltimore, which was about forty miles to the north, the District of Columbia 
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never became a commercially significant city. For the most part, Washington consisted of 
government offices, the homes and offices of a few prominent businesspeople, and 
working-class communities diffused throughout the city. Parts of the District of Columbia 
that were located outside of the jurisdiction of the City of Washington were still largely 
inhabited by plantation owners, their families, and their slaves. Indeed, this was the case 
for most of northern and eastern Washington. 
 In the decades leading up to the Civil War, one significant community existed east 
of the Anacostia River. It was named Uniontown, for its builder, the Uniontown 
Development Corporation (UDC). Starting in 1854, the developers began advertising to 
white workers along the docks about the opportunities that Uniontown offered. The 
company touted the neighborhood’s benefits, such as greater distance from the nuisances 
of the Navy Yard and a fairly short ride to work. Furthermore, Uniontown was not 
racially integrated. The UDC treated the greater proximity between white workers and 
black workers—who largely lived in homes close to the Navy Yard—as an advantage. 
Homeowners in Uniontown were unable to sell, rent, or lease property to anyone who 
was African American or “of African descent.”146 Polluting industries like soap making 
and butchering were also prohibited in the Uniontown development.147  
 The landscape surrounding Uniontown “remained swampy and wild, and the river 
subdivided itself into channels running between bush-covered islets and vast expanses of 
wild rice.”148 Southeast Washington along the Anacostia was mostly low-lying and 
marshy, unsuited for large-scale construction until engineers could make improvements 
in the grade and stability of the land. Retaining barriers and drainage efforts along the 
Anacostia riverfront were necessary before any sort of large-scale development could 
take place in the surrounding areas. The Barry Plantation was located to the southwest of 
Uniontown, in between low-lying areas that had been periodically submerged by the 
Anacostia, to the west, and the hillier lands to the east. Barry Farms remained fairly 
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Public Domain Image of American Civil War Defenses of Washington, DC. US Government, Department 
of War. 1865. James Barry’s Farm is visible south of Poplar Point. The estate stretched to the East, nestled 
between the two main roads on the southwest corner of the Uniontown development. The hills in the east 
are marked by hatches. St. Elizabeth’s hospital sat on top of a ridgeline over the plantation. Creeks ran 
throughout the Barry estate into the Anacostia River. The red lines mark the routes of military highways. 
 
 The Civil War and its immediate aftermath brought significant environmental 
changes to the District of Columbia. Perhaps most significantly, the plantation system in 
the federal capital collapsed. President Abraham Lincoln signed legislation abolishing 
slavery in the District of Columbia on April 16th, 1862.149 Prevailing for over two 
hundred years on the backs of thousands of enslaved people, the plantation system ended 
in a relatively brief moment. Furthermore, the Union Army’s work to protect the city 
required extensive modifications to the landscape. Army personnel built a ring of earthen 
forts around the capital. As anthropologist Brett Williams writes, defensive construction 
projects also “demanded a massive deforestation, which stripped the hilly perimeter so 
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lookouts could spot a Confederate approach.”150 This effort “hasten[ed] land erosion and 
fill[ed] the river with silt.”151 As plantation owners and merchants in the region had long 
known, deforestation was tied to shifting landscapes and unstable soil.  
 A more dramatic and lasting change would come in the immediate aftermath of 
the Civil War, as the federal government planned for the redistribution of the lands it had 
seized, purchased, or otherwise acquired during the conflict. With the plantation system 
in the tidewater region largely destroyed, some federal officials saw room for new 
approaches to land use in the highlands lining the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers. Colonel 
Oliver Otis (O. O.) Howard was one such individual. Howard redistributed the plantation 
to the former slaves who had toiled on behalf of the Barry planters. He hoped that the 
transformation of Barry Farm into a series of small family plots would provide the 
freedmen with income and some degree of economic independence from white 
landowners.152  
 In the aftermath of the Civil War, the District of Columbia continued to develop 
unevenly. The portion of the city to the west of the Anacostia River expanded. On the 
eastern side of the river, however, there were far more family farmers. They worked to 
transform the landscape in order to support their traditional livelihoods. Some 
neighborhoods in the higher elevations—and especially those close to the existing 
development of Uniontown—continued to grow. But much of eastern Washington was 
still rural and sparsely populated.  
 Between 1867 and 1940, the residents of sparsely populated Barry Farms worked 
to bring about a new envirotechnical landscape. Physically, they altered less of the 
environment than the plantation owners had. Their farms were not built to facilitate large-
scale production, but were rather meant for household or at most local consumption. The 
size of the lots, as well as the hilly conditions of the land limited fully self-sufficient 
agricultural production among the African American farmers. Their farms provided 
“vegetables, chickens, and dairy products that were used for the families’ consumption 
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and were also sold at the local market to help support the family.”153 Despite owning their 
own homes and lots, many residents sought work across the river, and used their land to 
supplement their diets and income.  
 The farmers’ work represented an interregnum between two environmental 
regimes. The previous plantation system was physically exploitative and environmentally 
demanding. It relied on slave labor to remove trees and plant tobacco, resulting in soil 
instability, run-off, and siltation. After the Civil War, former slaves and their descendants 
built a regime of smallholding farms that taxed the land less than the plantations had. 
Still, rainfall frequently led to swelling creeks and streams throughout the region. Smoot, 
for example, reminisced about “the sudden storms of summer with its [sic] vivid 
lightening and heavy peals of thunder, bringing torrents of rain that swelled the peaceful 
stickfoot creek into a raging torrent.”154 These environmental features of eastern 
Washington did not seem to pose a significant envirotechnical obstacle to the Barry 
Farms community, which maintained its envirotechnical system for about seventy-five 
years. In the 1940s, the ADA would plan on a much larger scale, building a new 
envirotechnical system meant to support decent, safe, and sanitary housing. It would 
encounter significant envirotechnical obstacles as it pursued its goals. 
 
The Emergence of a Local Housing Program: The ADA Builds a New Envirotechnical 
Regime, 1940-1943 
 
 Barry Farms was one of the ADA’s first wartime projects. In some ways, it 
prefigured the problems that the Authority would encounter at sites across eastern 
Washington, D.C. While lightly populated, Barry Farms was also moderately forested. 
The era of clearing swaths of trees fell by the wayside after the destruction of the 
plantation system. The smallholding families of the region had little incentive to clear-cut 
the woods around their properties. Barry Farms was also rolling and rugged. Streams and 
creeks cut down slopes towards the Stickfoot and eventually the Anacostia River. Finally, 
                                                        
153 “Oral History—Working Outline (and Some Script),” 1, Folder 1, Box 1; Neighborhood Background 
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although a sewer viaduct ran near the property selected for the Barry Farms complex, 
many of the homes therein were not connected to the main line. The ADA did not have 
its work cut out for it. The Authority would first have to strip the trees from the site, then 
level and grade it, then extend infrastructures while constructing hundreds of dwelling 
units. 
 The ADA made its first assessment of the landscape of Barry Farms in 1941. It 
hired an appraisal company to do an initial survey of the area and determine a fair price 
for the existing lots. As mentioned in the introduction, the ADA wished to build housing 
that was economically viable as well as up to the standards of decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing. The cost of acquiring land was part of the economic viability of a site. The 
ADA’s efforts represented the first time that any agency of the District of Columbia tried 
to figure out the complex lines of ownership in the Barry Farms neighborhood, not to 
mention what the site actually looked like, through firsthand, on-the-ground reporting. 
While the courts might have revealed some information about land ownership in the 
community, the official documentation might have been far removed from how the local 
community actually practiced property management and inheritance.155 
 The 1941 appraisal of the Barry Farm tract provided the ADA with valuable 
information about the appearance of the landscape, giving the Authority the ability to 
estimate the scale of work to be done. The report includes information about how much 
of the land was sloped, the viability of portions of the site for large-scale construction 
projects, and the quality of the improvements made on the sites by owners over the past 
sixty years. While not as detailed as later appraisals, such as those conducted for Lincoln 
Heights and Highland Dwellings, the report does provide some crucial information. What 
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the Alley Dwelling Authority did learn was that out of a little more than 32.7 acres, a 
total of almost 1.7 acres was sloped enough to be noticed by the appraiser.  
This figure does not seem like much, of course, since 1.7 acres constitutes only 
about 5.2% of the total area of the Barry Farm plot. Indeed, the Barry Farms plot was less 
sloped than other housing projects built during the Second World War, especially 
Highland Dwellings and Lincoln Heights. But topographical maps help clarify the picture 
at the site. The southern edge of the property was situated at the peak of a steep cliff, 
which declined sharply from the southeast to the northwest. It appears as though 
contractors unsuccessfully graded the southern edge of the property. From the southeast 
to the northwest, the property slopes at a gentler rate from about seventy-five feet above 
sea level to about twenty feet at the property’s northwestern corner, nestled in between 
what are now the Anacostia Freeway and Suitland Parkway. The site as a whole clearly 
slopes towards the Anacostia.156  
 Correspondence between the Alley Dwelling Authority and the appraiser did not 
indicate that the land sloped downwards by about fifty feet from the southeast to the 
northwest. The Alley Dwelling Authority at least knew that there was severe sloping on 
5.2% of the land; the appraiser indicated as such by writing that “approximately 33% of 
area is low and swampy, requiring 10 to 15' fill” for one plot and writing the single word 
“slopes” on the other uneven plots. The Alley Dwelling Authority’s Board therefore 
knew that individual parcels were uneven, but did not necessarily know that the land was 
uneven across the entire surface area. Only the appraiser’s report mentions the condition 
of the land. Even in that, there does not appear to be much attention on the appraiser’s 
part to the average topography of the plot. With the property line beginning on the edge 
of a ravine and falling fifty feet over the course of three city blocks to the intersection of 
the Suitland Parkway and Anacostia Freeway, Barry Farm was clearly built on sloped 
land.  
                                                        
156 The appraiser’s report does challenge the prevailing view of the nearby white residents that Barry 
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Washington, DC.”, Box 5, Series: Land Acquisition Project Files USHA, DC-1-9 (Washington DC) to DC-
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 Regardless of the ADA’s understanding of the conditions of the landscape, the 
construction process at Barry Farms had to try to overcome the two envirotechnical 
obstacles of poor materials and siting. In his 1944 report to Congress, John Ihlder frankly 
reported on the ways that both the wartime economy and environmental factors 
complicated progress on the Barry Farms site. For one thing,  
 
Problems of substitute materials and equipment immediately arose, as suppliers 
insisted on ever-higher priority ratings. Hardware, plumbing fixtures, floor 
coverings, and numerous other items were affected. Gas ranges and hot water 
heaters had been omitted from the general contract, as these were to be secured 
through the USHA’s mass purchase plan.157 
 
Ihlder and the ADA were constrained by the wartime economy. As revealed below, these 
economic constraints impinged on the Authority’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing. Ihlder does not go into all of the details about material deficits at the site. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the environmental forces at the Barry Farms site 
stressed those materials, producing an environmental obstacle that the ADA found 
difficult to redress after the buildings were constructed.  
 In the same report, Ihlder made Congress aware of the envirotechnical obstacle 
presented by the site itself. The sloped landscape, combined with seasonal rains, 
produced unanticipated problems for the contractors. Ihlder wrote that 
 
No sooner was one group of war-created problems cleared away than another 
emerged to halt the work and delay the opening of the houses. A temporary 
drainage system was installed to permit the contractor to proceed. Heavy rains in 
October not only stopped grading and the laying of sidewalks, so that some of the 
completed houses were isolated in deep mud; the rains also weakened a bank 
which formed a boundary of the property, and endangered the wall of St. 
Elizabeth’s hospital, which stood on the crest of the bank. This hill had been cut 
back to provide additional houses at the instance of the USHA. 
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An immediate engineering conference was called to determine the best means of 
holding the bank and to drain the slope in order to prevent a serious slide. This 
resulted in a separate contract for a series of concrete cribbing and drains.158 
 
As had happened throughout the history of the Barry Farms site, the soil shifted as a 
consequence of heavy seasonal rains. This was not uncommon, but created several 
problems that the ADA struggled to address. They were linked to later instances of 
erosion and soil movement. Furthermore, the trees that had long anchored the soil in 
place had been removed to make way for complexes with abundant greenspace. The 
siting of Barry Farms itself gave rise to envirotechnical obstacles, as the environment 
interacted with the reshaped and less forested landscape. 
 The Alley Dwelling Authority did its best to respond to some of the rougher 
conditions on the Barry Farm site. For example, the plot that the appraiser described as 
“low and swampy” was sold to the War Department in 1944 because it was impossible to 
use for housing construction. The War Department ended up using the plot for the 
construction of the Suitland Parkway, which ran alongside the northern perimeter of 
Barry Farm.159 Sheridan Terrace, which was built in the late-1950s, would also be located 
adjacent to Suitland Parkway.   
 During the construction phase, the ADA did not allow the District of Columbia to 
visit the site. The ADA was quite frank about being unable to follow the inspection 
process and complete the buildings at Barry Farm on time.160 This was also the case for 
Lincoln Heights and Highland Dwellings. On occasion workers at the Barry Farm site 
would remark on the quality and types of materials used in the construction process, 
sometimes referring to the District building code. Homer Smith, the Technical Officer for 
the Barry Farms site, noted to the Chief Counsel for the ADA that the sheathing used for 
electrical wires used in the complex was not in accordance with the District code due to 
                                                        
158 Ibid. 
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the deficit of proper building materials.161 As mentioned in the introduction, the District 
of Columbia was responsible for ensuring that the materials and their arrangement within 
the complex was safe and representative of standard building practices. Furthermore, the 
District of Columbia was responsible for enduring that the land at Barry Farms was stable 
and the buildings were build in conformity with what was viable at the site. Due to 
pressure from the USHA, however, the ADA conducted its own internal monitoring of 
work at the site. As evidence above, it did find at least one occasion where the water and 
soil interacted on the modified landscape to complicate construction and erode slopes. 
 Work on Barry Farms was complete by the end of 1943. This meant that only 
about two years passed from the initial appraisal in 1941, the purchasing of properties in 
Barry Farm or their seizure via eminent domain, the planning and design process, and the 
end of construction work. For comparison, Kenilworth Courts took about five years from 
the planning phase to the end of construction activities. Lincoln Heights took about three 
years from the planning stage to its completion.  
The history of construction at Barry Farms speaks most prominently to the first 
envirotechnical obstacle: the problem of siting. In order to build homes on the scale that 
both the ADA and USHA desired, the Alley Dwelling Authority would have to change 
the grading across parts of the land. Although the entire plot was built on a slope towards 
the Anacostia River, the most pressing concerns for the ADA were particular sections 
which required about 10 to 15 feet of fill to bring up to grade. During the construction 
process, the contractors noted in at least one instance that the land could erode 
significantly as a consequence of heavy rainfall. Still, the contractors accomplished much 
of what they were hired to do. In the end, the entire complex sloped towards the 
Anacostia River. Water naturally moved from the highest point towards the northeast of 
the complex towards the lower southwest portion. This would prove to be a problem later 
on, as it provided opportunities for flooding and pooling towards the low-lying sections 
of the complex. Without a significant number of trees to anchor the soil in place and 
capture water, the soil would continue to run off towards the Anacostia.  
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 As far as the second envirotechnical obstacle of materials goes, Barry Farms 
suffered from a death of appropriate structural components and interior appliances. 
Eventually it would receive what it needed to fully open, but the war limited the 
availability of important items, which delayed production, according to Ihlder. Lincoln 
Heights is a stronger example of the second envirotechnical obstacle, which is covered 
extensively in the following chapter. 
 Barry Farms’ placement on the periphery of downtown Washington and across 
the Anacostia River maintained the traditional pattern of segregation of African 
Americans in discrete places across the metropolitan region. Barry Farms had long been 
owned and worked by black families, but its population had been relatively small and 
diffuse. Through its efforts, the NCHA would provide housing for over four hundred 
families on the Barry Farms plot, which would dramatically increase the population in 
that neighborhood. Those residents were left isolated and alone, as the complex began to 
deteriorate in the 1950s. The complex therefore retained older patterns of black 
segregation and seclusion, but within a modern envirotechnical context where residents 
had little control over their surroundings.  
 
Defending the Old Envirotechnical Regime: Residents Resist Displacement, 1943-1954 
 
When it was completed in 1943, Barry Farms was one of the first large-scale 
public housing complexes built by the city’s public housing authority.162 It contained 432 
units for families of various sizes and sprawled across almost 33 acres.163 The complex 
was one of several public housing complexes constructed during the Second World War 
that was intended entirely for African American residents.  
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Image of Barry Farms taken soon after it opened. Notice the terraces running behind the buildings, 
separating rows of homes by several vertical feet. From Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs 
Division, “Barry Farms Housing Development, Washington, D.C. Terrace section I,” available at 
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/gsc.5a19190/ (accessed February 25th, 2020). 
 
  
Another image revealing the sloped landscape of Barry Farms. The homes were kept fairly level on 
individual terraces, while the streets sloped noticeably downhill towards the Anacostia River. While the 
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complex was not absent of trees, the site had far fewer in 1943, compared to 1940. From Library of 
Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, “Barry Farms Housing Development, Washington, D.C. Group 
among trees I,” https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2018722793/resource/ (accessed February 25th, 2020). 
 
 As the NCHA continued to acquire land near the original Barry Farms complex, 
neighborhing residents expressed anxiety about their loss of control over the landscape. 
In 1948, covering the aftermath of the Barry Farm construction project, a reporter for the 
Pittsburgh Courier—a predominantly African American newspaper—profiled a man in 
Barry Farm whose land and home were threatened by an expansion of the Barry Farm 
project. “So I moved out here in 1943”, he says, “[w]ith my own hands I built me a 
house. It’s not much now, but I’m going to keep adding as I go along until I get what I 
want. Now the Government comes along and wants to take my land away and redevelop 
it!”164 This apprehension over the changing regime of land use and land control in Barry 
Farm was also expressed in the way that the Barry Farms community received residents 
of the new complex. As more and more public housing residents were moved onto land 
that was farmland only recently, those residents’ anxieties increased. John Dale, a 
resident of Barry Farm since the 1890s, reflected that “[p]articularly when they tore down 
all those houses down in Southwest we got a lot of those people they were bad 
people…their children were bad. They had been shoved into [the Barry Farms public 
housing complex].”165 Local African American residents sometimes received the public 
housing complex poorly. 
 Longstanding residents of the Barry Farms community were well aware that they 
were losing control over their communities and their land as the NCHA continued its 
building program. Residents saw that the NCHA was intent on transforming their 
neighborhood from a rural and rustic semi-agricultural community to a densely 
developed residential space. Indeed, the NCHA was intent on overthrowing the older 
envirotechnical regime—controlled and managed by the residents themselves—for a new 
one under its administration. In the 1920s, residents of the Barry Farms community 
reminisced about streams rushing in the summer months and cattle being moved across 
fields. By the 1940s, that memory was tied to a landscape that no longer existed. 
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Residents of Barry Farms saw that the NCHA was making environmental changes on a 
massive scale, and spoke out about their diminishing control of the area. 
 For the NCHA’s planners, however, the transformation of Barry Farms was a 
necessary counterweight to the increasing pace of urban renewal following the Second 
World War. Public housing construction and urban renewal proceeded in tandem from 
1952 until the 1970s. As older neighborhoods, usually referred to as slums by urban 
reformers, were knocked down and rebuilt, their populations were often shifted into 
public housing complexes in other neighborhoods. For example, from the 1950s until the 
1970s, 6,000 families—about 23,000 individuals—across 560 acres were forced to move 
by the District of Columbia’s Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA) in the Southwest 
Urban Renewal Area alone.166 Of the displaced people, only about 1500 out of 5500 
families were placed into public housing. Seventy seven percent of those residents were 
black and eighty percent were renters.167 Whole city blocks were razed and alleys and 
tenements cleared as municipal reformers sought to build a new model community. 
Public housing complimented the work done downtown as the NCHA transformed 
swaths of eastern Washington, eliminating what it considered to be rural blight and 
replacing it with modern urban neighborhoods. 
 What was rural blight to the NCHA might have been a product of environmental 
constraints that residents of Barry Farms encountered. In the late-1940s, urban planners 
found that Barry Farms did not conform to the District street plan. They encountered a 
community built organically, by the residents, rather than coordinated through central 
planning offices downtown. According Frederick Gutheim, who wrote an extensive 
history of planning in the District of Columbia, “Barry Farms’ street system…developed 
independently of any District plan [and] followed either the ridges or the valleys of the 
site. Housing was scattered (70 percent of the land was vacant), primitive, and primarily 
of wooden construction.”168 Gutheim’s comment on the site reveals that the 
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envirotechnical regime that the private homeowners in Barry Farms had built was one 
that largely conformed to the topography and hydrology of the landscape. Barry Farms’ 
post-Civil War development ran along the ridges and valleys of the area. 
 As urban renewal continued apace in the late-1940s and early 1950s, the 
periphery of the Barry Farms complex, which was still sparsely inhabited, came under 
increasing scrutiny from the NCHA and the NCPPC.169 The agencies undertook a major 
study of the housing, environmental, social, and economic conditions of Barry Farms and 
a smaller, neighboring area named Marshall Heights in 1944, the year after Barry Farm 
public housing complex was completed. According to the study, “‘[r]ural blight’ was 
largely a function of the layout of the area, which was difficult to police and provide with 
other essential services.”170 By rural blight, the two agencies meant scattered homesteads, 
some of which were built on private roads and contained dilapidated structures. The 
solution that the NCPPC and the NCHA offered was to redevelop the neighborhood as a 
whole, in order to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing for both local residents and 
families displaced by slum clearance activities across the river. Of course, this would 
require the eviction of the smallholding families that had long lived in both Marshall 
Heights and Barry Farms and the demolition of their homes. 
 Those smallholders rejected the redevelopment plans put forward by the two 
agencies. Instead of the wholesale demolition and reconstruction of their neighborhood, 
residents of Barry Farm and Marshall Heights wanted the appropriate public agencies to 
build and expand sewerage according to the existing street plan, which largely followed 
the many ravines and hillsides of the area. The NCPPC rejected this plan, however, 
concerned about that the scheme would “[obstruct] future development by strengthening 
the obsolete street pattern.”171 Although the RLA announced slum clearance plans for the 
area in 1946, public protest would delay action for several more years. With urban 
renewal and demolition taking place in parts of Northwest Washington, the need for 
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public housing in other neighborhoods placed a great deal of pressure on the NCHA to 
move forward with construction plans.172  
 Locals’ rejection of urban renewal plans around the periphery of the Barry Farms 
complex represented a stand against powerful redevelopment agencies. Barry Farms still 
had symbolic importance. It was a landscape built in the shadow of slavery and the 
exploitative plantation system. It also represented a rejection of the past hardships of 
slavery for idle masters. Smallholding farmers built Barry Farms over the course of 
seventy-five years. Suddenly, large agencies stepped in to assert their right to control and 
reorder the landscape.  
 Those agencies—the NCHA in particular—took a paternalistic approach to urban 
planning. Until 1952, John Ihlder remained in charge of the NCHA. He was steeped in 
Progressive Era notions about the relationship between blight, environmental decline, and 
the health of the city. He believed in environmental transformation on a large scale to 
prevent the deterioration of the city and the social, moral, and physical wellbeing of its 
citizens. Ihlder had also worked through the New Deal Era, which had invested great 
faith in the ability of experts—Ihlder among them—to bring forward positive changes in 
the landscape. Ihlder believed that he knew what was best for the local community. 
 Neighborhood resistance to the redevelopment plans continued through 1947. In 
January of 1948, the House Appropriations Committee rejected funds for the 
Redevelopment Land Agency’s scheme to redevelop the area. Remarkably, this rejection 
was carried out with reference to the neighborhoods’ activist groups and individuals. In 
this instance, African American homeowners and residents were able to push back on 
redevelopment and urban renewal programs. This was an aberration considering the 
power of urban renewal agencies and the popular support for slum clearance in the 
immediate post-Second World War period.173  
Throughout the following month, the NCPPC and the NCHA regrouped, and 
attempted to craft a plan that would be able to pass the House Appropriations Committee. 
The agencies promised that residents of the Barry Farm neighborhood and the Marshall 
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Heights area would be rehoused first if redevelopment threatened their homes.174 Three 
days after that announcement was made, on March 6th, 1948, the agencies made a new 
appeal for slum clearance funds for Southeast Washington, this time to a Senate 
Appropriations Slum Committee.175 On March 12th, the Senate subcommittee provided 
$50,000 for slum clearance planning, but explicitly forbade appropriations for actual 
clearance activity.176 This was a victory for the citizens’ groups who had protested the 
redevelopment plan. In 1949, Congress passed a new housing act that explicitly forbade 
funding “for those projects that had been presented to and rejected by Congress[,]” which 
included the Barry Farm and Marshall Heights area plans drafted by the Redevelopment 
Land Agency and the National Capital Parks and Planning Commission.177 
Against the trend for the time, residents’ activism in the late-1940s was 
successful. Congress rejected the NCHA and NCPPC’s plans to expand the stock of 
public housing in the Barry Farm neighborhood specifically because of residents’ 
backlash. It is remarkable, in the history of urban development that a scattered, group of 
homeowners was able to resist the power of municipal agencies that had long worked to 
seize their land. It was also surprising considering the political power structure of the 
District of Columbia. Without local politicians to lean on or any representation at the 
federal level, it was often difficult for working-class or impoverished residents of the 
capital to be heard. The protestors around Marshall Heights and Barry Farms may have 
succeeded because they were private homeowners. In any case, their ability to 
successfully push back against the NCHA was anomalous in the case of such 
development schemes. Surrendering to the Redevelopment Land Agency, the National 
Capital Parks and Planning Commission, and the National Capital Housing Authority 
would have led to the loss of the community’s control of the land in the neighborhood.  
The question of building more public housing and further integrating Barry Farms 
into the municipal infrastructure systems and envirotechnical networks arose once again 
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in 1953, four years after the apparent victory on the part of the citizen activists. In that 
year, the metropolitan planning organizations began studying the Barry Farm area, a 
necessary legal prerequisite to slum clearance activities. The slum study was covered in 
the Washington Times-Herald on October 7th, 1953. That article points out that Barry 
Farms 
 
in general is topographically rugged, having a number of steep hills and 
ravines that complicate construction, to say nothing of an impracticable 
street layout that fails to blend with the highway pattern of the 
surrounding neighborhood. These complications have discouraged 
builders from developing Barry Farms. For that reason, the area is one of 
the few remaining large tracts of open land left within the city confines. 
In addition, Congress wrote into the Housing Act of 1949 a provision 
that blocks use of public redevelopment funds in both the Barry Farms 
and the Marshall Heights subdivisions.”178  
 
Clearly by 1953 Barry Farm remained a fairly underdeveloped part of Washington. The 
street layout remained much as it had for the previous century, running from house to 
house along the ridges and valleys of the Southeastern neighborhood. Although other 
neighborhoods around Barry Farms—and the public housing complex itself—had been 
integrated into the region’s envirotechnical networks, Barry Farms remained somewhat 
separate. 
 The National Capital Housing Authority, the Redevelopment Land Agency, and 
the National Capital Parks and Planning Commission launched their last effort to fully 
redevelop Barry Farm and Marshall Heights after the organizations finished their study of 
the neighborhoods. In May of 1954, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee passed 
a bill that stripped away the language of the 1949 Housing Act, which had prevented 
development in Barry Farm and Marshall Heights. Eager to proceed with urban renewal 
projects in Southeast, John Seerles Jr., then the executive director of the Redevelopment 
Land Agency, stated “new plans for Barry Farm redevelopment would probably would be 
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drawn up if the Senate and House approve the change voted by the group.”179 
Unfortunately for Seerles and the rest of the Redevelopment Land Agency, as well as the 
NCPPC and the NCHA, a joint House and Senate committee rejected the proposal to 
develop Barry Farm and Marshall Heights, and the plans were laid to rest in July of 
1954.180 This was the final victory for residents of Barry Farm and Marshall Heights. 
 These disputes between community activists and the urban planners and builders 
who lived on opposite sides of the Anacostia represent an important theme in the history 
of the Barry Farm site. The activists in Barry Farm and Marshall Heights fought to 
protect the envirotechnical regime that their forebears had built over the course of about 
seventy-five years. The anti-renewal activists on the periphery of Barry Farms fought for 
local control over their neighborhood; theu sought to maintain the structures and street 
layout that they had lived with for decades. Congress eventually allowed small homes 
built along ravines and gullies to remain for a time, despite the NCHA’s desire to build 
large-scale public housing complexes. The activists at the Marshall Heights site were 
defending their homes, of course, but their dispute also represents the long fight between 
locals and experts from further afield. The NCHA and RLA hoped to take control of the 
land, water, and infrastructures of the smallholding community in Marshall Heights. 
Instead, residents fought back in Congressional hearings and the courts. Ultimately, the 
locals won.  
 
Running Barry Farms: Daily Life on a Sensitive Site, 1954-1983 
 
While these fights over the redevelopment and integration of Barry Farms and 
Marshall Heights continued, life went on in the Barry Farms public housing complex. 
Barry Farms was, in the first years after it opened, sometimes described as modern 
housing for the poor in the local press. Barry Farms was never selected as a model 
demonstration project but it was featured prominently in a 1954 Washington Post and 
Times Herald article. In this article, resident Gloria Young and her family describe their 
new Barry Farm home by stating that the “modest four rooms and bath unit at the Barry 
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Farms public housing project looked like a mansion[.]”181 Indeed, the NCHA’s properties 
were improvements over the dilapidated alley dwellings that most families moved from. 
The Young family had previously lived in a run-down home on L Street SE. While living 
there, the family had to endure “a tumbled-down row brick that has no plumbing or 
cooking facilities and gaping holes in the rear wall where windows should be.”182 “The L 
Street house[,]” the Post and Times Herald article continues, “had a room which was 
originally a kitchen. The floor, however, had rotted away and the Youngs had not used 
the room for years. Likewise, two of the remaining five rooms could not be used because 
of fallen plaster, leaky roof and no windows.”183 Barry Farms, on the other hand, offered 
four stable walls, new roofs and floors, and clean and healthful surroundings in what was 
then relatively underdeveloped Barry Farms. 
 At least, that was how the National Capital Housing Authority described its 
housing complexes. For the Authority, the projects were the means to bring poor 
residents up to meet the middle-class standards of cleanliness and decency. Yet, very 
early in its operating history, the Barry Farm complex faced environmental problems. 
Vermin were the most prominent sign of the deterioration of the Barry Farm community. 
In 1966, twenty-three years after the complex opened, the Senate Subcommittee on 
Business and Commerce held a series of hearings on the housing conditions in Barry 
Farms. The Subcommittee was predominantly interested in ensuring that landlords—
including the National Capital Housing Authority—made appropriate repairs and that 
tenants of “insanitary” buildings were properly relocated.  
One speaker from Barry Farm participated in the hearing. Louise Davis had lived 
in Barry Farm for ten years, since 1956, just two years after Gloria Young remarked on 
the improved living spaces offered by the Barry Farm complex. Davis attended the 
hearings to voice two concerns. As she put it to the subcommittee, “No. 1 is rats….[m]y 
son was sitting outside on the morning of June 6, when a big rat came out of the vent that 
leads into the basement or storeroom that is in the exclusive control of the NCHA.”184 
Davis goes on to state “[t]he people of Barry Farms are still without their screen doors. 
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Over one-third of the tenants of Barry Farms have holes in their walls and ceilings or 
some other bad holes that need repairing; if not, a rathole, because I know that one-third 
of the homes in Barry Farms has ratholes. My neighbor was told to put putty on her 
ceilings so that it would stop failing.”185 Davis then asks the subcommittee “[w]hy can’t 
we have decent, safe, and sanitary housing, too?”186 
Davis’s testimonial points to the fairly rapid decline of Barry Farm. Over the 
course of about a decade, the project went from being recognized in the press as a 
modern low-income housing development to an unsafe and unsanitary place to live. 
Stuck with a dearth of critical materials and pressure from the FPHA to follow a rapid 
production schedule, the contractors hired to build Barry Farm worked to meet their 
deadline, imperiling the promise of decent, safe, and sanitary housing from the very start. 
Improvements in basic infrastructures could not, according to the tenants of Barry Farm, 
make up for the structural unsoundness of the project itself. Although they did not 
describe it in these terms, residents of Barry Farms were aware of the envirotechnical 
obstacles of poor siting—which was itself a product of the NCHA’s transformation of the 
landscape—and poor materials. These two physical problems were exacerbated by the 
shifting soils and rainfall within the envirotechnical system, which undermined the 
complex’s stability. 
 The National Capital Housing Authority connected the Barry Farms community 
to the District of Columbia’s water supply. The pipes that it built integrated the rental 
units into an envirotechnical network that spanned the metropolitan region. Water flowed 
from reservoirs in and around the city, through mains and into smaller pipes, eventually 
reaching residents who perhaps had lived most of their lives relying on community 
pumps outside of their homes and yards. But very basic material problems undermined 
the routine flow of water through the system. Poor quality materials—the only ones 
available during the war—frequently broke down. Sinks stopped up, and uncontained 
water spilled from broken pipes and joints. Then, a cascade of negative environmental 
and material consequences followed. Plaster crumbled and corroded once it became 
oversaturated, and rats found new holes and spaces through which to threaten the renters. 
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Shifting soils and heavy rainfalls outside stressed the exterior of the complex’s buildings. 
Decent safe, and sanitary housing required an envirotechnical system that kept water 
contained and surfaces dry. Once one element fell apart, other materials did too, creating 
unhealthy and unsafe living spaces for public housing residents. 
The tenant grievance document goes on to discuss the structural conditions of the 
housing: 
 
The plumbing at Barry Farms is now being replaced with copper piping. 
Heretofore, the wartime plumbing was continually breaking down. And because 
it was laid out sequentially, when one sink got stopped up, so too did the 
adjoining neighbors' sinks. Incidentally, NCHA has levied repair charges on all 
the tenants thus plagued with antiquated plumbing including the "innocent" 
neighbors, and this has occurred not only at Barry Farms. The old plaster hasn't 
stood up, particularly under the attack of leaking plumbing in second-floor 
bathrooms. There are many holes in Barry Farms' walls and ceilings, some 
having been complained of for months, even years. One woman with a broken 
upstairs toilet had to try to cook for weeks on a stove that was below the dripping 
wastes. The stench was sickening.187 
 
Although the NHCA received a greatly enhanced budget just prior to the Second World 
War, it came with the caveat that it would build housing quickly and on a large scale. The 
USHA breathed down the neck of John Ihlder and the NCHA’s leadership, insisting that 
projects be completed at a rapid clip. These were bureaucratic and economic problems 
that complicated the NCHA’s ability to build decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings. The 
poor materials interacted with the hastily transformed site to produce substandard 
housing. The envirotechnical system did not operate as Ihlder and the NCHA intended. 
Hence, projects like Barry Farm deteriorated quickly over the course of just a few 
decades.  
 The rats and decaying plaster remained dangerous hazards for Barry Farms 
residents through the mid-1960s. In 1966, the “Band of Angels,” a citizen activist 
organization based in Barry Farms staged a demonstration and protest over poor housing 
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conditions. The activists were primarily concerned that they were not being consulted 
about the proper use of $300,000 earmarked for housing improvement by the NCHA’s 
executive director Walter Washington. Lillian Wright, the chair of the Band of Angels, 
stated in The Washington Post that “[s]ince we live here we are best qualified to advise 
Mr. Washington on how the funds should be spent in the best interests of our 
community[.]”188 Wright argued against the longstanding practice of issuing housing 
policy—including decisions about where to build homes—from the executive offices of 
the NCHA. 
 The Band of Angles highlighted several problems within the Barry Farms 
complex. Most of their concerns had to do with the structural integrity of the complex. 
According to resident Mary Taylor, “I had a pipe burst in my ceiling and about a 6-foot 
area of plaster fell on my baby and another child.”189 In another instance, Elizabeth Reid 
“reported that rats had eaten away the clothes in a neighbor’s bureau and a portion of the 
doors of a closet.”190 The interrelationship between nature and artifice is apparent in both 
of these examples. Rats, undomesticated and dangerous, scuttled through the 
apartments—perhaps aided by cracks in the walls, floors, and ceilings produced by 
broken pipes—destroying property and the structure itself. Water flowed uncontained 
from leaking pipes, which contributed to decaying plaster. The materials used in the 
construction of Barry Farms, along with their arrangement, deteriorated some units 
within the complex. 
 Apart from vermin, structural problems also proliferated at the Barry Farm 
complex through the 1970s and 1980s. Due to the flow of rainwater, the poor quality of 
piping, and the state of dereliction in and around Barry Farm, by the late 1970s the gas 
supply became unreliable. In 1976, the Barry Farm housing complex lost all gas for 
heating. In response, the District of Columbia initiated a nine-year program to improve 
the complex’s utilities. The city government was only partially successful. In October of 
that year, heavy rains seeped into the thirty-six year old pipelines, which cut off service 
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to residents.191 Earl Biggs, who was then the manager of the Barry Farm complex for the 
National Capital Housing Authority, had claimed that for months that whenever it rained 
the pressure in the pipes would drop.192 The spokesperson for the gas company stated that 
“the rains and the valley in which the project is located caused water to seep into the 
pipes during the weekend.”193 The hydrology and geology interacted with the aging 
infrastructure of Barry Farm to render housing inhospitable to residents. A gas leak in 
June of 1979 led the city to begin repairing the gas lines, but this project left residents 
without gas for cooking or heating water for nearly two weeks, much to their irritation.194  
 In 1981, the Washington Post profiled Jasper Burnette, the beleaguered acting 
manager of the Barry Farm public housing complex. Burnette would later go on to serve 
as the interim head of the NCHA after it had been renamed the Department of Public and 
Assisted Housing. In the early 1980s, however, Burnette was faced with the difficult task 
of improving the increasingly decrepit Barry Farm complex. The reporter describes the 
conditions of Barry Farm by writing that “[i]nside the apartments there are gaping holes 
in walls and ceilings; flaky plaster, rusting gutters; wheezing refrigerators and run-down 
gas ranges need to be replaced; floors need repair; stopped-up sinks and toilets need 
unstopping; and grubby grass needs cutting.”195  
According to Burnette, the hydrology and topography of the area surrounding 
Barry Farm complicated structural problems and exacerbated stress on the building. He 
stated that “there’s a lot of flooding; water bangs up against the buildings and the 
structures begin to sink and rot[.]”196 The site clearly deteriorated quickly, in large part 
due to the environmental pressures of the area. Poor maintenance is only one part of this 
story, however. The landscape surrounding Barry Farms, and the materials used in its 
construction, interacted poorly with other environmental features of the envirotechnical 
system. The NCHA was under pressure to build housing quickly, and it did, but in doing 
so recognized the difficulties of modifying the terrain and building housing in a large 
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scale. Ultimately, the envirotechnical obstacles within the larger system led the Authority 
to very limited success in achieving decent, safe, and sanitary housing. 
In The Washington Post article that profiled Burnette, resident Phyllis Best stated 
“[e]verything is connected. When one thing goes everything else goes too. First it’s the 
sinks, then the toilets. They leak onto the floors and walls. We’ve got holes in the walls 
and we got mice too.”197 Best understood that public housing was integrated into a larger 
envirotechnical system that included not just the managers of public housing making 
decisions about the landscape and the provision of basic environmental amenities like 
clean water and gas for heating, but also landscape itself. The soil, hydrology, and even 
weather patterns of the Barry Farms location placed a great deal of stress on the complex. 
Ultimately, the economic situation of the NCHA rendered it unfit to fix those stresses. 
 
Conclusion: Barry Farms, Siting, and the History of Envirotechnical Regimes 
 
The ADA built a new envirotechnical regime at the Barry Farms site. The region 
had previously been modified by older envirotechnical regimes, including that of the 
planters, who deforested the landscape in the pursuit of a profitable crop. After the 
planters left their mark on the landscape, the Barry Farms area was handed over to 
families that had formerly been enslaved laborers. They built communities that ran along 
the ravines and hills of the region. The ADA intervened to overthrow that regime, which 
had been built over the course of decades. Within two years, the ADA constructed a new 
envirotechnical regime.  
The ADA’s plans for Barry Farms called for significant modifications to the 
existing landscape. This was necessary for two reasons. First, the guiding Progressive 
ideology of the ADA’s planners meant that public housing should resemble middle-class 
neighborhoods. This was a crucial component of the moral environmentalism of 
reformers like John Ihlder. Thus, Barry Farms would consist of several two-story 
rowhouses with plenty of greenspace. Second, the USHA pressured the ADA to build 
housing on a scale that could accommodate the defense workers moving into the District 
of Columbia. These forces encouraged the ADA to undertake significant modifications to 
the landscape, including tree removal and re-grading. Some of those modifications gave 




rise to environmental obstacles that the Authority could not adequately confront. This 
undermined the ADA’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings.  
By building public housing and extending sewerage, clean water, and gas lines 
into Barry Farm during the 1940s, the City of Washington began to take charge of the 
envirotechnical landscape of the neighborhood. Ultimately, the NCHA successfully 
integrated the Barry Farms complex into regional envirotechnical networks while leaving 
residents of the complex segregated from the local community. Residents of the Barry 
Farms public housing complex became dependent on the infrastructures that could make 
their homes decent, safe, and sanitary, until they began to break down in the 1960s.  
Surprisingly, some residents near the Barry Farms complex successfully resisted 
the incursion of political forces from across the river well into the 1950s, even though the 
NCHA, and NCPPC had sought to redevelop the area since the 1940s. This bucked the 
trend of powerful urban renewal agencies ignoring local dissent as they remade the 
landscape. Heavy rains and slanted grounds contributed to the sinking and warping of 
walls, floors, and roofs. The initial decay of the Barry Farms structure also undermined 
residents’ ability to secure decent, safe, and sanitary housing under the auspices of the 
National Capital Housing Authority. 
In addition to the physical decline of Barry Farms, which negatively affected 
some of the residents at the complex, the NCHA also maintained patterns of racial 
segregation and environmental racism that had persisted in the District of Columbia since 
even before its founding. African American families, once living in cramped and dirty 
alley dwellings, aspired to modern housing through the NCHA’s projects. Instead, 
hundreds of families found that their units or those of their neighbors or friends 
deteriorated as the prevailing envirotechnical system gave rise to significant obstacles to 
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings. Before the NCHA’s work, Barry Farms was a 
product of racial segregation. The NCHA amplified the environmental burden on African 
American communities in Barry Farms by moving hundreds of black families onto an 







Shifting Soils, Uneven Terrains, Poor Materials: The NCHA Confronts 
Environmental and Economic Pressures at Lincoln Heights 
 
 The interactions between the materials used to build public housing complexes 
and the terrain, hydrology, soil mechanics, and seasonality at the sites that the ADA 
selected led to the emergence of significant envirotechnical obstacles. Those obstacles 
hampered the ADA’s efforts to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing. The history of 
Lincoln Heights shows how the materials that the ADA relied on to build its complexes 
were faulty components within the larger envirotechnical system. As the ADA worked to 
build a new hybridized space at the Lincoln Heights site, it found that the natural 
processes at work there—soil movement, the flow of water, the heavy seasonal 
rainfalls—interacted poorly with the manufactured components of public housing. Thus, 
like Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights quickly deteriorated, even though at first it resembled 
the vision that planners like John Ihlder had for decent, safe, and sanitary housing.  
 The materials that the ADA used were far from optimal. They were selected 
because the conditions of the Second World War reduced the availability of better 
building supplies. As the United States’ participation in the conflict geared up during 
1942 and 1943, the ADA was forced to compete with other domestic agencies that were 
desperate for timber, steel, aluminum, copper, and other such components of structurally 
sound homes. Despite its requests, the ADA often lost the fight for such materials. 
 The environment enters into this history as another force that undermined the 
ADA’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Without optimal materials available, 
the environment placed a great deal of stress on the Lincoln Heights complex. Any 
envirotechnical system is dynamic. It reshapes itself as nature and artifice mingle and act 
together in both anticipated and unanticipated ways. In moments when the 
envirotechnical system acted in ways that the ADA did not intend—for example, when 
heavy rains corroded the roofing materials used at the site—the ADA chose how best to 
respond. But because the envirotechnical system at Lincoln Heights was shaped in part 
by the ADA, institutional politics and the economic situation of the early 1940s also 
played roles in shaping the range of possible responses that the ADA could make. 
Ultimately, the ADA was unable to do much to stem the envirotechnical obstacles that 
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emerged from the interactions between materials and the environment of Lincoln 
Heights. 
 This chapter will examine the construction of Lincoln Heights, tying the problems 
of land subsidence, crumbling foundations, and other structural issues that emerged in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s to the nature of the site on which the complex was located. 
The envirotechnical history of Lincoln Heights was similar to that of Barry Farms. The 
two sites were hilly and moderately forested. Both had long been home to smallholding 
black farmers. In both cases, the ADA demolished the homes that once stood on the sites 
and replaced them with large complexes consisting of two-story, semi-detached homes. 
The final product of the ADA’s work, in both instances, was a modern residential 
neighborhood that was connected to the regional infrastructures considered to be vital to 
modern dwellings. Yet Lincoln Heights reveals far more about the second envirotechnical 
obstacle that ADA planners faced. The materials used to build Lincoln Heights did not 
adequately support the operation of the envirotechnical system. In the case of Lincoln 
Heights, the stress that the environmental components of the envirotechnical system 
exerted on the manufactured components contributed significantly to the ADA’s failure 
to provide decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings. 
 The case of Lincoln Heights reveals much about what ADA planners knew about 
the qualities and characteristics of the spaces in which public housing complexes were 
being built and how they acted on that knowledge. The ADA left behind far more 
correspondence between contractors, site superintendents, and the Authority’s leadership, 
than had been generated at Barry Farms and the history of Lincoln Heights reveals how 
the ADA responded to the envirotechnical obstacles of the site. Even when the ADA’s 
contractors made the Authority’s leaders aware of the situation on the ground, the ADA 
was unable to pivot towards better construction methods. This left more space for the 
environmental features of the site to undermine the manufactured features. Ultimately, 
the ADA did little to rectify those environmental obstacles during the Second World War 
and after. This meant that residents were left to suffer increasingly dire housing 
circumstances as the environment continued to place a great deal of stress upon the 
complex in the 1950s and 1960s. Lincoln Heights demonstrates that the institutional and 
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economic constraints on the NCHA would severely undermine the war projects’ 
achievement of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings.  
 
Setting the Stage: The Environmental Features of Lincoln Heights 
 
Lincoln Heights is located in a particularly hilly section of Washington, DC. From 
the central road that cuts north to south across the complex to 51st street, which runs north 
to south along the eastern side of Lincoln Heights, the elevation drops precipitously from 
about 145 feet to about 90 feet over the span of just about 100 yards, creating a grade of 
about eleven percent between the center of the complex and the right-of-way at 51st Street 
NE. 
 The western side of Lincoln Heights slopes downward from 145 feet to a little 
more than 100 feet. The neighborhood as a whole was built on a series of hills that ran 
through the site from north to south, sloping towards the east and west on either side. An 
urban creek named Watts Branch runs across the northern border of the Lincoln Heights 
neighborhood. At that point, the land slopes sharply towards the creek, which sits at an 
average elevation of forty feet above sea level.198 Across the creek the changes in 
elevation from block to block are much more gradual. Compared to some of the 
neighborhoods surrounding it, Lincoln Heights is particularly hilly, which accounts for its 
relatively low degree of development until after the Second World War.199 
In 1941, twenty-two homes stood on the Lincoln Heights site. Many had been in 
the possession of smallholding farmers and their descendants since the end of the Civil 
War. Locals referred to the community as Lincolnville, which was reflected in the name 
given to the eventual public housing complex. Most of the residents of Lincolnville were 
former slaves and their descendants. Their homes consisted of one-and-one-half acre 
tracts, where homeowners farmed small plots to supplement their incomes and diets. 
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Farmers in the area produced meat, poultry, dairy products, and vegetables.200 Before the 
Second World War, the surrounding neighborhood was much like Barry Farms. It was 
sparsely populated, with a few homes lining the ridges and streams of the area. The roads 
that existed on the plot conformed to the local landscape, connecting scattered farms to 
the main streets. Most of the homes also relied on external water supplies, usually from 
wells located on the properties and lacked indoor sewage.201  
 The site had access to plenty of fresh water but was far from the Anacostia River, 
which became polluted and silted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. 
Watts Branch, which flows from Prince George’s County, Maryland, to the east, into the 
Anacostia River near the Kenilworth Courts housing complex once ran freely through the 
agricultural landscape.202 Today, however, after the work of the NCPPC, NPS, and 
NCHA, Watts Branch runs through a culvert just to the north of Lincoln Heights. This 
was a consequence of the ADA’s desire to transform the small agricultural community 
into a residential neighborhood connected to the rest of the city. The potential flood 
hazard from Watts Branch threatened future construction around Lincoln Heights if it had 
not been properly contained. The channelized Watts Branch runs for about 550 yards 
through this culvert, over which several detached homes and streets were built in the 
1950s and 1960s. Urban renewal agencies within the District of Columbia made 
modifications to the landscape to support large-scale construction. 
 The hydrological history of Watts Branch helps contextualize the problems 
associated with periodic flooding in the area surrounding the eventual site of the Lincoln 
Heights complex. The stream drains part of central Prince George’s County and much of 
central Northeast Washington. In total, the Watts Branch watershed consists of 3.53 
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square-miles.203  In the 1940s, as Lincoln Heights was being built and tenants moved in, 
the government of the District of Columbia and federal planning agencies began tackling 
the problem of frequent unpredictable flooding along Watts Branch. In early 1943, for 
example, the NCPPC purchased fifty lots on either side of the creek between Minnesota 
Avenue to the west and Division Avenue to the east, which is where the culvert north of 
Lincoln Heights begins. The NCPPC wanted to prevent construction too close to the 
creek, “which overflows its banks after heavy rains[,]” according to Norman C. Brown, 
then the land purchasing director for the Commission.204 At the same time that the 
Lincoln Heights complex was under construction, just a few yards to the north the 
NCPPC was working on flood abatement strategies. Federal agencies in the District of 
Columbia hoped that by channelizing and burying Watts Branch they could prevent 
future flooding at the new housing developments being built in and around Lincoln 
Heights in the early 1940s. Their efforts proved futile. In the 1950s and 1960s, suburban 
development around the sources of Watts Branch in Prince George’s County added more 
impervious surfaces to the watershed, which demanded that Watts Branch carry water 
and run-off in increasing volumes towards the Anacostia River.  
Suburban developments were not solely to blame for the flood risk posed by 
Watts Branch. The NCPPC’s re-routing efforts sometimes overburdened sections of the 
creek. The agency dug a new streambed in 1950—more than a decade after the opening 
of Lincoln Heights—which turned at a nearly ninety-degree angle to the west of Division 
Avenue, just a few feet north of the public housing complex. The new course was a result 
of the District of Columbia’s desire to straighten the course of Watts Branch, “which 
[had] been repeatedly flooded[.]”205 Apparently, those efforts failed. Eight years later, 
spurred by demands from a local citizen advocacy group, the District of Columbia once 
again embarked on “[a] project designed to eliminate flooding of homes by Watts Branch 
during storms[.]”206 The creek posed periodic threats to local homeowners and developers 
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as eastern Washington, D.C. continued to grow. Older hydrological features of the 
region—like Watts Branch and its tributaries—were embedded within a larger 
envirotechnical system that various city agencies built to ensure the safe and profitable 
development of this part of eastern Washington, D.C. Sometimes however, the 
modifications that those agencies made to support development acted in frustrating and 
complicated ways, which necessitated further action to maintain the envirotechnical 
system. 
As with Barry Farms, the ADA hired an appraiser to visit the Lincoln Heights site 
and report on the condition of existing property, the landscape, and its monetary value. 
The appraiser visited the sites that the NCHA hoped to acquire and traversed the yards 
and woods abutting residents’ homes. The appraiser’s report thus revealed much about 
the variations in elevation across the site. Based on his findings, it appears that the ADA 
chose to embark on an ambitious project. The obvious and apparent variations in 
elevation at the site would require extensive modifications if the ADA hoped to build on 
the scale that it (and the USHA) desired. As detailed below, the contractors who built 
Lincoln Heights would face difficulties while trying to build the complex in conformity 
with the ADA’s vision. They reported a great deal about the environmental obstacle 
posed by the relationship between the environmental features of the site and the materials 
available for construction.  
 In order to accurately describe the characteristics of the landscape at Lincoln 
Heights, the appraiser divided the property into 253 individual squares, each of which 
was about 100 feet deep and fifty feet across. Of these 253 squares, the appraiser listed 
only seventy-four as level. For the remaining squares, the appraiser found that 126 were 
sloped (meaning they changed in grade from about two to four feet from front to back); 
twenty-six were very irregular, four were rough, twenty were rough and irregular, and 
three were rolling and rough. This means that only 29% of the property was level. The 
majority of the property’s squares were sloped (about 50%) and the rest (21%) were 
rough, irregular, or rolling.207 The appraiser’s descriptions of the small farmhouses and 
the surrounding terrain at the Lincoln Heights site showed that the builders would face 
uneven ground during construction, much as they had at Barry Farms.  




 During the construction process, the contractors would also make the executive 
board keenly aware of the complexity of the Lincoln Heights site, and its vulnerability 
during particular seasons and because of the modifications they made to support a large 
housing project. Due to financial and material constraints the ADA was unable to address 
these issues as the complex was built, thus locking together manufactured and natural 
components of an envirotechnical system that interacted poorly with each other. While 
the envirotechnical system at Lincoln Heights would continue to work in dynamic ways, 
thus perpetuating the envirotechnical obstacles associated with the materials that the 
contractors first witnessed during construction, the ADA was left in a position of 
powerlessness to respond to those obstacles. It was too constrained by the wartime 
economy. Thus, the envirotechnical system would continue to build and rebuild itself, 
damaging the structures that residents relied on. 
 
Building Lincoln Heights: Contractors Face Seasonality and Flooding, 1943-1945 
  
As was the case for Barry Farms, when the NCHA first began construction at the 
Lincoln Heights site, some local homeowners expressed dissatisfaction with the siting of 
the project. White homeowners in the surrounding areas did not want to live in close 
proximity to a large public housing complex for African Americans. Charles M. Thomas, 
then the President of the Northeast Boundary Association, wrote about his concerns in a 
1943 letter to Eleanor Roosevelt.208 According to him, the Association looked on the 
African American communities as backwards and undeveloped. “[T]he old Lincoln 
                                                        
208 Roosevelt had long been interested and active in Progressive-era causes such as housing, 
education, and general urban issues. In many ways she embodied similar values to those of reformers 
like John Ihlder. Her husband’s role as the 32nd President from 1933-1945 gave her an advantage in 
advocating for particular Progressive causes, as well as the financial and political platform to address 
perceived problems. Contemporary sources describe Roosevelt as “interested in progressive 
education and social questions, housing, and the general furtherance of women’s and children’s 
causes[.]” [See: The Poe Sisters, “Wives of Presidents Have Been Active In Organizations Promoting 
Public Welfare: Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt Interested in Housing and Education,” The Washington Post, 
January 20th, 1937. Roosevelt also served as the honorary president of the Washington Committee on 
Housing (later renamed the Washington Housing Association), which consisted of a number of 
private citizens of means who sought “to improve housing conditions in Washington, particularly 
among families of low income.” See “Vacant Homes Found for All Alley Residents: House District 
Committee Gets Report From Housing Group,” The Washington Post, May 3rd, 1934 and “MS 597 
Washington Housing Association Records, 1935-1959,” Special Collections Finding Aid (Washington, 
DC: Historical Society of Washington, DC, revised April 2016) available online at 
http://www.dchistory.org/uploads/fa/ms0597.pdf (accessed May 14th, 2019).  
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Road”, Thomas writes, “now resembles a post Civil War ramshackle colored highway 
through some backward village.”209 Thomas’s letter to Roosevelt built on a previous 
complaint from the North East Boundary Association against the siting of public housing 
in the Lincoln Heights area. In October of 1943, one month before the Association 
contacted Roosevelt, its Housing Committee petitioned the NCHA not to construct public 
housing in the neighborhood. This complaint was one of many from white homeowners 
across Washington who were soon to be neighbors with public housing residents. This 
was sparked by racial animosity, primarily, since the plans for Lincoln Heights stated that 
the complex was meant for African Americans.210 Local white homeowners were aware 
that the project would be located in a black neighborhood, but they worried about the 
concentration of so many families in Lincolnville. Despite white residents’ concerns, 
planning and construction for Lincoln Heights began in earnest in 1944 and continued 
into 1945.211  
Ihlder recruited the architectural firm Saarinen and Swanson to design Lincoln 
Heights. The firm’s architects planned Lincoln Heights with a system of curving roads 
that provided access to greenspace and the freestanding buildings, bucking the uniform 
grid evident throughout most of the District of Columbia.212 Even though the complex 
was being built during a global armed conflict and in the capital of one of the major 
combatants, Ihlder stuck to the vision he had held for decent, safe, and sanitary housing 
throughout his career. Still, economic and institutional forces would place a great deal of 
stress and frustration on the NCHA and its contractors as the complex was built. 
Ultimately those forces would provide greater room for the natural features of the 
                                                        
209 Charles M. Thomas, President of the North East Boundary Citizens Association, to Eleanor 
Roosevelt, November 14th, 1943; Lincoln Heights Dwellings 1943-1945, Box 1, Entry P 23: Records 
Regarding Public Housing Dwellings, 1943-1959, RG 302, NARA. 
210 “War Housing Project Must Go, NHA Rules,” The Washington Post, August 18th, 1945. 
211 Records on the construction of Lincoln Heights for 1944 are scarce, consisting primarily of one 
memorandum from John Ihlder to the heads of the various offices under the National Capital Housing 
Authority saying that it was necessary to change the name of the project from Hillside Dwellings to 
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Washington. See: Memorandum from John Ihlder to NCHA Heads of Offices, October 12th 1944; 
Lincoln Heights Dwellings 1943-1945, Box 1, Entry P 23: Records Regarding Public Housing 
Dwellings, 1943-1959, RG 302, NARA. 
212 Eeva-Liisa Pelkonnen and Donald Albrecht, editors, Eero Saarinen: Shaping the Future (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2010), 145. Saarinen would go on to design the Gateway Arch, 
which was completed in the 1960s. 
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landscape to undermine the stability of the manufactured components. This was clear to 
the contractors as they built Lincoln Heights.  
Furthermore, even though the pressure of wartime population surges demanded 
quick and timely completion, the Lincoln Heights contractors continually failed to meet 
construction deadlines. There were two reasons for these delays. First, labor strikes on the 
Lincoln Heights site took time away from construction and planning. Second, 
environmental obstacles like the quality of the soil for construction purposes and rainfall 
pushed back work on the site by damaging some of the materials used. What the history 
of construction at Lincoln Heights reveals is that the quality of the materials used in 
public housing mattered almost as much as the siting of the complexes in some cases. 
Those two envirotechnical obstacles were related, but it is possible to distinguish their 
roles within the larger system. When substandard materials interacted with local weather 
patters, they often broke down. The deterioration of materials at the Lincoln Heights 
during construction was a consequence of local patters of rainfall and soil movement.  
Thus the obstacles that the contractors encountered were precursors to later problems 
with flooding and structural instability that emerged in the 1950s. 
 Once again in the case of Lincoln Heights, the NCHA opted not to involve the 
Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia. Responsible for inspecting the 
structural quality of the buildings, the layout of infrastructures throughout the buildings 
and the complex, and the strength and stability of the soil, the Board of Commissioners 
could have offered significant help to the NCHA and its contractors. With the federal 
government encouraging the rapid completion of wartime housing, however, the District 
of Columbia was unable to play a role in the design and construction process. The NCHA 
resisted requests from both the District government and its own contractors to invite 
expert inspectors on site to monitor and certify the work being done. Homer J. Smith, the 
site manager for Lincoln Heights, noted this when he wrote to John Ihlder, stating that 
“[s]ince FPHA [Federal Public Housing Authority] has decided to proceed with the 
construction of Lincoln Heights Dwellings without obtaining a permit from the District of 
Columbia, it is strongly recommended that specialized personnel be obtained to inspect 
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the plumbing, heating, and electrical work.”213 Smith went on to write that “[t]he above 
recommendation is made on the assumption that the District of Columbia Inspector’s 
Office will not inspect the work, that a new employee properly qualified to perform the 
work probably is unobtainable at the present time[.]”214 
 The dispute between the NCHA and the Board of Commissioners became an item 
of public knowledge when The Washington Post reported on it in July of 1945. On July 
7th, 1945, The Washington Post reported on the decision. “Failure of the Federal Public 
Housing Authority to seek a local building permit”, the article states, “for 
constructing…Lincoln Heights housing development in Northeast Washington is based 
on ‘national policy’ and not on intent to violate District building requirements.”215 Oliver 
P. Winston, director of the District of Columbia’s field office for the Federal Public 
Housing Administration, claimed that the FPHA, as an agency of the federal government, 
could not be compelled to follow local municipal regulations. The FPHA’s official 
position was that the municipal government had no standing to compel a federal agency 
to follow its permitting rules. 
 The Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia thought otherwise, and 
sent word to Tom C. Clark, then the Attorney General for the United States, that the work 
was illegal. The Commissioners pointed out that in addition to failing to secure a building 
permit, the builders also refused to sign a covenant that ensured the construction of 
separate water, sewer, and electrical systems in each building. The National Capital 
Housing Authority, acting as an agent for the Federal Public Housing Administration, 
called on the contractors to follow all local District of Columbia standards and 
regulations.216 Yet the sources show that neither the FPHA nor the NCHA followed the 
basic provision in the city’s building code to allow an inspector to investigate the site and 
issue a permit. Furthermore, the NCHA disregarded the site manager’s suggestion to call 
in an outside expert to assess the project.  
                                                        
213 Homer J. Smith to John Ihlder, “Heating, Plumbing, and Electrical Inspection Recommended for 
Lincoln Heights Dwelling,” April 2nd, 1945; Lincoln Heights Dwellings 1943-1945, Box 1, Entry P 23: 
Records Regarding Public Housing Dwellings, 1943-1959, RG 302, NARA. 
214 Ibid. 




 Ultimately, the NCHA won the dispute and carried on construction under its own 
guidance and monitoring. Realizing that he would not receive the District’s approval of 
his crew’s work, Smith issued his own recommendations to the NCHA. He wrote:  
 
1. That extreme care be used in deciding when proper soil has been found on 
which to place footings. 
 
2. That in any case of doubt, load tests be run before proceeding with the footing 
construction.  
 
3. That changes in water levels be observed as a guide to possible future 
shrinkage to be expected in the subsoil. 
 
4. That buildings be placed and grading be completed in the lower portions of the 
site before placing buildings close to tops of major cuts in grade. 
 
5. That the compliance with D.C. Code requirements be given special 
attention.217 
 
Smith concisely details the relationship between slope, water, and soil in the Lincoln 
Heights area. Not all slopes respond the same way to the flow of water, and the 
relationship between soils, water, and subsidence are questions for engineers.218 The 
degree of subsidence, for example, depends on the storage capacity of various strata 
within the ground, and the average recharge and discharge rate of the soil.219 Land and 
soil movement is also influenced by the presence or absence of trees and other vegetation 
on the ground. Through rigorous testing experts could have helped guide the construction 
of Lincoln Heights. Smith, in the above excerpt, called for load testing to determine the 
specific weight of any foundations that the soil could carry without becoming damaged as 
                                                        
217 Homer J. Smith to P.W. Clogston, “Lincoln Heights Dwellings,” April 3rd, 1945; Lincoln Heights 
Dwellings 1943-1945, Box 1, Entry P 23: Records Regarding Public Housing Dwellings, 1943-1959, 
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a result of land subsidence. He indicated that the site was potentially unstable, and that 
the NCHA should take proper precautions to build lasting structures.  
 The contractors witnessed the troubling relationship between the modified 
landscape and seasonal rainfall firsthand. In November of 1945, P.W. Clogston, then the 
Superintendent of Construction, wrote to Bernard E. Loshbough, then serving as the 
NCHA’s Deputy in Charge of Operations, that the project was only 62.4 percent 
complete, when in fact the agreed upon schedule would have placed Lincoln Heights at 
99.7 percent complete by that month.220 Clogston identified the main issue at hand when 
he wrote that extremely heavy rains during the month of July delayed progress on laying 
foundations and actually constructing some of the last remaining buildings on the site. 
That is, the typically heavy summer rains in the District of Columbia set back work on 
Lincoln Heights. Furthermore, the District of Columbia Department of Sanitation was 
concurrently working to build sewers and water lines in the area, leaving many of the 
streets torn up since no work could be done during heavy rainstorms.221 The National 
Capital Housing Authority was kept informed about the role of the weather and frequent 
heavy rains that mitigated progress on the site. 
 Apart from the envirotechnical obstacles posed by the site itself, Lincoln 
Heights’s contractors also expressed dismay about the quality of available materials. For 
example, in the summer of 1945, Homer Smith wrote to inform John Ihlder that there was 
                                                        
220 P.W. Clogston, Construction Superintendent to Mr. Bernard E. Loshbough, Deputy in Charge of 
Operations, “Report on Progress and Status of Lincoln Heights,” November 30th, 1945; Lincoln 
Heights Dwellings 1943-1945, Box 1, Entry P 23: Records Regarding Public Housing Dwellings, 1943-
1959, RG 302, NARA. Contractors at the Lincoln Heights site also contended with labor unrest, which 
further delayed construction. In a letter from P.W. Clogston to John Ihlder, the superintendent of 
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Draftsmen Union began to picket work at nine in the morning on July 10th, 1945. As the number of 
striking workers rose, the teamsters joined in and refused to drive crucial building material to the 
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Heights. The engineers who struck affected the construction project at a crucial early stage, since 
they were “held responsible for the mechanical and other technical features of the finished structure, 
including its safety, utility for specific functions, and architectural detail.” See: P.W. Clogston to John 
Ihlder, “Labor Situation at Lincoln Heights,” July 11th, 1945; Lincoln Heights Dwellings 1943-1945, 
Box 1, Entry P 23: Records Regarding Public Housing Dwellings, 1943-1959, RG 302, NARA. 
221 Clogston to Loshbough, 2. 
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“an acute shortage of brick in the Washington area.”222 The conditions of the Lincoln 
Heights site would place great stress on the available materials, especially considering 
how little investment the NCHA made in testing and examining the hydrology and soil 
stability of the area.  
 Rainstorms also affected the roofs of the buildings that were still being built. 
Throughout months of heavy rainfall in 1945, the contractors were still hurrying to 
complete the roofing on the remaining structures. Half-finished buildings could be found 
throughout the building site. Lumber shortages complicated the construction process. The 
workers were forced to rely on cheaper—and flimsier—gypsum or drywall boards 
instead of wood for the roofs and the walls. Clogston noted a number of problems with 
gypsum, foremost of which were its weakness, relative to wood, and also its tendency to 
crumble and dissolve when exposed to water. On the last buildings constructed at the site, 
the roofs consisted of two layers of half-inch thick gypsum sheathed in tar. As Clogston 
put it to John Ihlder, “[i]t is unfortunate that such material of only one inch thickness 
must be used in a permanent project, but with the present shortage of lumber it is 
probably deemed necessary.”223 In some cases, Clogston noted, the roofing had cracked 
under the weight of the workmen, calling into question how the coating of the roof could 
proceed at all, considering that workers had to be on top of the roof to coat it.224 
Furthermore, children from the completed units and the surrounding neighborhood 
sometimes snuck into the construction site, playing on the roofs of the uncompleted 
buildings and threatening to damage the gypsum boards. As noted above, the summer of 
1945 was fairly wet, according to the construction site superintendent. Therefore, “any 
leaks that may occur repaired immediately, as the gypsum board deteriorates very rapidly 
when it gets wet.”225 The contractors likely had a very small window, then, to adequately 
coat the gypsum roofs after they were built to protect against dampness and rain.  
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 Clogston and Smith were eyewitnesses to the construction of Lincoln Heights. 
Smith recommended additional testing to ensure that the buildings were properly built, 
while Clogston informed the executives about the rainy conditions at the site and how 
they delayed work and contributed to the deterioration of some materials. Taken together, 
Clogston and Smith spoke` to the poor quality of the materials used at the Lincoln 
Heights site and the environmental obstacles to its construction, respectively. There is 
little evidence that the NCHA adequately tested the site to ensure that buildings were 
built to withstand the flow of water and the movement of soils at the site. Indeed, the 
Authority was operating under pressure from the FPHA to build homes quickly. 
Furthermore, the NCHA’s access to optimal building materials was severely constrained. 
The war demanded that those materials go to uses elsewhere. The observations that 
Clogston and Smith made prefigured many of the problems that would later emerge at the 
Lincoln Heights complex. As the envirotechnical system was built, it encountered several 
obstacles that the NCHA could not sufficiently address. The executives decided, instead, 
to use patchwork fixes like recoating roofs with bitumen. 
 The NCHA was candid about some of the obstacles that it faced during 
construction. In early 1945, John Ihlder remarked on the topography at the Lincoln 
Heights site. On February 5th of that year, Ihlder circulated a memorandum to the other 
board members of the National Capital Housing Authority pertaining to the consideration 
of the Lincoln Heights site for construction. Summarizing the problems inherent in 
actually building public housing in that area, Ihlder wrote: 
 
Lincoln Heights is illustrative [of the difficulties] of constructing public housing. 
The site was suggested to us by the NCP&PC because, due to topography, land 
division, street layout, land titles, etc., it was impracticable for private 
development.226 
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Ihlder was well aware of the impracticalities of constructing the Lincoln Heights public 
housing complex, given the complexity and variation of the terrain of the surrounding 
area. He made his fellow board members aware of those issues as well. The National 
Capital Parks and Planning Commission too saw that the topography of the site rendered 
it unsuitable for private development. Instead, the NCPPC assumed that public funds 
could help develop the site for low-income housing. Yet public funding did not guarantee 
positive outcomes for the completed structures. The NCHA was able to modify the 
landscape and erect housing on a large scale at Lincoln Heights. In doing so, it 
encountered environmental stresses on its buildings stemming from seasonal rainfall and 
sloping hillsides. Its ability to react to those obstacles was constrained by institutional 
politics and a scarcity of key materials. Pressure from the FPHA to build quickly also 
meant that the NCHA flaunted city regulations—such as the inspection process—meant 
to ensure the stability, safety, and durability of construction projects. Ultimately, Lincoln 
Heights opened to the public without a resolution to those obstacles. By the 1950s, 
Lincoln Heights’s failure to provide decent, safe, or sanitary housing was increasingly 
obvious. 
 Despite the frequent delays at the site, contractors finished most of their work in 
December of 1945, to the relief of the National Capital Housing Authority. In building 
Lincoln Heights without regard for some District regulations, however, Ihlder likely 
ended up on the bad side of the city’s Board of Commissioners. Still seeking to exercise 
some sort of oversight over the project, the Commissioners requested information about 
the extent to which the Lincoln Heights project deviated from the city’s building code. If 
those deviations were not adequately addressed, the Commissioners wrote, then the 
project could not be opened to tenants.  
 Ihlder wrote a letter in response to some of the District Commissioners’ queries 
about the Lincoln Heights project. One of the exemptions that Ihlder sought pertained to 
the grading of the site. The District Building Code stated that the finished distance 
between the first floor elevation of a particular apartment building and the grade of the 
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outside wall could not exceed five feet.227 This regulation kept the foundations of lower 
buildings from exposure to too much rainfall, which could contribute to flooding within 
the building and gradual decay of the foundation itself. If the foundation failed, the 
Commissioners worried that structural damage would occur elsewhere in the buildings. 
For buildings further downhill, the exceptionally steep grades could also contribute to 
flooding and water buildup in the rear of the structures.  
 To this concern, Ihlder wrote that “[t]he exceptional steep and irregular 
topographical conditions on this site made the design problem most difficult, and at some 
buildings, conditions forced us to exceed the five foot limitation or to resort to excessive 
retaining wall construction.”228 For reference, some of the grading in the center of the 
Lincoln Heights complex is pictured below:  
 
 
Image taken from Andrew Giambrone, “D.C. Housing Authority Teases Plan to Refinance about a Third of 
its Public Housing Units,” Washington, DC Curbed, February 26th, 2019, 
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May 10th, 2019). 
 
The image above shows the retaining walls built around complexes located on lower 
elevations. The first floor apartments are visible, as is the aboveground distance of the 
exterior wall around the foundation of the buildings further uphill. Ihlder’s comments 
were meant to show that the varied topography of the site itself rendered the District 
Building Code’s stipulations unfeasible. A few years after Lincoln Heights was 
completed, the topography, working in conjunction with heavy rainfall in the area, would 
prove detrimental to the buildings’ structural integrity and residents’ health and 
wellbeing. The poor quality of the building materials within the structures presented 
another envirotechnical obstacle that undermined the integrity of the complex. 
 Once it was completed in late 1945, the NCHA took full control over the Lincoln 
Heights, since the FPHA had completed its financing of the construction process. This 
meant that the NCHA would be tasked with maintenance, repairs, and other physical 
aspects of the Lincoln Heights complex. The construction managers did their job 
informing the NCHA executives about the environmental constraints of the site. It now 
fell to the Authority to properly manage and maintain its new complex. In this regard, it 
is worth reiterating what the executives knew about the physical construction and natural 
environment of the Lincoln Heights neighborhood. First, Ihlder and the Board of 
Directors were kept informed of the construction process, with all of the difficulties that 
the building crews encountered with the terrain and envirotechnical obstacles at the site. 
Second, work was delayed by strikes, rainfall, and a shortage of adequate material. Third, 
because of wartime restrictions, the contractors hired to build Lincoln Heights had to use 
materials that were not suited for the purposes to which they were put. The most 
structurally significant substitution was the use of gypsum boards for roofing, which 
cracked under the weight of workers and children who managed to sneak onto the site. In 
addition, rain corroded the gypsum boards, leading to crumbing roofs and leakage in the 
buildings. Heavy rainfall in spring and summer of 1945 exacerbated these problems, and 
the slow pace of construction overall likely did not help resolve the issue. 
 The construction of Lincoln Heights represented the establishment of a new 
envirotechnical regime. Built on a rolling terrain, the NCHA’s initial modifications to the 
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site—the removal of preexisting structures and trees as well as grading the surrounding 
area to accommodate a large complex—changed the environment in significant ways that 
were meant to support decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Yet the human actors in this 
story were not the sole agents of change at the site. The hybridized landscape of public 
housing exerted pressure on the contractors themselves, who contended with heavy rails 
on sloping hills, which made process of laying foundations difficult. Furthermore, the 
elements stressed the types of materials that went into the complexes, damaging them 
through heavy rains combined with the weight of the roofers and children who made their 
way onto the sites. Finally, bureaucracies sometimes worked at cross-purposes. The 
District of Columbia could not properly inspect the site, which meant that the 
envirotechnical system was likely less stable than if proper care had been taken to test 
and monitor work. The FPHA eliminated the District of Columbia’s participation in the 
project. When the Board of Commissioners requested information about the extent to 
which the site conformed to city code, the NCHA responded by asking for forgiveness 
for breaking the rules. The envirotechnical obstacles posed by the site and the materials 
used in the complex were obvious to the builders from the very beginning. They 
undermined the NCHA’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing, which left 
hundreds of African Americans in deteriorating homes. 
 
Eroding Slopes and Pooling Water: Life at Lincoln Heights in the 1950s and 1960s 
 
For the first decade after it was completed, life at Lincoln Heights went on 
without much concern or attention from the National Capital Housing Authority. The 
Board of Directors only discussed the project in passing, as was the case with most 
complexes after they were completed. The NCHA executives were more interested in the 
bigger question of how best to house the city’s poor than the day-to-day operations of its 
complexes, which were left to local managers. Over the course of the first decade of 
operations at Lincoln Heights, the envirotechnical obstacles that the contractors noted at 
the site and in the buildings began to reemerge. 
 In 1949, George W. Miner, a manager at the Lincoln Heights site, wrote to John 
Ihlder about mounting garbage at the site. According to Miner, tenants at Lincoln Heights 
had complained for several months before he sought attention and help from the National 
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Capital Housing Authority executives. Fourteen incinerators had been built throughout 
the complex to accommodate the demands that four hundred and forty families’ garbage 
placed on the surrounding area. Yet, according to Miner, “[t]he insufficient capacity of 
outside incinerators, the size of the openings for the deposit of trash and garbage plus the 
unusual velocity of the wind are causes of the litter problems at Lincoln Heights.”229 
Apparently, high wind speeds and the exceptionally hilly conditions of the Lincoln 
Heights area made the trash and litter situation particularly difficult to deal with. Since 
1946, the team that ran the Lincoln Heights complex had requested $20,000 to build 
retaining fences, which “would serve as a trap for litter blowing from the outside 
incinerators on top of Lowrie Place Hill”, making the site easier to maintain.230 Miner’s 
concerns show that the topography of Lincoln Heights could make it difficult to keep the 
complex clean. The hills on which the complex was built posed a distinct set of 
environmental problems for the site managers. The visual blight of litter strewn about the 
grounds and carried down hill by drafts was less significant, however, than the structural 
problems that would come to plague the site.  
 In 1952, seven years after Lincoln Heights was completed, John P. Prescott, the 
Assistant Director for Management and Disposition for the Public Housing 
Administration, began carrying on a correspondence with James Ring, who took over the 
role of executive officer after Ihlder’s retirement. Prescott was a federal administrator 
tasked with investigating housing built with assistance from the federal government 
during the Second World War. His inspections revealed several structural problems 
within the Lincoln Heights complex. Upon visiting the site, Prescott noticed that periods 
of heavy rain could pose potential problems for the structural integrity of the buildings as 
well as the landscaping around the homes. The investigator noted the envirotechnical 
obstacles posed by a poor relationship between the materials and the environment at 
Lincoln Heights just seven years after the contractors finished work. 
 Prescott noted that on the roofs of the different apartment buildings, the flashings 
had badly corroded. Flashings are impervious structures built to prevent water from 
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flowing through materials or spaces that could be penetrated, like the joints between a 
chimney and the roof. Rather than calling for rebuilding the flashing on the roofs of 
affected apartment buildings, Prescott suggested recoating the roof with additional 
bitumen, in order to prevent seepage to the floors below.231 In a letter from P.W. 
Clogston seven years prior, he noted that the gypsum boards were particularly vulnerable 
to damage given the heavy rains in the area. While recoating the roofs might have helped 
in the short-term, Prescott’s solution left in place the gypsum boarding that had caused so 
much trouble for the contractors. Furthermore, seven years had passed since the end of 
the Second World War. Material shortages no longer plagued domestic worksites on the 
scale that they had during the conflict. Prescott’s suggestion was cheaper than re-fitting 
the roofs with timber, but also left units susceptible to flooding and warping if heavy 
rains seeped through the gypsum. 
 Prescott’s letter also noted the extensive damage that rainfall brought to the 
grounds of the Lincoln Heights complex. He noted that “[a]dditional retaining walls 
should be erected at the foot of eroded slopes” and, commenting on the shifting soils of 
the site, that “[b]adly eroded slopes at northwest end of Lourie [sic] Street near Division 
Avenue bridge require terracing.”232 Here, Prescott noted that because of the extensive 
rainfall at the Lincoln Heights site and the particularly steep slopes between the different 
apartment complexes in the area, the soil there was not particularly stable, and had shifted 
a great deal since the site was opened to tenants. The National Capital Housing Authority 
had instructed construction crews to build some retaining walls in the past, as stated in 
Ihlder’s response to the Board of Commissioners’ 1945 inquiry, but they had not 
stemmed erosion at the site. Just seven years after crews finished work at the complex, a 
federal administrator noticed the obvious damage wrought by the natural shifting of the 
soil on the Lincoln Heights hilltop. This was an envirotechnical obstacle posed by the 
siting of the complex and the grading that was necessary to support the type of housing 
that Ihlder envisioned. It was similar to the problems that contractors at Barry Farms 
faced when they cut into a hill, leading a wall at St. Elizabeth’s hospital to partially 
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collapse. Proper drainage seemed to be a problem at both Barry Farms and Lincoln 
Heights. 
 In January of 1953, Prescott followed up on his inspection from the preceding 
April and found little improvement at Lincoln Heights. He noted structural problems with 
some of the Lincoln Heights buildings. For example, debris from messy and cluttered 
basements had stopped up some of the drains, leading to water pooling and flooding in a 
handful of buildings. Of course, the National Capital Housing Authority had known about 
the problem of trash disposal in the structures since 1949, when George Miner contacted 
the Board of Directors about the lack of capacity for trash disposal. Some of the buildings 
also had leaking water lines, which would have added to the pools of water in the 
buildings’ basements. One factor that likely complicated the problem of flooding and 
broken water lines was the NCHA’s decision to ignore the District of Columbia 
municipal code calling for individual utility lines for each building. As evidenced at 
Barry Farms, which also had clustered utilities, when one drain or pipe stopped working, 
it also hampered all of the following lines. This allowed water to pool, which added to the 
patterns of flooding evidenced in almost all of the other chapters.233 Prescott also noticed 
that some of the concrete retaining walls on the property had cracked because of the 
shifting soils and heavy rainfall in the area. The retaining walls had originally been built 
to keep the ground in place given the grading of the property, as Ihlder explained in his 
1945 letter to the District of Columbia Board of Commissioners.234 The re-graded and 
terraced site stressed the material components of the envirotechnical system. 
 Although Prescott knew of the structural instability at some of the buildings on 
the site, and brought it up to the NCHA’s executive board, it is unclear what steps were 
taken to rectify those conditions. The question of who would pay for the necessary 
repairs and improvements also mattered, and neither the Public Housing Administration 
nor the National Capital Housing Authority seemed willing to foot the bill. In June of 
1953, Prescott wrote to the National Capital Housing Authority to state that “[w]e 
recognize that considerable work is required to improve drainage, control erosion, and 
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provide ‘Standard’ conditions for landscaping. However, it is strongly recommended that 
a study be made with a recognized landscape architect, or engineer, who will collaborate 
with Local Authority’s technical staff, and who will prepare plans and schedule of 
operations for ultimate correction of this complex problem.”235  
 During the postwar period, however, the NCHA faced a diminished budget. This 
would affect the Authority’s ability to rectify the envirotechnical obstacles at its sites, 
which in turn amplified the effects of natural processes on the materials within the 
envirotechnical system. Between 1946 and 1960, the federal allocation for the Authority 
averaged about $35,018 for operations and maintenance at finished projects.236 The 
Authority experienced a budget increase between the years 1946 and 1951, when the 
budget climbed from $19,250 to $38,000. Between 1951 and 1960, the budget peaked at 
$45,000 in 1953 and was at its lowest point from 1957-1959 at $38,000. During 
Prescott’s investigation, the NCHA was budgeted $38,000 from Congress for 7707 total 
units.237 Considering the significant envirotechnical obstacles present at complexes like 
Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights, this may not have been enough to fully redress the 
problems that Prescott observed. The financial position of the NCHA limited its ability to 
manage the negative outcomes of the envirotechnical system that it had built during the 
Second World War. 
 Prescott’s statement to the National Capital Housing Authority echoes the 
comments made by Homer Smith, the site superintendent during construction, who in 
1945 recommended that if the NCHA chose not to adhere to District regulations, it 
should at least hire an outside expert to study the site. Prescott stated that rather than 
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funding repairs outright, the Public Housing Administration would prefer that a 
recognized expert collaborate with the NCHA’s staff to determine the best path towards 
the “ultimate correction of” the “complex problem” of structural engineering and soil at 
the Lincoln Heights site. In neither case, it appears, did the NCHA follow the advice of 
eyewitnesses to some of the problems of land subsidence and erosion at the complex. 
 The story of Lincoln Heights is not one of a public housing complex opening and 
then slowly decaying as a function of limited funding, lack of repairs, and neglect on the 
part of the municipal and federal authorities. It is evidence that significant 
envirotechnical obstacles—primarily, those pertaining to siting and materials—severely 
constrained the contractors’ ability to erect stable and secure buildings. Those conditions 
were partially features of the site that the NCHA selected, and despite some 
modifications the Authority was unable to fully respond to the stresses brought about by 
the hydrology and topography of Lincoln Heights. From the planning stage forward, 
multiple parties warned the National Capital Housing Authority about the instability and 
precariousness of its surroundings. The site was prone to shifting soils, which threatened 
and indeed undermined the stability of building foundations and the security of retaining 
walls meant to limit soil movement in the first place. Furthermore, superintendents at the 
Lincoln Heights construction site noted crumbling roofs as a function of workers’ weight 
as well as heavy rainfall at the site. Neither the materials used in the complex nor the site 
helped the NCHA achieve decent, safe, or sanitary housing. 
 What the NCHA tried to do, in a limited way, was reshape the landscape of 
Lincoln Heights. After the appraisers and surveyors gave the executives a general 
glimpse of the site, they guided their construction crews on how to modify and reshape 
the landscape in order to bring about positive results for its housing projects. Some of the 
managers involved in that process had experience with the landscape of Barry Farms, 
which also required large investments in earth-moving equipment in order to terrace the 
site, which would allow the projects to be erected. In Lincoln Heights, as in Barry Farms, 
the NCHA encountered one envirotechnical regime—that of the smallholding farmers 
and property-owners in the African American neighborhood—and tried to alter it in order 
to support a new function within the urban landscape: that of good, quality, low-income 
housing. Constraints from the realm of politics and the economy, however, worked to 
 
121 
undermine the NCHA’s goals. The Authority ignored parts of the District of Columbia 
building code and the recommendations of its own managers that special attention should 
be paid to environmental conditions like soil stability and hydrology. Ultimately, then, 
the NCHA refashioned the site in ways that could not overcome environmental stresses. 
The substitution of poorer quality materials—like gypsum and bitumen for the roofing—
further undermined the quality of housing at Lincoln Heights. Ultimately, the new 
envirotechnical regime at Lincoln Heights, which the NCHA hoped would provide for 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing, failed to do so. This had to do with the selection of the 
site, the materials used there, and the NCHA’s ability to respond to environmental forces. 
 
Life in the Lincoln Heights Complex in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
The source material on Lincoln Heights is distinct from that of the other case 
studies because little evidence remains about the daily lives of residents of the housing 
complex. Compared to first-hand accounts and interviews, there is much more 
documentation about the construction of the complex, and the difficulties that contractors 
encountered at Lincoln Heights when it was being built. In 1968, tenants of Lincoln 
Heights did join with residents of James Creek, Greenleaf Gardens, and Knox Hill in a 
suit against the federal government, the National Capital Housing Authority, and the 
government of the District of Columbia, charging that “the NCHA failed to maintain and 
repair their homes in accordance with the city’s housing code and that the city…failed to 
enforce the code requirements on NCHA property.”238 Of course, that would not be the 
first time that the NCHA failed to adhere to the city code pertaining to housing 
conditions.  
 The plaintiffs in the 1968 suit were all residents of World War Two-era public 
housing complexes. In Lincoln Heights specifically, a survey conducted by the NCHA 
revealed hundreds of defects.239 Those defects could be structural, as most of the housing 
complexes included in the suit contained holes in the walls or ceilings that were not 
patched or repaired. Considering the long history of structural damage at the Lincoln 
Heights complex, stretching back to the period when it was actually being built, the 
                                                        




structural deficiencies are not surprising. If these other World War Two-era public 
housing complexes were built with similar haste and improper materials, it would be 
unsurprising for rain to come in through cracks in the ceilings and walls during inclement 
weather.240 
 In order to address some of these lingering structural issues, the National Capital 
Housing Authority launched a novel program in the 1970s. A photograph from 1970 in 
The Washington Post captures the necessity of that rehabilitation program. The image 
reveals not only the steep grading between the different  
 
“D.C. Plans Renewal of Empty Units,” The Washington Post, September 19th, 1970. 
 
buildings, but also the toll that twenty four years of erosion, shifting soils, and rainfall 
took on the concrete surfaces of the complex. Rubble and trash line the exterior surface of 
the complex. The concrete running the length of the buildings was cracked and eroded. 
Spalled concrete at the foot of buildings and along their perimeter spelled trouble, as it 
opened more passages for water to seep into the structures. Clearly the complex was 
desperately in need of repair, both inside and outside. 




 The solution to the problem of blight at the Lincoln Heights complex came from a 
strange source: the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. In 1970, the NCHA 
and the Department of Corrections reached an agreement to allow somewhere between 
forty and fifty inmates, then housed in the Lorton Reformatory in Northern Virginia, to 
live on the Lincoln Heights property while performing long overdue repairs.241 The 
prisoners were tasked with renovating the decrepit and nearly empty Lincoln Heights 
complex, including replacing appliances, repairing windows, doors, and roofs, and 
painting and plastering where necessary.242 Articles covering these repair efforts 
demonstrate the degree to which Lincoln Heights had failed to bring about the standards 
of living first envisioned by the National Capital Housing Authority. Residents had been 
forced to contend with trash strewn across their laws, shifting foundations, flooding, and 
a host of other problems. Coverage of this work in The Washington Post revealed the 
other problems that residents suffered in the complex. 
 The program continued through 1971. Workers lived in a halfway house off-
premises during the course of their repairs at Lincoln Heights. The workday was tightly 
scheduled in order to hasten the work. The Department of Corrections believed that the 
program would allow the incarcerated workers to further develop the plumbing, 
electrical, and carpentry skills that they had first learned in prison jobs. Indeed, Lincoln 
Heights was desperately in need of the sort of structural work that the prisoners 
performed.243 It is difficult to believe that the apartment buildings at Lincoln Heights 
were meant to decay so quickly. Only twenty-five years after the complex was opened, it 
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was deteriorating from the inside and out. By 1971, twenty-six years after Lincoln 
Heights opened, the 440 families that had originally moved into the complex had already 
moved out, for fear of falling plaster, broken floors, and walls ridden with holes. Indeed, 
as records from the construction and early years of Lincoln Heights demonstrate, there 
were significant envirotechnical obstacles at work that degraded the foundations, walls, 
roofs, and basements of the apartment complexes from the very start.  
 Despite the prisoners’ work, conditions at Lincoln Heights failed to improve. 
More families returned to the complex after the prisoners completed the rehabilitation 
project. In 1975, Nadine Winter, chair of the District of Columbia City Council’s 
Committee on Housing, toured the Lincoln Heights complex. During her visit, Winter 
saw a pool of dark water about one foot deep in the basement of one of the apartment 
buildings, left sitting since rains during the previous week because both of the basement’s 
sump pumps had failed.244 Winter questioned the property manager on the site, who eyed 
the cameras and journalists trailing her warily. Winter also pressed the manager to 
respond to questions “about a hole under a pair of steps that had been caused by 
erosion.”245 The land beneath the Lincoln Heights buildings had not ceased to move since 
construction began in 1944. 
 Winter did not address the causal relationship between the local environmental 
conditions and structural problems at the Lincoln Heights site. She was likely unaware of 
the environmental history of the site. But it is possible to connect the problems that 
Winter observed in 1975 to those that Prescott had warned about twenty years earlier and 
those that the site superintendents had seen in 1945. All of these individuals witnessed 
how the topography and hydrology of the Lincoln Heights site had conspired to weaken 
the apartment buildings and imperil tenants. They all noted the problems associated with 
erosion at the site. The National Capital Housing Authority had a sense of the difficulties 
it would encounter, and the construction phase revealed far more about the qualities of 
the landscape. Ultimately, the envirotechnical obstacles that the NCHA encountered 
worked counter to its pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. 
                                                        





 What did this mean for the residents? Lincoln Heights had always been 
segregated, first by policy, and then by fact. It was built on top of a former African 
American community, which had built its own envirotechnical regime. The NCHA 
sought to reorient the landscape and put it to use as a space that could support decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. The landscape was meant to help improve the health and 
economic wellbeing of tenants at Lincoln Heights. Unfortunately, the NCHA was unable 
to surmount the envirotechical obstacles that were so apparent duruing and after 
construction. The wartime economy had set in motion a building program that was 
constrained by the environment from the start. The Authority’s postwar financial 
situation preempted any major changes to the envirotechnical system that the NCHA 
built. Thus, 440 African American families were trapped in deteriorating housing. The 
combination of a regarded landscape and poor materials allowed environmental 
conditions to degrade the quality of the NCHA’s housing stock. The homes that it built 
perpetuated the unequal distribution of environmental burdens to black Washingtonians. 
 In a political twist, by the 1970s, the National Capital Housing Authority was left 
without increases in federal funding necessary to offset the costs of repairs. The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development refused to increase its subsidies to the 
District of Columbia because the city had been found in violation of several federal 
regulations.246 The federal government supported the NCHA and shielded it from local 
regulations in the 1940s. By the 1970s, a federal government that operated with a 
significantly different mission instead punished the NCHA, which had become another 
arm of the municipal government. In 1979, Robert Moore, who had been hired to write a 
confidential report on the state of public housing in the District of Columbia to Marion 
Barry, who was then serving his first term as mayor, ranked Lincoln Heights as the worst 
project in the District in terms of structural deterioration. Those problems, of course, 
were not new, but instead were produced by the pressures of the shifting soils, uneven 
terrain, and heavy rainfall on the materials used at the site. The modified landscape that 
the NCHA’s contractors built could not overcome all of the environmental constraints of 
hilly, deforested, and waterlogged Lincoln Heights.  
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Conclusion: Lincoln Heights and the Legacy of Siting and Materials in Wartime Public 
Housing Complexes 
 
 Seven years after Lincoln Heights opened, officials from the federal agency 
tasked with monitoring and inspecting former wartime housing projects noticed some of 
the structural failures plaguing Lincoln Heights. James Prescott brought these issues to 
the NCHA Executive Board several times, to no apparent avail. In the 1970s, visitors 
noted water pooling in the basements of some of the apartment buildings. Attempts to 
completely rehabilitate the structures in 1970 and 1971—twenty-five years after the 
buildings opened—failed to redress the severe structural failures that the contractors did 
their best to deal with in 1945. The problems with Lincoln Heights persisted in part 
because of the uneven and rainy landscape and because of the ways that environmental 
pressures destabilized the materials that the NCHA’s contractors used. Those materials 
were not replaced until the 1970s. 
 Construction managers at Lincoln Heights saw the soil and water as problems that 
the NCHA should have examined and addressed. The engineers believed that testing the 
soil and water flow in the area might help them design foundations or structures that were 
more suitable given the environmental proclivities of the Lincoln Heights site. Homer J. 
Smith called for tests of the soil and water to be conducted prior to laying the permanent 
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foundations for some of the complexes. But it is unclear whether or not those tests were 
performed, and therefore the contractors may have used foundations that were not suited 
for the landscape of Lincoln Heights. Indeed, cracks in the apartment buildings’ walls, 
flooding, and other such problems related to faulty foundations were observed by visiting 
bureaucrats, inspectors, and residents themselves throughout the subsequent thirty years. 
Although Smith hoped a solution to the environmental hazards of the site could be fixed 
with appropriate materials and building practices, the NCHA’s leadership faced pressure 
from the USHA to build quickly. Ultimately, it compromised the long-term stability of its 
complex for the aesthetic features and surroundings that Ihlder valued. The 
envirotechnical obstacles of the site as well as the relationship between the local 
hydrology and substandard materials diminished the quality of the Lincoln Heights 
complex. The NCHA created a new landscape that was susceptible to envirotechnical 
failures, as the human-built components of the landscape interacted poorly with the 
modified topography and natural patterns of rainfall at the site.  
 The history of Lincoln Heights matters for a few reasons. First, the project was 
one of the first executed under the Lanham Act, which provided funding and a clear 
mission for the National Capital Housing Authority. John Ihlder must have been 
appreciative of his Authority’s new access to the money, capital, and support from the 
federal government to execute his vision for proper housing across the city. Ihlder found 
that he now had the ability to build proper housing in beneficial surroundings on a 
metropolitan scale. Lincoln Heights was supposed to be model low-income housing 
located in a picturesque section of Northeast Washington. Unfortunately, however, the 
NCHA was unable to confront the combination of grading at the site and the flow of 
water, or build the complexes, in ways that ensured their long-term stability.  
Second, Ihlder was able to build his projects in the nation’s capital. Lincoln 
Heights and the other early housing projects could prove to be models for public housing 
across the country. Despite lacking much of the industrial development that fostered 
insalubrious and dangerous conditions for impoverished urban dwellers, Washington 
clearly had many of the same problems of sanitation, clean water delivery, degraded and 
unsafe housing stock, and pollution that other major US cities faced in the early twentieth 
century. Ihlder hoped to provide housing that defied these conditions in order to 
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demonstrate not just the city of Washington’s ability to overcome late-industrial era 
blight but that of the entire country. To Ihlder, Washington, D.C.’s public housing 
program was a synecdoche that stood for the rest of the nation’s ability to build clean, 
livable cities for all, regardless of income or social position. 
But Lincoln Heights, one of the city’s earliest public housing complexes, was not 
a success. It fell apart, and in doing so it represented, in part, the ways that an 
envirotechnical system can operate in unintended and—given the prevailing economic 
situation of the NCHA in the mid-1940s—unfixable ways. Despite warnings from 
construction managers, Lincoln Heights was finished and opened to occupants who faced 
frequent flooding, crumbling concrete, eroded slopes, and a host of other issues stemming 
from the physical location of their apartments. The history of Lincoln Heights clearly 
shows the extent to which envirotechnical obstacles stemming from siting—and the 
transformation of a site—mattered in the history of Washington’s public housing 
program. In this case, the soil, hills, and water of the Lincoln Heights neighborhood 
worked to erode the foundations of the apartments that Ihlder and the rest of the NCHA 
earnestly hoped could lift residents out of blighted communities. Instead, the structures 
worked to keep residents in unsafe and unsanitary living conditions.  
 Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms both reveal similar patterns in the history of the 
NCHA’s early public housing program. Both required significant interventions on the 
Authority’s part to rearrange and re-grade the landscape. In both cases, the NCHA 
contended with the countervailing forces of increased funding to build housing on a large 
scale and a powerful federal government demanding the rapid completion of projects. 
This meant that the NCHA built sprawling complexes across land that was stripped of 
many of its trees and graded to the best of the Authority’s ability. In neither case, 
however, were the District of Columbia’s inspectors allowed to visit the complexes and 
ensure that the buildings were in conformity with the best practices that the city 
government mandated. These factors combined to increase the envirotechnical obstacles 
that the NCHA’s contractors faced during construction. Ultimately, those obstacles were 
built into the NCHA’s envirotechnical system at Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms. They 
became features that over a fairly short period led to the decline of the quality of the 
public housing stock at Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms. The landscape, as well as the 
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interactions between the materials used in the complexes and their interactions with the 
local environment constrained the envirotechnical system in significant ways, preventing 
it from supporting decent, safe, and sanitary housing. 
 The environmental obstacles that the NCHA’s contractors faced while building 
Lincoln Heights would remain forceful actors in the later history of the complex. Only 
seven years after Lincoln Heights opened, a PHA inspector noticed that there was a 
possibility of rainwater seeping into the gypsum roofing. The NCHA’s contractors had 
contended with that problem while they were building the complex. The slopes around 
Lincoln Heights continued to erode during heavy rainstorms. Retaining walls cracked and 
concrete spalled as the ground underneath the structure continued to settle and shift for 
years after the NCHA’s work at the complex. 
 One significant outcome of the Lincoln Heights project was the concentration of 
over four hundred African American families in a deteriorating housing complex. This 
was also the outcome for Barry Farms. It could well indeed have been the outcome for 
housing complexes across the eastern portion of the District of Columbia. Both Barry 
Farms and Lincoln Heights reveal the different forces that constrained the NCHA’s 
ability to house impoverished African American residents in decent, safe, and sanitary 
dwellings. The Authority was able to build on a large scale and rehouse hundreds of 
families across eastern Washington, D.C. It transformed the landscape and used various 
building materials to erect housing that conformed to Ihlder’s idea of proper housing. 
Soon after it finished building Lincoln Heights, however, the complex began to 
deteriorate. Hundreds of families were stuck in subpar homes that only continued to 
decline, as the NCHA faced tightening budgets throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The 
environmental obstacles that the NCHA encountered at its complexes actively 






The Dangers of Sub-Optimal Materials: Fire Ravages Highland Dwellings, 1941-
1966 
 
 Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights, and Highland Dwellings all demonstrate the 
significant envirotechnical obstacles that the NCHA encountered during and after the 
Second World War. Construction efforts included not just digging foundations and 
putting up walls, but also reshaping the landscape in order to support large housing 
developments on what was once a rolling terrain. That process put in motion many of the 
difficulties that contractors and later residents would face as a consequence of the 
complexes’ siting. Adding to the stress on the public housing units was the use of 
substandard materials. Without stronger and more suitable materials, environmental 
stresses emerged to substantially damage the public housing structures. This was also the 
case for Highland Dwellings, which is the focus of this chapter. Highland Dwellings 
demonstrates the immediate dangers posed by the failure of manufactured components 
within an envirotechnical system. The complex was ravaged by a series of fires between 
1942 and 1966 that claimed over a dozen residents, injured many more, and destroyed 
many of the tenants’ possessions. While Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms certainly 
deteriorated quickly, Highland Dwellings represents an even more rapid decline due to 
the envirotechnical constraints of the materials available to the NCHA. Even after 
wartime restrictions on the availability of materials abated, the NCHA continued to rely 
on outdated and dangerous components that failed to mitigate several fires, which 
themselves claimed many lives.  
 Both environmental and urban historians have traced the history of fires in 
industrializing cities. Their work reveals that fires have served as opportunities for the 
redevelopment and reconstruction of urban environments with safer materials and 
designs. First, because they have been destructive, violent, and large in size, fires in 
industrializing cities have prompted important political and economic responses. In the 
aftermath of large fires, politicians and urban reformers sought to rebuild cities in order 
to mitigate their future threat.247 Fires, although devastating, were also opportunities for 
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reconstruction along safer and more durable lines. Those designs could also shape the 
development of cities. Little Hell, an Italian enclave in Chicago, was left out of the city’s 
late-nineteenth century fire plan. Hence, it was built with shoddier materials, and did not 
conform to the city building code, which gave rise to many of the negative environmental 
problems associated with tenement neighborhoods. In turn, the threat that the built 
environment of Little Hell posed to residents’ health and wellbeing was used to justify 
the Chicago Housing Authority’s decision to demolish the neighborhood and build 
Cabrini Green in the 1940s.248 
 Second, fires prompted technological improvements in building construction and 
design. In The Fireproof Building: Technology and Public Safety in the Nineteenth-
Century American City Sara Wermiel describes on the different construction materials 
that architects and engineers began to use in response to the spate of fires that engulfed 
industrializing cities across the United States during the mid-nineteenth century. Wermiel 
too emphasizes how fireproofing was a largely successful response to the environmental 
hazards posed by fires in densely populated neighborhoods built with flammable 
materials.249 Thus historians who have studied urban fires have largely focused on the 
responses they provoked. In the case of cities in the United States, most were able to 
effective plan and design city neighborhoods during the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries that prevented devastating sprees of large fires. 
 Highland Dwellings provides an example of what happened when a municipal 
agency was unable to respond to major fires. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, 
public housing construction consisted of more than just erecting homes in the 1940s and 
1950s. The NCHA built a new envirotechnical system; it planned on the level of the 
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neighborhood to transform an agricultural landscape into an urban neighborhood over the 
course of just two or three years. Yet that system was built with faulty components. The 
substandard fireproofing within Highland Dwellings threatened the lives and property of 
its residents, and led to several deaths. Rather than representing an opportunity for 
change at the complex, the NCHA continued to manage Highland Dwellings as if nothing 
had happened. In the end, Highland Dwellings represented what happened when fire did 
not serve as a chance to safely rebuild a neighborhood. 
 The Highland Dwellings complex was built for white residents, but became 
predominantly African American over the course of the 1950s, following the integration 
of NCHA projects in 1953.250 The ways that the landscape and materials used within 
Highland Dwellings undermined the quality of housing for white residents suggests that 
the environmental injustices and failures of Washington’s public housing program 
sometimes affected working-class whites as well. But from the 1950s forward, as white 
tenants moved from Highland Dwellings into their own enclaves, African Americans 
increasingly bore the burdens associated with substandard materials in and around the 
complex. The NCHA, in turn, was not able to do much to stem the tide of deterioration 
and decay at its complexes. African Americans were left to bear the burdens of poor 
housing on sensitive sites. In the case of Highland Dwellings, one such burden was fire. 
 
Siting Highland Dwellings: The Rugged Terrain East of the Anacostia 
 
 Highland Dwellings was built to house white workers and their families. Images 
of the site reveal that most of the buildings in the complex were similar in appearance, 
consisting of a number of separated two-story buildings neatly plotted across several 
acres in Southeast Washington. Unlike Barry Farms, Highland Dwellings was fairly 
distant from the Anacostia River, and was therefore further from the industrial activities 
                                                        
250 Soon after integration at Highland Dwellings, the project grappled with white flight. One statistic 
put forward by the National Capital Housing Authority in 1962 showed that in June of 1952, Highland 
Dwellings was completely segregated, housing 350 white families. By October of 1959, the number of 
white families had declined to 108. The number of black families more doubled those of whites at 
226. See: “Statement of Walter E. Washington, Executive Director, National Capital Housing 
Authority, Before The United States Commission on Civil Rights, April 13th, 1962”; Folder “Question 
as to Need for Regulations to Provide for the Nondiscriminatory Use of Housing Facilities P. 1-140, 
Entry P 101: Transcripts of Hearings on Nondiscriminatory Housing and Homes Improvement 
Regulations, RG 351, NARA. 
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taking place in the Navy Yard and at the Bolling Naval Air Station. Likely Highland 
Dwellings was planned for commuters who drove into jobs downtown, primarily at the 
Navy Yard. When construction started, the site on which the complex was located was far 
removed from the more populated and developed sections of the District of Columbia. 
 
 
Rear view of one of the courtyards at Highland Dwellings. Gottscho-Schleisner, Inc.,, “Highland 
Dwellings, Washington, D.C. Refuse arrangements,” April 28th, 1944. Available at the Library of Congress 





The Highland Dwellings Administration building. Note how the land clearly slopes from the right-hand 
side of the image to the left. Gottscho-Schleisner, Inc., “Highland Dwellings, Washington, D.C. 
Administration building,” April 28th, 1944. Available at the Library of Congress website, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/2018743292/ (accessed November 29th, 2019). 
 
 Much like Barry Farms, the Highland Dwelling site was regraded to support 
several houses built on what were once rolling hills and valleys. As evidenced by Barry 
Farms and Lincoln Heights, large structures block the natural flow of water to its lowest 
point. From the northeast corner to the southwest corner of the complex is a gradual slope 
of thirty feet (from 176 to 146 feet) over the course of 1,776 feet. In other terms, the area 
on which the Highland Dwellings was built is on a slope with a 1.7% gradient. While not 
significant at first sight, and barely noticeable to residents, visitors, and drivers alike, that 
gradient still matters for the flow of water. When it rains on the complex, the water 
follows a southwesterly course until it eventually empties into Oxon Run, an urban creek 





Topographical map of the Washington Highlands complex. The blue lines represent ten-foot changes in 
elevation from the highest points on the right to the lowest to the left. Screenshot taken from the District of 
Columbia Geographic Information System, “Topography-10 Foot Contours,” courtesy of the District of 
Columbia Open Data Project, https://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/topography-10-foot-contours?geometry=-
77.006%2C38.830%2C-76.991%2C38.833 (accessed November 29th, 2019). 
 
 
1958 Zoning Map of far Southeast Washington, D.C. The green patch shows the route of Oxon Run Park, 
which was managed by the National Park Service. Highland Dwellings is located in the bottom-right corner 
of the image. 6thStreet SE meets Atlantic Avenue in the bottom-center of the image. District of Columbia 
Office of Zoning, Historic Zoning Viewer, 1958, http://maps.dcoz.dc.gov/HistoricZoning/ (accessed 
November 29th, 2019). 
 
 More revealing of the topographical realities that planners faced at Highland 
Dwellings is the landscape immediately surrounding the complex. For example, the slope 
from the southwestern corner of the complex to Oxon Run begins at a height of 146 feet 
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(the lowest elevation of Highland Dwellings) and descends to 58 feet at the basin of the 
creek. The ground therefore slopes 10.5 percent from Highland Dwellings to Oxon Run. 
In other words, Highland Dwellings sits atop a hill in Southeast Washington. Despite the 
advantages of that site for drainage as compared to, for example, Barry Farms, the site 
does slope from the northeast to the southwest. Furthermore, the land descends rapidly 
downward over just a few hundred feet in most directions away from Highland 
Dwellings. Indeed, the site had to be landscaped in order to accommodate the public 
housing complex.  
 As with Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights, the NCHA graded and terraced the 
Highland Dwellings area to conform with its idea of ideal housing in appropriate 
surroundings. This was part of the Authority’s attempt to build a new envirotechnical 
regime at the Highland Dwellings complex. The planners and builders of the project 
hoped to rearrange and alter the landscape in order to give the appearance of middle-class 
domesticity. Part of this process was clustering buildings together in order to match the 
rowhouses that were being erected at the same time in more prosperous parts of the 
District of Columbia to the west. The spacing of those buildings, however, along with the 
construction practices and materials used would eventually contribute to the spread of 
fire. The NCHA sought better housing aesthetically, but also created a layout that would 
hasten the decline of the complex, while endangering its residents. The burden of the 
envirotechnical obstacles at Highland Dwellings would be borne primarily by its white, 
low-income tenants. After integration and the concomitant shift in the complex’s 
demographics, that burden would be borne by the complex’s impoverished black 
residents. 
 In order to assess the properties at Highland Dwellings and to get a sense of the 
scale of work that would be necessary to transform the site, the National Capital Housing 
Authority hired Francis LeBaron Smoot, a local real estate agent and appraiser.251 The 
                                                        
251 Smoot’s appraisal report might be the most substantial textual record he left behind. A city 
directory from 1914 lists a “Francis Leb. Smoot” as having a real estate office at 706 H Street NW. See 
Boyd’s Directory of the District of Columbia (R.L. Polk and Company: Washington, D.C., 1914), 1569. 
Furthermore, Georgetown’s Oak Hill Cemetery lists a “Francis Leb. Smoot” as buried at lot 129, 
having lived from 1883 until 1960. Chronologically, it makes sense that the Smoot buried in Oak Hill 
Cemetery and the one listed in Boyd’s Directory are the same, since Smoot would have been a 31-
year-old real estate manager in 1914. For the cemetery listing, see Oak Hill Cemetery Website, 
Explore, “Smoot, Francis LeBaron”,  
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Authority had initiated the same process for Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms, but Smoot 
decided to publish his report with his name included, as opposed to the other appraisers. 
His report reveals that the terrain of the Highland Dwellings site was uneven. Smoot 
divided the plot into thirty-four distinct parcels, which varied in size from 4,125 square 
feet at the smallest to 378,225 square feet, or 8.68 acres at the largest. The total size of 
the plot was 847,032.6 square feet, or a total of about nineteen-and-a-half acres. This 
made Highland Dwellings a medium-sized wartime development. Barry Farm was 32.7 
acres, while Lincoln Heights was 14.5 acres.252 The tract on which Highland Dwellings 
was located was topologically varied, with sudden changes in grade common across the 
plot as a whole.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
https://www.oakhillcemeterydc.org/app/themes/oakhill/assets/records/129.pdf (accessed 
November 29th, 2019). This was not the same Smoot who commented on rainfall in Barry Farms in 
chapter three. 
252 “Book #1 Appraisals DC-1-9 Washington, DC.”, Box 5, Series: Land Acquisition Project Files USHA, 
DC-1-9 (Washington DC) to DC-1-16 (Washington, DC), RG 196, NARA II;  “Appraisal Report, Lincoln 
Heights”; Box 5, Land Acquisition Project Files USHA, DC-1-9 (Washington DC) to DC-1-16 











All images taken from Smoot’s original appraisal report. Hillside Dwellings, DC-1-13, December 16th, 
1943; Folder “Site Approval Sheet Project D.C. 1-13,” Box 5, Series: Land Acquisition Project Files 
USHA, DC-1-9 (Washington DC) to DC-1-16 (Washington, DC); RG 196, NARA II. 
 
 The photographs above depict four different parcels on the Highland Dwelling 
tract. The landscape was dotted with hills and sharp ravines. Without a good deal of 
landscaping, grading, and leveling, the site would not be suitable for the scale of 
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development that the NCHA executives had in mind. In the first and third pictures, 
especially, the unevenness of the land is apparent, as the landscape slopes generally 
upward from creeks that had carved ravines across the site. The NCHA would also have 
to strip many of the trees on the site. Past episodes of deforestation had resulted in a good 
deal of soil loss and the siltation of the Anacostia River. 
The Washington Highlands area was even more sparsely populated than the 
communities that existed before the Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights projects. The 
appraiser lists only one property on the site, a two-story, six-room, approximately sixty-
year-old farmhouse with electricity but no indoor plumbing. This farmhouse sat on the 
largest of the parcels that Smoot listed, and the property in total consisted of over 8.5 
acres. The appraiser listed the property as being in fair condition, which was meant that 
the structure was suitably decent, safe, and sanitary, while perhaps a bit shabby. The 
report reveals that indeed the condition of the land itself may have been an impediment to 
the more concentrated development of the Highland Dwellings site, riven as it was with 
hills and valleys.  
As with Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights, the Highland Dwellings site needed 
modifications before it could support housing on the scale that Ihlder and the NCHA 
sought. For example, in his brief notes on the slope and elevation of the site, the appraiser 
noted that for parcels twelve through sixteen, the land was “from 20 to 40 feet in the 
hole.” The appraiser went on to note that for this plot of land, which constituted just more 
than 52,000 square feet or 6.16 percent of the total area, it would be extremely difficult 
for the builders to turn the property into the simplified and level space that the National 
Capital Housing Authority sought. According to the appraiser, it was “[e]xtremely 
difficult to sell property of this type that must be filled in. Not buildable land.” Though 
that was the appraiser’s pointed comment on the quality of the site, he also noted that for 
parcels five and six, which constituted 2.22 percent of the total property, he devalued the 
land from front to back as it sloped towards a ravine. Smoot measured that ravine as 
being 150 feet long, 40 feet across, and 12 feet deep. The ravine ran through parcel 
number 2, which constituted 6.77 percent of the total property, and Smoot decided to 
lower the value of that plot as well. Finally, for parcels 18 through 30, constituting 29.15 
percent of the total area of the site, the appraiser noted that the land had a 3-4 percent 
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grade, which again lowered the value of those plots relative to the level ground on the 
site.253 
All together, the appraiser’s data showed that the Highland Dwellings site was 
fairly uneven terrain. 8.38 percent of the entire plot was extremely varied in elevation, 
and the appraiser made it a point to warn the ADA about the conditions of those plots. A 
further 29.15 percent of the property was fairly uneven and had a noticeable slope. Taken 
together, more than one-third of the property was uneven, not to mention the fact that 
land around the perimeter of the site sloped downhill very quickly. As evidenced in 
previous chapter, the NCHA had struggled with erosion on the slopes throughout its 
wartime properties. Smoot himself offered a generally positive description of the 
landscape, claiming that 88% was buildable while 12% was not.254 He was 
straightforward about the largest impediments to construction at the site, including the 
gullies and ravines that ran through the property. Regardless, to transform the landscape 
to support housing on a large scale, the NCHA would have to make several interventions 
in the extant layout and grading of the site. 
In his report, Smoot highlighted three reasons why private developers would not 
want the land. The first reason was economic: the federal government already possessed 
the land to the north of Highland Dwellings. The National Park Service owned and 
maintained Oxon Run and its banks for several feet on either side, and the steepness of 
the ravine and the size of the creek made it largely impractical for construction 
purposes.255 The second and third points that Smoot raised about the impracticality of the 
site for private development were related to the local environment. Private developers 
were having problems figuring out how to lay sewer lines through the Washington 
Highlands. The different elevations at the location as well as the problem of the ravines 
                                                        
253 The quotes from this paragraph come from one source: Folder Project DC-1-16 Appraisal by 
Francis LeB. Smoot, undated. Box 6--Records of the Field Offices, Land Acquisition Project Files 
USHA, DC-1-16 (Washington DC) to DC-1-17 (Washington, DC), RG 196, NARA II. I have not seen the 
curious expression “in the hole” used in the other two appraisals for Barry Farms and Lincoln 
Heights, which I suspect was a distinctive expression that Smoot employed. This may be because 
although he assisted on the Barry Farms appraisal, Smoot was the lead author for this particular 
report. I take the expression to mean that there was a ravine or depression crossing those plots.. 
254  Ibid. 
255 For this information and the figure below, see District of Columbia Department of Zoning, 




and gullies complicated the construction process, since the landscape consisted of several 
irregularities in elevation.256 It would be up to the NCHA’s planners and engineers to re-
grade the site in order to connect it to the larger envirotechnical system of Washington, 
D.C. 
The most revealing point that Smoot made in his comments to the NCHA was 
about 8th Street, SE. While writing about the uneven terrain of the site, Smoot noted that 
on the maps then used by NCHA planners: “[w]hereas 8th is a dedicated street it is 
actually a gully, which would be very costly to bring up to the approved grade which is 
taken from the topographical map made by the Geodetic survey of 1892. The storm water 
in that approximate 60 years, has undoubtedly caused further erosive in 8th street 
[sic].”257 Smoot’s note was revealing for two reasons. First, he explains that the NCHA 
was relying on outdated maps from fifty years prior. The 1892 map showed a paper 
street—a planned route that had not in fact been built—that was in fact a large gully. 
Smoot’s work helped reveal what the landscape looked like. He did the necessary 
fieldwork while assessing the cost of acquiring the site. His observations showed that the 
soil in parts of the Highland Dwellings site was uneven and susceptible to erosion even 
before the NCHA’s work. Once again, the site acted as a potential envirotechnical 
obstacle to the successful construction of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.  
The historical record reveals far more, however, about the dearth of appropriate 
materials available to the NCHA. As the Second World War ended and the United States 
supported Europe’s recovery, domestic building materials were scarce. Yet at home the 
flood of workers into production centers and returning veterans placed a severe strain on 
the existing housing stock. The NCHA had to build quickly to accommodate the needs of 
homeless or underhoused Washingtonians. Once again, the NCHA found itself with an 
increased mandate at the same time that the materials available to it were reduced. This 
combination of factors gave the envirotechnical system at Highland Dwellings a degree 
of instability as natural phenomena—in this case, fire—imperiled the lives and property 
of the complex’s residents. 
                                                        
256 Folder Project DC-1-16 Appraisal by Francis LeB. Smoot, undated. Box 6--Records of the Field 
Offices, Land Acquisition Project Files USHA, DC-1-16 (Washington DC) to DC-1-17 (Washington, DC), 





Building Highland Dwellings: The Material Obstacles to the NCHA’s 
Construction Program, 1943-1946 
 
In a site description assembled by the Public Housing Authority for internal 
circulation, one employee noted that “[t]he site is geographically centrally located in a 
Negro neighborhood at the focal point of a radiating street system. It is well situated at a 
relatively high elevation which will lend itself to both good circulation of air in the 
summertime and proper drainage of surface water during inclement weather.”258 This 
comment, released after the appraiser’s report was made available to the NCHA, runs 
against some of the commonly accepted knowledge within the NCHA. In the past, Ihlder 
had referred to hilly sites as undesirable for private development. Far removed from the 
downtown core, and consisting of confusing property lines, the rugged conditions of 
eastern Washington D.C. reduced interest among private homebuilders. The NCHA, on 
the other hand, was able to quickly acquire and built on those terrains because it had the 
capital and federal mandate to do so. The PHA, of course, was not involved in the 
construction of NCHA housing. It merely provided low-interest loans for the NCHA to 
carry out its mission. Thus, the PHA’s description might have been incorrect. 
Furthermore, according to the appraiser’s report, the neighborhood in fact consisted of a 
single home and in at least one case included a road that existed only on a map. 
During the Second World War, housing planners continued to emphasize the deep 
connections between housing and its surroundings. They sought the wide spaces of 
undeveloped land with few private homes on the eastern sides of the Anacostia and 
Potomac Rivers in order to build homes and neighborhoods. Yet, the shortage of critical 
materials; the problem of siting and the necessary transformation of the landscape to 
support middle-class standards of domesticity; the interactions among the land, air, and 
water on those sites; and the fast pace of construction hindered the public housing 
program in eastern Washington, D.C., from the beginning. The envirotechnical obstacles 
pertaining to siting and materials that were first identified by site managers at Lincoln 
Heights persisted through the construction process at Highland Dwellings. Ultimately the 
                                                        
258 Hillside Dwellings, DC-1-13, December 16th, 1943; Folder “Site Approval Sheet Project D.C. 1-13,” 
Box 5, Series: Land Acquisition Project Files USHA, DC-1-9 (Washington DC) to DC-1-16 (Washington, 
DC); RG 196, NARA II. 
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planning process set in motion construction practices that made Highland Dwellings 
more of a liability than a benefit to many of its residents. 
As for the initial question about why Highland Dwellings had originally been 
intended for white workers, it might be helpful to consider the larger developmental 
history of eastern Washington, D.C. Development in the eastern part of the County of 
Washington and, after 1871, the City of Washington had been haphazard except for those 
parcels first administered by the Freedman’s Bureau and in Uniontown. Take, for 
example, the following maps, showing the development of the area around Highland 
Dwelling from 1867 until 1950. Particular attention should be paid to roads and physical 
structures in this small corner of Washington. Wheeler Road SE has been placed in the 
upper- to mid-right of each image for reference. 
 
 
A road map of Washington County, in the District of Columbia, 1867. At this point, few roads run through 
far Southeast Washington, indicating the low degree of development in the region. At this point, Southeast 
Washington was undergoing a major transition in land ownership, as many of the former estates were being 
turned over to newly freed slaves, as detailed in chapter two.259 
 
                                                        
259 District of Columbia, Office of the Surveyor, “Map of the Roads in Washington County, DC,” 1867, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3851p.ct004799/?r=0.426,0.466,0.576,0.288,0 (accessed 




This map shows suburban developments in far Southeast in 1895. There is obviously a greater degree of 
development than in 1867, with two neighborhoods clearly named. Still, much of the map is blank, 
indicating the sparse development outside of those communities.260 
 
 
This map, from 1915, shows yet more development in Far Southeast. It is aspirational, however, since most 
of the roads to the east of Nichols Avenue, which runs a crooked route from north to south towards the 
                                                        
260 District of Columbia, Engineering Department, “Map Showing Suburban Subdivisions of the 
District of Columbia,” 1895, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3851g.ct004691/?r=0.711,0.529,0.253,0.126,0 (accessed 
September 1st, 2019). 
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center of the map, are dotted, rather than solid lines. This indicates that those roads were planned, but not 
yet built.261 
 
 As evidenced above, in the twenty years between 1895 and 1915, surveyors and 
planners received and recorded far more information about the street layout of 
Southeastern Washington. Yet, these maps tell viewers nothing about the types of streets 
or whether they actually exist or were merely paper streets. Also there is a large blank 
spot on the map upper-middle of the map where Highland Dwellings would eventually be 
located. This indicates that there were few—if any—residences that predated Highland 
Dwellings. Furthermore, the dotted streets indicate avenues yet to be built. This map is 
aspirational, but does show a greater degree of development east of Nichols Avenue SE. 
 
 
This road map from 1921 shows yet more development east of Nichols Avenue, but still shows the route of 
mostly planned streets in that area. The section labeled “U.S. Property” was owned by the NCPPC. Part of 
it would eventually become Highland Dwellings.262 
                                                        
261 C.S. Hammonds and Company, “District of Columbia,” 1915, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3850.ct004482/?r=0.72,0.558,0.228,0.114,0 (accessed September 
1st, 2019). 
262 District of Columbia, Office of the Surveyor, “Map of the Permanent System of Highways, District of 
Columbia,” 1921, https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3850.ct004468/?r=0.525,0.399,0.749,0.375,0 




This topographical map from 1947 shows Highland Dwellings, revealing that it was fairly isolated from the 
mostly white-owned homes—represented by the black squares—along Wheeler Avenue SE. Note the low 
degree of development in the surrounding area.263 
 
 
                                                        
263 Geological Survey, “Washington and Vicinity, Maryland, Virginia, District of Columbia,” 1947, 




Once again, this 1953 map shows that there was little development in the area surrounding Highland 
Dwellings into the early 1950s.264 
 
 These maps reveal that the development of Southeast Washington proceeded at an 
uneven pace and was largely undertaken by individual families and communities. There 
was little coordination for development at the municipal level until the ADA began its 
work in the 1940s. Some sections of eastern Washington, D.C. grew quicker than others. 
Indeed, while Highland Dwellings may have been built in a predominantly African 
American section of the District of Columbia there were some white communities among 
the hills and valleys of the region. There was one such community to the east of Highland 
Dwellings that had been built during the early twentieth century. By 1925 there were 
enough residents to charter a community organization. In November of that year, sixty 
members attended the inaugural meeting of the Highlands Citizen Association, electing 
their Board of Directors.265 Although reports from the time do not indicate the racial 
composition of the neighborhood, the actions that the Washington Highlands Citizens 
Association took in the years following the construction of Highland Dwellings strongly 
indicate that the surrounding neighborhood was in fact white. In 1953, for example, 
Ralph E. Cushman, President of the Washington Highlands Citizen Association, 
protested the NCHA’s decision to integrate all public housing complexes.266  
 These maps help clarify the level of development at the Washington Highlands 
site. While there may have been a black neighborhood where the NCHA decided to build, 
it was fairly isolated from the rest of the city. Over the course of the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries, white homeowners moved onto the higher elevations around 
the Highlands site. The NCHA’s decision to purchase Washington Highlands was 
representative of a pattern; the Authority consistently built on top of black 
neighborhoods. They justified their decision by claiming that the neighborhoods were 
underdeveloped, unsanitary, or decrepit and that they should be replaced with middle-
class housing. In the case of Barry Farms, the Board of Public Works and the Board of 
                                                        
264 United States Army Map Service, “Washington and Vicinity,” 1953, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3850.ct004519/?r=0.42,0.73,0.24,0.12,0 (accessed September 1st, 
2019). 
265 “New Association Elects: F.M. Cannon Becomes President of Washington Highlands Group,” The 
Washington Post, November 17th, 1925. 
266 “Group Fights Opening Area to All Races,” The Washington Post, May 9th, 1953. 
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Public Health had consistently, throughout the early-twentieth century, tried to build 
sanitary infrastructures, for fear of disease outbreaks in the neighborhood. Near 
Lincolnville, the surrounding white residents expressed concerns about the ramshackle 
appearance of the black community’s homes to Eleanor Roosevelt. The NCHA 
consistently purchased these black neighborhoods and built housing for workers on top of 
them that rectified both the apparent neglect of homeowners in the area and the poor 
conditions of housing elsewhere in the city. 
 The NCHA’s efforts to redevelop the landscape of the Washington Highlands and 
other similar places in eastern Washington were means by which those communities 
became integrated into the larger envirotechnical networks of a modern metropolis. The 
NCHA overthrew the previous envirotechnical regime, which had consisted of 
smallholding farmers who arranged the arable land, water, and terrain to support small-
scale agricultural production. It did so by purchasing those communities wholesale and 
demolishing its homes. The Authority then undertook the difficult work of cutting down 
some trees, re-grading the site, laying down new roads and pipes, and building housing. 
Over a very short period, Washington Highlands lost the appearance of a small farming 
community, and became aesthetically and physically similar to other neighborhoods 
throughout the city.   
 
Anything but Fireproof: Fire Threatens Workers and Residents at Highland Dwellings, 
1942-1964 
 
 Although Highland Dwellings was built on fairly uneven terrain and required 
terracing, the historical record does not reveal much about the envirotechnical obstacles 
of the site, as opposed to Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms. Many of the problems that 
workers and the first residents faced at Highland Dwellings were instead related to the 
poor quality of materials and building plans at the complex. The degree of devastation 
caused by several fires at Highland Dwellings was exacerbated by the construction 
quality as well as the NCHA’s reluctance to adhere to the District of Columbia building 
code. Sometimes caused by accidents or faults in the wiring of some complexes, fires 
reflect the complex intertwinement of nature and artifice in an envirotechnical system. 
Although they might be caused by interactions between manufactured parts of the 
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system, fires quickly became natural perils to the continued stability and safety of 
buildings at Highland Dwellings. They spread as more oxygen fueled their growth, and 
they prompted the NCHA to try to respond to their frequent outbreaks at the complex. 
Fires were agents of physical and environmental change at the Highland Dwellings 
project, and necessitated responses from the leadership of the NHCA. In other words, 
fires were non-human agent of historical change. 
 In the end, the NCHA was unable to take the opportunity that the fires posed to 
rebuild Highland Dwellings in a safer manner. Although the fires sometimes burnt 
buildings in the complex to their foundations, the NCHA did very little to revisit and 
reassess the construction practices that made them so common and dangerous. Of course, 
the NCHA was hamstrung by a relatively small budget. In the case of fires at the 
complex, economic pressures granted a non-human agent of historical change a powerful 
opportunity to impinge on the Authority’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings. 
Highland Dwellings demonstrates what happens when a civil authority does not act to 
prevent fires. As expected, the fires wrought great damage to residents’ property and 
lives. 
 The ADA hired the construction firm Jefress-Dyer to build the Highland 
Dwellings complex. The crew began construction in early 1942, with many of the units 
ready for occupants in 1943 and 1944.  Since the project consisted of several stages, the 
ADA allowed residents to move into sections of Highland Dwellings as soon as they 
were complete. The first tenants moved into the complex in 1942. Those residents, 
however, had to contend with a dearth of basic infrastructural services. The roads leading 
to their homes had yet to be surfaced, and the streets did not have lighting. These two 
factors were burdens on a community that was built far from the central business and 
industrial sections of the District of Columbia, meaning that residents had to rely on their 
automobiles to get to and from Highland Dwellings and their workplaces.267 Upon 
receiving complaints from the project’s first tenants, James Randolph, a Congressman 
from West Virginia and then the Chair of the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, 
                                                        
267 “Families Living in Highland Dwellings Will Get Street Repairs but No Arc Lights,” The Washington 
Post, May 28th, 1942. 
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appealed to John Ihlder to bring lighting to the neighborhood.268 Randolph noted that 
most of the heads of the households at Highland Dwellings worked late shifts and needed 
lighting to see the unfinished road ahead of them. After these appeals, the National 
Capital Housing Authority prioritized the installation of lighting across the grounds of the 
complex. Given the scale of the NCHA’s projects throughout eastern Washington, D.C. 
during the early 1940s and its desire to demonstrate the economic viability of a low-
income housing program, the Authority likely wanted to begin collecting rents as soon as 
possible.   
 As residents moved onto the project in 1942 and 1943, construction elsewhere on 
the site continued apace. The frustrated contractors dealt with a deficit of reliable 
building materials, as had been the case at both Barry Farm and Lincoln Heights. For 
example, although most gutters were built with sheet metal at the time, the war effort 
severely constrained the amount of that material available for housing construction. 
Hence, the NCHA’s contractors were forced to use the cheaper option—wood—for the 
construction of the complex’s gutters.269 The NCHA approved the use of wooden gutters 
on January 24th, 1944. Wood, of course, is far more flammable than sheet metal. 
Although it is difficult to establish a direct connection between the wooden gutters in 
Highland Dwellings and the propensity of the site to experience severe fires, their 
presence likely did not help to stop the spread of flames.  
 On February 14th, 1942, the first major fire occurred at the Highland Dwellings 
complex. It claimed no lives, but set back the pace of construction. The project was only 
partially occupied at the time, and no one was injured. The fire did, however, destroy the 
possessions of three households. The structure that burned was typical for Highland 
Dwellings: It was a semi-detached home with four separate units, two on either side of 
the main building. The fire began in an unoccupied apartment, but spread throughout the 
entire building and burnt the structure down to its foundations, causing severe damage to 
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the walls throughout the building.270 The event went unreported in the local newspaper, 
and record of the fire only remains in the minutes of the National Capital Housing 
Authority’s legal division. The accident spurred no action on the part of the legal or 
executive committees of the ADA. But the fire was, however, a harbinger of future 
disasters.  
 On February 29th, 1944, the NCHA entered into a dispute with Jefress-Dyer, the 
contractors hired to build Highland Dwellings. The dispute involved three main issues. 
First, Ihlder was annoyed that landscaping work had not yet been completed when tenants 
first began to move into some of the later buildings at the Highland Dwellings 
complex.271 Of course, Ihlder had long been interested in building housing that appeared 
to conform to middle class standards of domesticity. The notion that public housing 
would not be in an ideal state when the majority of tenants moved in was anathema to his 
thinking as well as the general Progressive view of the relationship between housing and 
its surroundings. Ihlder’s concerns were also about the amount of time that the contractor 
was taking to finish the project. He emphasized that “time was of the essence” and that 
the contractors should consider finishing the buildings in groups in order to expedite the 
work.272 Finally, Ihlder was agitated about building nine on the complex, which had been 
destroyed in a fire. Of course, Ihlder was irked by the setback that the fire posed but also 
insisted that the cost of the destruction and reconstruction of the building be borne by the 
contractor, rather than the NCHA.273 The fire that destroyed building nine would not be 
the last at the Highland Dwellings complex. 
 Between 1942 and 1966, eight major fires struck the apartments at the Highland 
Dwellings complex. Five of those eight fires occurred between 1957 and 1965, claiming 
the lives of eleven people in just eight years, as the complex increasingly housed black 
families displaced by urban renewal. The number of fires in Highland Dwellings was 
unprecedented when compared to the number of fires in other housing complexes. 
Deficient materials at the complex sometimes caused fires. More to the point, however, 
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was that the NCHA sometimes ignored District of Columbia regulations. The 
envirotechnical system that the NCHA set in place in the Washington Highlands possibly 
included components that had not been vetted by the very agency responsible for setting 
and enforcing construction standards. In the end, the materials used in Highland 
Dwellings as well as their arrangement within the buildings would contribute to the 
epidemic of fires in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. 
 The first major fire after the completion of Highland Dwellings occurred in 1945. 
According to contemporaneous reports, the fire was set by a distraught mother, who tried 
to burn down her unit in order to “rid herself” of her children.274 The Washington Post 
described Ruth Arends, the mother who set fire to her apartment, melodramatically. As a 
singer with the Columbia Light Opera Company, Arends suffered from not achieving 
“better roles with the civically-sponsored opera company,” and was despondent over the 
bills coming in for their newborn and the low pay she received from her work.275 
Dumbfounded at the cause, the police found their answer offered in the story told by 
Arends, calmly, as she stood in the cold winter air in a fur coat and nightgown. Arends’s 
actions harmed more than just her and her family’s possessions; the fire also destroyed 
the furnishings of one of her neighbors, a Navy Yard machinist, and smoke damaged 
some of the possessions of the adjoining units.276 
 Well after the end of the Second World War, the NCHA took some action to try 
to understand the project’s susceptibility to fire. In 1954, the agency hired a fire insurance 
company to assess buildings throughout the Highland Dwellings complex. The insurance 
company found that despite the three fires that had occurred at the complex, “[t]here are 
no sprinklers in any of the buildings and sprinkler protection is not anticipated”, which 
indicated that the executive board of the NCHA was not considering sprinkler 
installation.277 The insurance company, however, issued no recommendation that 
sprinklers be installed in the units. This choice may have proven fatal as Highland 
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Dwellings entered the 1950s and 1960s, when a rash of fires over just eight years claimed 
eleven lives. 
 Three years after the insurance company’s assessment, another fire struck 
Highland Dwellings. In 1957, a fire in one of the units led to the death of two young 
parents. The father, James E. Thomas, died in the blaze while the mother perished during 
an unsuccessful rescue attempt for her six-year-old daughter and two-year old son. The 
daughter, Karen, had already saved her brother from the flames, although the mother had 
not realized this when she returned to the unit. According to Karen, “I tried to get Daddy 
up…but he wouldn’t wake up…I couldn’t get back in the house to wake up my Daddy 
because of the smoke and my brother would cry for me.”278 The fire was not contained to 
one apartment, as it damaged the two adjacent units in the building. 
 Investigative reporting by Connie Feeley, a staff writer for The Washington Post 
in the wake of the fire revealed to the public that Highland Dwellings did not conform to 
the District of Columbia building code. A District official revealed to Feeley that “[t]he 
public housing project…does not have the protective fire walls required by the District 
Building Code.”279 Although city regulations required the buildings to have a masonry 
firewall between units, Highland Dwellings relied solely on an asbestos sheet in between 
the regular wallboard. Harvey Everett, head of the Housing Management Office for the 
NCHA, blamed the substandard construction on the lack of critical materials available 
during the Second World War.280 Although asbestos works as a fire inhibitor, given 
enough heat the material cannot withstand the spread of flames and damage from one unit 
to another.281 In any case, the NCHA chose not to take any action at the site to rectify its 
deviation from the city building code. The Authority did not take the opportunity that the 
fire offered to reconsider its building policies or retrofit the complex to meet the city’s 
construction codes. 
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 Just two months after the fire that claimed the lives of six-year-old Karen 
Thomas’s parents at Highland Dwellings, another blaze at the complex killed a young 
man and his toddler son. The mother, named “Mrs. John A Crowley” in The Washington 
Post, was able to escape the flames with three of her children.282 Fire investigators and 
the NCHA puzzled over the cause of the fire, but ultimately pointed to negligence on the 
part of the parents, who sometimes observed their three-year-old son playing with 
matches.283 Understandably upset about the fires that claimed four lives and thousands of 
dollars worth of property in the span of two months, tenants demanded that the NCHA 
work to upgrade the fire prevention structures on the public housing site. James Ring, 
who served as the second chief of the NCHA, promised to do so in a late-February 
meeting with tenants of Highland Dwellings.284  
 In 1959 Everett considered using an experimental new wall coating developed in 
Sweden in order to combat the spate of fires. Rather than relying solely on the wall 
paneling and asbestos interiors, the NCHA considered using “Three-Q” wall coating, 
which consisted of marble dust and other ingredients mixed into a plastic binder. The 
binder would be spread with plaster on the walls, with a second coat sprayed on top after 
the first layer dried.285 There is no record of the NCHA applying the new coating widely. 
Even with concrete widely available, the Authority continued to rely on asbestos sheets. 
Furthermore, the wall spray would have simply acted as a patch on a severely flawed 
envirotechnical landscape. Fires had started at units that were uninhabited during the 
construction process. The causes of the other fires—with the exception of that in the 
Arends unit—had not been conclusively determined. The materials that the NCHA had 
used, combined with the pace of construction, were envirotechnical obstacles to the 
safety of the complex. If the NCHA had used the wall coating throughout the complex, it 
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would have likely been an insufficient response to material problems that were embedded 
in the structures themselves.286 
 The fires continued into the 1960s. In January of 1961, another fire at the complex 
took the lives of three small children.287 Everett responded by beginning the remodeling 
of units throughout the complex. He instructed the contractors to replace the existing 
fiberboard wall coverings with flame-resistant gypsum board—the same boards that 
crumbled at Lincoln Heights when exposed to damp conditions—and to install half-inch 
thick sheets of insulation between the walls to prevent flames from spreading to adjoining 
units.288  
 Despite the renovations, there were two more deadly fires in 1964 and 1965. The 
first claimed the life of a young girl, Mary R. Baxter, on the eve of her fourth birthday. 
Deputy Fire Marshall Eugene B. Davis blamed an unattended skillet left on the stove for 
the fire.289 Despite the substitution of gypsum boards for the earlier asbestos fireproofing 
between units, the fire spread throughout the building and either destroyed or damaged 
the adjacent apartments. Luckily, seventeen other residents of the three adjacent units 
were able to escape the blaze, suffering minor injuries from smoke inhalation and damage 
to property.290 
 The final fatal fire at Highland Dwellings happened in late-April, 1965, just four 
months after the last fire in December of 1964. Once again, the victims were young 
children, ages 4, 5, and 11. At the time of that fire, only half of the units in Highland 
Dwellings had been renovated, even though nine years had passed since Everett pledged 
to repair and replace fireproofing materials throughout the entire complex.291 The scene 
after this fire was particularly chaotic. The mother of the children had been widowed 
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recently, and was placed under sedation since she imagined she could still hear her 
children crying for her.292 Furthermore, Deputy Fire Marshall Eugene B. Davis, first 
interviewed in the aftermath of the fire that killed Mary Baxter, collapsed and died from a 
heart attack at the age of 53 while interviewing witnesses at the scene.293 Davis would be 
the final, albeit indirect, victim of the many fires at Highland Dwellings. In the wake of 
this fire, tenants called on Walter Washington, then the third Chief Executive of the 
NCHA, to build concrete walls in between the units, which had been mandated by the 
city building code since before Highland Dwellings had been built.294 Washington 
offered a lukewarm and noncommittal response, stating that the NCHA would “consider 
any proposal our engineers think is feasible.”295  
 The poor materials used in the Highland Dwellings site, time constraints during 
production, and the NCHA’s lack of follow-through on promises to update the structures 
contributed to the devastating nature of the fires at the project. By refusing to update its 
buildings according to the District of Columbia code, the NCHA was partially 
responsible for the scale and severity of the fires at Highland Dwellings. Even after 
almost a dozen people had died—most of them young children at that—the NCHA 
refused to rehabilitate the apartments with fireproof materials. Furthermore, the National 
Capital Housing Authority ignored the District of Columbia Building Code, which called 
for the construction of masonry walls between each individual unit, to prevent the spread 
of flames between domiciles. Tenants of Highland Dwellings called for the NCHA to 
build masonry walls in a meeting with Walter Washington. He ignored their pleas. In no 
way could Highland Dwellings have been called decent, or safe. The materials used at the 
Highland Dwellings complex created an unsafe environment by allowing flames to 
spread throughout the buildings. Although devastating, fires in the past had often driven 
engineers and city planners to remake tightly packed neighborhoods along new grids and 
                                                        
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Douglas Martin, “Walter Washington, 88, Former Mayor of Washington, Dies,” The New York 
Times, October 28th, 2003. Washington’s first job after obtaining his law degree was with the National 
Capital Housing Authority, where he would have worked under John Ihlder for about four years. 
Washington would helm the NCHA for five years between 1961 and 1966, before President Lyndon 
Johnson appointed him to serve as the President of the Board of Commissioners. Washington would 
later work as the Chairman of the New York City Housing Authority before returning to the District of 
Columbia when Johnson appointed him to the position of Mayor-Commissioner.  
295 William J. Raspberry, “Fatal Fires Stir Project Dilemmas,” The Washington Post, May 3rd, 1965. 
 
158 
with stronger, fireproof materials. The NCHA lost several of its buildings, but continued 
to rely on outdated and dangerous materials, which endangered residents throughout the 
complex. 
 
Conclusion: The Human Cost of Envirotechnical Obstacles 
 
 Highland Dwellings is a distinctive case in the history of public housing in the 
District of Columbia. It had many of the same initial impediments to construction that 
Barry Farm and Lincoln Heights also experienced. The original ravines and gullies have 
been filled, rerouted, or buried beneath the streets or in the sewerage tunnels that run 
underneath the property. More than the problems of topography and hydrology, however, 
Highland Dwellings suffered from poor structural engineering that was employed the 
interest of expediency rather than safety. Whereas erosion, flooding, other problems 
associated with the transformation of the landscape of public housing were well-
documented features of the other two wartime public housing complexes, Highland 
Dwellings suffered far more from the material deprivations of the Second World War. 
The use of substandard materials within Highland Dwellings contributed to the spread of 
fires, which endangered the lives and welfare of its low-income renters.  
 Fire has long been an agent of historical change. It is a phenomenon that can be 
caused by human action, but it leaves an indelible imprint on the landscape. Often, it is 
unanticipated and can dramatically reshape neighborhoods, communities, and even cities. 
During the mid-nineteenth century, fires ravaged communities across the United States. 
They prompted action on the part of engineers, urban planners, and municipal politicians, 
who funded new firefighting crews, redesigned blocks and neighborhoods, and 
researched new materials and ways of building that mitigated the costliness and 
devastation of urban fires. 
 The Highland Dwellings fires, on the other hand, occurred in the post-fireproof 
metropolis. By the 1940s the District of Columbia had already adopted many of the 
policies and procedures that other cities had in place to prevent the possibility of future 
fires. The NCHA, however, acting under pressure from the USHA ignored the proper 
procedure and construction practices that might have helped prevent the scale of many of 
the fires that it experienced in the 1950s and 1960s. The case of Highland Dwellings 
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reveals that in the absence of a strong institutional response to rectify poor construction 
practices, fires play more significant roles in undermining the health and safety of public 
housing residents. As was the case for the material deficits at Lincoln Heights and Barry 
Farms, when the NCHA was unable or unwilling to correct the operation of the 
envirotechnical system that it built, the system amplified the threats to decent, safe, and 
sanitary housing. The tenants of public housing were always the individuals who most 
suffered as a result of the envirotechnical obstacles of the NCHA’s public housing 
program. 
 Highland Dwellings solely housed white defense workers until 1953, when the 
NCHA integrated all of its projects. Thus white residents sometimes experienced 
envirotechnical obstacles. Yet Highland Dwellings did not exhibit the same problems of 
siting as Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms. The records do not reveal as much about 
erosion, shifting soils, or flooding, as was the case for some of the other public housing 
complexes built during the time. However, the white residents of Highland Dwellings 
certainly endured envirotechnical obstacles that pertained to the types of materials that 
were used in the structure. Whereas the African American complexes deteriorated as a 
result of the interactions between a transformed landscape and poor quality materials, 
Highland Dwellings experienced a much more rapid decline as fire after fire struck the 
complex. 
 By 1962—nine years after Highland Dwellings had been integrated—the site was 
home to 423 black families and 145 white families.296 In the early 1960s, three-quarters 
of families renting apartments in the complex were black. The fires continued for another 
three years as white families continued to leave the project. White families could access 
the private home rental and ownership markets, but African Americans were largely 
locked out of home ownership and could only rent poorer quality dwellings. Thus as the 
NCHA continued to dither on the subject of proper fireproofing, more and more black 
families were trapped in buildings that did not conform to the District of Columbia 
building code. The envirotechnical obstacle of improper materials gave rise to an 
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environmental injustice, as more and more black families sought shelter at a complex that 







Transformations in the Metropolitan Landscape: Kenilworth Courts and the 
Envirotechnical Failures of Public Housing in the Postwar Period 
 
 Construction began at Kenilworth Courts in 1957. Between the completion of the 
wartime projects and the beginning of work on the Kenilworth complex, a few things that 
had previously conditioned the NCHA’s building program had changed. For one thing, 
the NCHA no longer had a strong federal partner that was willing to intervene on its 
behalf. During the war, the USHA shielded the NCHA from the oversight of the District 
of Columbia, which allowed the local Authority to proceed rapidly on its projects. By 
avoiding the inspection and certification process, however, the NCHA also lost a valuable 
outside partner that could ensure the structural stability of its buildings and the grounds. 
According to John Ihlder, those were just two of the District’s responsibilities; it was also 
charged with inspecting the wiring, plumbing, and other infrastructures that the NCHA 
provided in pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.297 
 After the end of the war, the NCHA also lost access to the large federal loans that 
the USHA had furnished. The purpose of the Lanham Act was to speed up housing 
construction for defense industry workers in strategic cities across the United States. It 
distributed millions of dollars in loans for local housing authorities to do just that. After 
the war, that money was no longer available for the NCHA. The NCHA was not alone in 
this instance; the Lanham Act had allowed several cities to greatly expand their public 
housing stock. With the USHA taking a less direct role in local affairs after the end of the 
Second World War, the NCHA had to rely on meager Congressional appropriations and 
the income it gained from rental units. By the time that work began on Kenilworth 
Courts, the NCHA was operating on a fairly fixed budget of $38,000 for the general 
maintenance of its properties.298 New builds, on the other hand, would be funded through 
the rents that it collected from tenants and bond issuances.  
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 These two features of the postwar construction program were not limited to 
Washington, D.C. The urgency of housing construction during the New Deal and Second 
World War periods had fostered the rise of local housing authorities with a fair degree of 
independence from the municipal government. The early leadership of public housing 
authorities often came from the ranks of experts and longtime activists within urban 
housing reform movements. John Ihlder came from that background, as did Elizabeth 
Wood, who helmed the Chicago Housing Authority.299 Catherine Bauer similarly took 
ideas about modern housing from Europe and applied them to the situation in American 
cities. She was empowered to do so, in part, during her time as the Director of 
Information and Research for the USHA.300 In the postwar period, however, much of the 
technocratic leadership that rose to a prominent position in local housing authorities was 
pushed out or constrained by local politicians and real estate interests. Wood, for 
example, was forced out of the CHA in 1953.301 The sweeping reforms and developments 
that were anticipated by housing reformers in the 1930s and 1940s fell by the wayside as 
the combination of reduced federal support and the loss of the first generation of 
leadership worked to give conservative opponents the upper hand in housing policy. 
 In Washington, D.C., however, the NCHA suffered more from a decreased budget 
than from a loss of leadership. Without a centralized and empowered municipal 
government, much of the postwar planning process for the District of Columbia was 
organized by different agencies, primarily the NCHA, the Redevelopment Land Agency 
(which was responsible for coordinating urban renewal projects), the NCPPC, and the 
NPS. The Board of Commissioners did not interfere with the internal workings of the 
NCHA to a great extent. Furthermore, the second and third executive directors of the 
NCHA—James Ring and Walter Washington—had either joined with the NCHA at its 
inception or fairly early on.302 The continuity of leadership within the NCHA and the 
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relative weakness of the District of Columbia’s local government distinguished the 
institutional history of the NCHA from other large agencies like the CHA. 
 Still, with a reduced budget, the NCHA had to seek out cheaper land for 
construction in the 1950s. Furthermore, the NCHA’s efforts to redevelop eastern 
Washington, D.C., along with those of other planning agencies, had resulted in 
population increases across the region by the late-1950s. Thus the NCHA also had fewer 
spaces from which to choose. The presence of the dump speaks to the growth and 
urbanization of the Washington metropolitan region over the course of the 1940s and 
1950s. Its size was a testament to the growing population of the region, which had been 
facilitated in part by the NCHA’s efforts to build housing and extend infrastructures into 
eastern Washington, D.C. The city and its surrounding counties were becoming 
interconnected and intertwined, as suburbanization continued apace and more of the city 
came into the hands of developers, the NCHA, and the RLA. The plight of residents of 
Kenilworth Courts was a local case of environmental injustice that was perpetuated by 
regional envirotechnical changes. The District of Columbia balanced wealthy and 
predominantly white communities’ desire for clean streets, homes, and alleys against the 
local conditions of black residents of Kenilworth Courts. The NCHA was an agent of 
environmental injustice by building a large complex so close to the dump. Of course, for 
its part the Authority was hamstring by a diminished budget, and black land had long 
been devalued in metropolitan spaces.303   
 The history of the complex shows that the NCHA still struggled with the 
envirotechnical obstacles that emerged from its choice of sites in the postwar period. The 
problems at Kenilworth Courts, however, were not primarily related to re-grading and the 
natural hydrology and topography of the site, although those factors did matter. Rather, 
many of the problems at Kenilworth Courts stemmed from the site’s proximity to an 
open-burn trash dump. Seeking cheap and readily available land, the NCHA built on top 
of a community that had long endured the burden of the stinking dump and its large daily 
fires. Thus, in keeping with the patterns that emerged during its spate of construction 
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during the Second World War, the NCHA perpetuated patterns of environmental injustice 
by offering residences built in a place with significant envirotechnical obstacles.  
 Residents of Kenilworth Courts suffered not just from the operation of the dump, 
but also from its closure. After a seven-year-old child died in a fire set by sanitation 
workers in February of 1968, the District of Columbia finally moved to close Kenilworth 
landfill, which had been recognized as antiquated by local sanitation engineers since the 
previous year.304 In transforming the dump into a large park, local sanitation engineers 
first dumped smoldering incinerator ash almost adjacent to the Kenilworth Courts 
complex. Residents of Kenilworth Courts bore a dual burden. First, they were harmed by 
the operation of the dump as an envirotechnical system meant to keep wealthier parts of 
the city clean and sanitary. The prevailing winds in the area carried smoke, soot, and ash 
towards the Kenilworth Courts complex. Second, as metropolitan sanitation engineers 
worked to overthrow the previous envirotechnical regime and replace it with one oriented 
towards recreation, the NCHA’s tenants again suffered from the placement of smoldering 
incinerator ash. The history of Kenilworth Courts reveals that by the 1950s, the NCHA 
had been largely successful in helping to transform eastern Washington, D.C. into a 
region of communities that were deeply connected to the rest of the city. In this period, 
the siting of public housing still constituted an envirotechnical obstacle that contributed 
to environmental racism. The proximity of postwar developments to odious landscapes 
undermined the NCHA’s pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
 
Setting the Scene: The Complex History of the Kenilworth Landscape 
 
 The NCHA carved out a corner of Northeast for the Kenilworth Courts project. 
Built on a wedge of land between Kenilworth Park and a large highway, the complex was 
isolated from more developed parts of Washington. The units comprising Kenilworth 
Courts were placed on 45th, Quarles, Ponds, and Douglas Streets Northeast. This small 
slice of the Northeastern quadrant is adjacent to the District of Columbia-Maryland 
border, nestled in between the Kenilworth Aquatic Gardens, a strip of undeveloped 
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scrubland that marks the border between Maryland and the District of Columbia, and the 
Kenilworth Avenue Freeway to the southeast.305 
 
Kenilworth Courts, outlined in blue. The Aquatic Gardens are visible as the set of segmented ponds to the 
West. The Anacostia River is visible in the Northwestern corner of the map. The Kenilworth Avenue 
Freeway runs along the Eastern border of the complex. Map constructed from the United States Geological 
Survey Earth Explorer Website, https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/ (accessed November 26th, 2019); 
coordinates Lat.: 38 degrees 54’ 41’’ N, Long.: 076 degrees 56’ 18’’ W. 
 
 The Kenilworth area itself is fairly hilly, although it generally slopes downwards 
towards sea level at the Anacostia River. On the way, the landscape becomes very 
marshy and riven with small islands and peninsulas around which the water rises and falls 
with the tides. The Kenilworth property itself transitions in grade from a maximum height 
of forty feet above sea level in the northeast corner to about fourteen feet above sea level 
in its Southwest corner. The buildings are therefore located on an uneven terrain that, on 
average, slopes from a high point closer to the Kenilworth Avenue Freeway down 
                                                        
305 The District of Columbia Housing Authority offers a helpful link to a Google-produced map of the 
area on the website for Kenilworth Courts, which can be found at 
http://www.dchousing.org/property.aspx?id=5N&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed April 
5th, 2018). The website also draws attention to the fact that Kenilworth Courts is unique because of 




towards the marshier lowlands of the Anacostia flats.306 It was common for the NCHA to 
acquire and build on uneven terrains. If one were to walk from west to east in Kenilworth 
Courts, one would walk up a noticeable slope while encountering long rectangular 
buildings situated on terraced land. The neat, even platforms on which the apartment 
buildings and heating plant of Kenilworth Courts are located betray what was once a 
much more varied, and far steeper, terrain. The rear of the complex on the western edge 
of the property abuts some flat and marshy areas that are under the management of the 
National Park Service. Two parks—the Kenilworth Aquatic Gardens and Kenilworth 
Park—separate the Kenilworth Courts complex from the banks of the Anacostia. Today, 
the public housing units are less than one-fifth of a mile from the marshy sections of 
Kenilworth Park. 
 Just as the Kenilworth Park and Aquatic Gardens separate Kenilworth Courts 
from more developed sections of Washington, the Kenilworth Avenue Freeway also cuts 
off the complex from the rest of the Kenilworth neighborhood. Located to the east in the 
highlands above the complex, the Freeway was first proposed in the early 1950s and 
constructed in segments through the rest of the decade and into the 1960s.307 When it was 
finished, the Kenilworth Avenue Freeway stood as a six-lane barrier separating the 
                                                        
306 Washington’s municipal government provides a handy topographical map of the city and 
surrounding area, available online at 
http://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/adbb63799c9944ed9ae3cf82bd8f2fd5_3?geometry 
307 See Grace Bassett, “7-Mile Link Parallels Anacostia; Consultants’ Plan Would Give DC First 
Through Interstate Artery,” The Washington Post, April 28th, 1955, which provides an overview of the 
planning stages of the Kenilworth Avenue Freeway and adjoining Anacostia Freeway. At this point, 
freeways were largely planned and built without input from the local communities most affected by 
their construction. This way of planning urban renewal and transportation projects was aptly 
captured by Robert Moses, the infamous urban planner from New York, when he stated “when you 
operate in an overbuilt metropolis, you have to hack your way with a meat ax.” [Robert Caro, The 
Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Vintage, 1975), 849.] Eastern 
Washington was by no means comparable to New York City in the 1950s in terms of its development 
or population, but the freeway construction project undoubtedly disrupted the daily lives of nearby 
residents. This was explicitly acknowledged in a 2007 report from the District of Columbia 
Department of Transportation, which stated that the Freeway is “an obstacle, where it prevents 
residents on either side from such destination points as the Anacostia River, a park or recreation 
area, a school, or a place to shop.” [District of Columbia Department of Transportation, Anacostia 
Waterfront: Kenilworth Avenue Corridor Study (Washington, DC, May 2007; available at   
https://ddot.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddot/publication/attachments/ddot_kenilworth_av
enue_corridor_study_2007_part1.pdf (accessed April 18th, 2019).] This type of large scale planning 
declined in the 1960s and 1970s, as neighborhoods rejected plans for more freeways through 
densely populated urban neighborhood in what historians have called the Freeway Revolts. See, for 
example, Raymond A. Mohl, “Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities,” Journal of Urban 
History 30, no. 5 (July 1st, 2004): 674-706.x 
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Kenilworth Courts housing complex from the residential and commercial spaces on the 
other side. Kenilworth Courts, by nature of the dump, the Freeway, and the street layout 
in that particular segment of Northeast was physically segregated from the rest of 
Washington, D.C.308  
The Freeway was as much a physical border as a symbolic one. As a major 
thoroughfare across eastern Washington, the Freeway served commuters travelling in and 
out of the city from Prince George’s County. It was also the primary way for drivers to 
access the Kenilworth neighborhood, if they wanted to visit the aquatic gardens or the 
nearby park. Its position and size, however, were distinct in a neighborhood of small 
homes and narrow streets. For most residents of Washington, driving on the Kenilworth 
Freeway likely represented a departure, in some ways, from daily life on the other side of 
the Anacostia River. Visitors to what would become Kenilworth Park had to use the 
Freeway to access the site, and it was the main thoroughfare connecting the Kenilworth 
neighborhood to sections of the city to the west of the Anacostia River. The housing 
complex that drivers passed on their trips to the park or the suburbs was scenery that was 
incongruent with the bucolic parks they visited on weekends and holidays. 
 That housing complex had a complex history that its surroundings obscure. 
Kenilworth Courts was a prime example of the forces of environmental injustice at work 
in the NCHA’s site plans. Although it was technically an integrated neighborhood, 
African American residents had long been relegated to the low-lying, marshy parts of this 
section of the city near the Anacostia River. This settlement pattern continued into the 
mid-twentieth century, as white and black Americans flocked to the District of Columbia 
for employment. The wartime population explosion, however, threatened the air, water, 
and land quality of the neighborhood and other sections of Northeast Washington as the 
Kenilworth landfill expanded and as more residents moved to the neighborhood. In spite 
of the slew of letters and editorials sent and published about the nuisance and burden of 
                                                        
308 The intentionality of the segregation of public housing and other spaces in Southeast Washington 
was quite apparent to subjects interviewed about public housing and life in Southeast. “It’s 
intentional,” claimed one subject interviewed about isolation in Anacostia. The reporter goes on to 
state that “It’s common to hear in Kenilworth Courts, as well as in other Projects, that isolation is 
increased by inadequate bus routes, an almost total absence of taxis, and an approach road system 
that puts the developments in the center of a virtual maze of streets.” See Lewis M. Simons, “Cities 
Within Washington: Public Housing Dwellers Feel Isolation and it Increases as Whites Return to DC,” 
The Washington Post, May 5th, 1978. 
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the Kenilworth dump, when Kenilworth Courts opened in 1959, housing planners had 
high hopes for the complex. Yet, those hopes quickly crumbled as the dump continued to 
spew toxins and noisome materials towards the public housing residents just up the block. 
In the case of Kenilworth Courts, the operation of the dump—an envirotechnical system 
meant to keep parts of the city clean and sanitary—impinged on the purpose of 
Kenilworth Courts, which was to rearrange the landscape and build housing in support of 
a decent, safe, and sanitary community. 
 
Building a Community in the Marshes: The Emergence of an African American 
Neighborhood in the Anacostia Flats, 1882-1942 
 
 Because of its proximity to the Anacostia River, much of the Kenilworth 
neighborhood lies close to swamps and marshes. Low-lying, marshy sections of cities had 
long been undesirable from the point of view of developers and homebuilders, a notion 
that persisted through much of the twentieth century. Therefore, many of Washington’s 
marshes were turned over to the Army Corps of Engineers for reclamation and then the 
NPS for management. The Army Corps’ had transformed the Kenilworth area 
dramatically by the time that the NCHA’s property opened. It had “placed flood control 
structures, used dredged material to turn the Anacostia Flats into useable parkland, and 
created an aquatic park out of the Kenilworth Gardens to protect the upper river.”309 
According to anthropologist Brett Williams, the Army Corps “finished reclaiming the 
Anacostia Flats [the marshy areas along the banks of the Anacostia River] by 1926, 
depositing a lake and two islands in the river and organizing its shores into a national 
park.”310 
 Despite the Army Corps work on the Anacostia River near Kenilworth, marshy 
conditions persisted in parts of the neighborhood until the 1940s and 1950s. Kenilworth 
Courts sits at an average elevation of approximately twenty-two feet. The grade to the 
west of the public housing complex, that is, towards the Anacostia, slopes fairly sharply 
                                                        
309 The US Army Corps of Engineers in the District of Columbia, Office of History, 
http://www.publications.usace.army.mil/Portals/76/Publications/EngineerPamphlets/EP_870-1-
73.pdf (accessed April 24th, 2018).  
310 Brett Williams, “A River Runs Through Us” American Anthropologist 103, no. 2 (Jun., 2001), 417. 
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downhill to an average elevation of about two feet.311 Thus much of the land surrounding 
what would become Kenilworth Courts remained marshy throughout the twentieth 
century, even with the Army Corps’ work to remediate and reclaim land along the banks 
of the Anacostia. Because the Kenilworth neighborhood was prone to flooding due to its 
proximity to the river, the land that now comprises the Kenilworth Courts complex and 
the surrounding area was sparsely occupied until after the Second World War.  
Despite the environmental obstacles, at least one prominent family made a living 
in Kenilworth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1882, Walter B. 
Shaw, a Civil War veteran and horticulturalist, purchased a 30 acre plot of land along the 
Anacostia Flats from his mother-in-law. The land stretched towards the east, nearly to 
where the National Capital Housing Authority would later acquire land for Kenilworth 
Courts.312 Shaw had lost his right arm at the 1864 battle of Spotsylvania during the Civil 
War, but trained himself to write with his left hand and secured a job as a clerk with the 
Treasury Department after the war.313 
                                                        
311 Open Data DC, Government of the District of Columbia, “Topography—2 Foot Contours,” 
http://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/topography-2-foot-contours?geometry=-76.975%2C38.907%2C-
76.914%2C38.918 (accessed April 5th, 2018). 
312 Hetty Lipscomb, “Knee-Deep in Park’s Water Lillies,” The Washington Post, July 15th, 2005; A 
Washington Man Who Farms the Water,” The Washington Post, August 2nd, 1908. 




Walter B. Shaw in the 1880s/1890s. [National Park Service, “Kenilworth Park and Aquatic Gardens: 
People,” https://www.nps.gov/keaq/learn/historyculture/people.htm (accessed April 30th, 2019). 
 
 Despite the material security that his professional career offered, Shaw was 
perpetually drawn to his farm. He eventually grew a small business selling water lilies to 
florists along the east coast. His hobby largely stemmed from his childhood surroundings. 
Shaw was born near the water in Penobscot Bay, Maine, and as a profile of him for a 
1908 Washington Post article put it, “he naturally turned his eyes waterward, for water 
was practically the only thing his eyes rested upon until he was nine years old.”314 Soon 
after he acquired the 30-acre plot in Kenilworth, Shaw began experimenting with various 
lily cultures. His hobby eventually blossomed into an occupation, and he soon devoted 
himself to raising lilies full time, importing exotic varieties from around the world.315 
Upon Shaw’s death, in 1921, the family business passed to his daughter, Helen Shaw 
                                                        




Fowler.316 By the 1930s Fowler, following in her father’s footsteps, had acquired a 
reputation as an “authority on water lilies.317  
 The father and daughter built an envirotechnical system along the banks of the 
Anacostia River. Their efforts to segment the banks of the river into individual ponds, 
and their work to raise exotic varietals of lilies include both human and natural processes. 
The two were intertwined on the Shaws’ land. However, the Army Corps of Engineers 
had different plans for the Shaws’ property. For the Corps, the lily ponds were an 
impediment to its own effort to build an envirotechnical system in the Anacostia River. 
Tasked with straightening and dredging the Anacostia, as well as fill in the marshes and 
swamps along its banks, the Army Corps wanted to build an envirotechnical system that 
would be commercially viable, profitable for real estate developers, and less hospitable 
for disease-carrying mosquitoes. The Corps also hoped to limit damage to property as a 
result of periodic flooding along the Anacostia’s banks. The Shaws wanted to protect 
their ponds as a means to maintain their business and provide recreational opportunities 
for local visitors. The struggle between the Army Corps and the Shaw family was a 
conflict about which envirotechnical system would prevail in that part of the Anacostia 
basin.   
Arguing that sections of the original Shaw farm had always belonged to the city, 
rather than to Shaw’s mother-in-law, in the 1930s the Army Corps moved to condemn 
some of the lily ponds and take over the land without compensation. At the time, the lily 
ponds were seen as malarial traps and dangerous to the health and welfare of 
Washington’s residents. Wetlands and marshes were not considered intrinsically valuable 
as natural habitats or means to stem downriver flooding on the Anacostia until later in the 
twentieth century.318 The Corps therefore hoped to fill in the ponds in the interest of 
                                                        
316 National Park Service, “Kenilworth Park & Aquatic Gardens: People,” 
https://www.nps.gov/keaq/learn/historyculture/people.htm (accessed April 5th, 2018). 
317 Ibid.; “Bethesda Garden Club Plans Show,” The Washington Post, May 19th, 1935. 
318 Wetlands and mashes can act as catchments for floodwaters by diverting flows that otherwise 
might threaten downriver communities. Furthermore, the prevailing thought about the value of 
marshes and wetlands changed as popular attitudes about nature and the intrinsic value of wetland 
habitats changed over the course of the twentieth century. In Dsicovering the Unknown Landscape: A 
History of America’s Wetlands, historian Ann Vileisis traces the emergence of ideas about the 
importance of protecting wetlands and marshes in the first decades of the twentieth century. By the 
late-1950s and throughout the 1960s, citizens and lawmakers began working to protect wetlands 
from drainage and pollution which threatened those ecosystems. See Ann Vileisis, Discovering the 
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public health.319 Fowler fought tooth and nail against the encroachments of the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Because of the successful business that her father had built, she was 
able to hire teams of lawyers to successfully force the Army Corps to back down from 
seizing her lands or otherwise disrupting the business. In the end, Fowler maintained 
control of the envirotechnical system, and continued to produce water lilies on her 
family’s pond.  
Despite her struggle to retain ownership of the ponds, in her early sixties Fowler 
decided to sell the family land. Looking to the future preservation of the lily ponds, 
Fowler decided to sell seventeen acres of marshland and ponds to the federal government 
for a sum of 15,000 dollars.320 Within two years, the National Park Service had converted 
the formerly private lily ponds into a new park on the banks of the Anacostia. Helen 
Fowler herself continued to be involved in the affairs of the Aquatic Gardens, leading 
tours and nature hikes on lands that used to belong to her family.321  
The Kenilworth Aquatic Gardens offered a sort of beauty and aesthetic pleasure 
that were starkly contrasted by the severely degraded quality of the adjacent Anacostia 
River itself. For decades the River had faced environmental deterioration from a number 
of sources. Gravity-fed sewer lines emptied waste from residential, governmental, and 
business districts into the river. Furthermore, as Washington and the surrounding rapidly 
developed industrial and commercial facilities in the decades following the Civil War, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Unknown Landscape: A History of America’s Wetlands (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997), Chapters 
Eight and Eleven. In 1993, the Army Corps of Engineers reversed its actions from the 1930s and 
decided to restore the wetland marshes in Kenilworth, “at elevations designed to support high and 
low marsh communities. After sediments reached a consolidated state, guts were cut through these 
areas to insure tidal flows in the marsh.” See Daniel R. Murphy, Robert E. Foley, et al., Effects of 
Wetland Restoration Using Anacostia River Sediments at Kenilworth Marsh, Publication no. CBFO-C98-
02, (Annapolis: US Fish and Wildlife Service, Chesapeake Field Office, June 30th, 1998), 1. It is worth 
considering the long history of New Orleans as well. Wetlands were incredibly important for 
controlling flooding in the bayou environment. Yet, in pursuit of buildable land, local, state, and 
federal engineers (within the Army Corps of Engineers) drained the city’s lowlands. This made 
engineers reliant on technological fixes to keep New Orleans dry, which could and did fail in 
disastrous ways throughout the twentieth century. See Ari Kelman, A River and its City: The Nature of 
Landscape in New Orleans (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2003). 
319 Joe Lapp, Kenilworth: A DC Neighborhood by the Anacostia River (Washington, DC: Humanities 
Council of Washington, DC, 2006), 6-7. Available in the Washingtoniana Collection’s Vertical Files, 
under Kenilworth—Neighborhood Studies. 
320 “U.S. Buys Shaw Lily Ponds as Rival to Cherry Blossoms,” The Washington Post, September 15th, 
1938. $15,000 is equivalent to about $270,000 in 2020. 
321 See, for example, “Shaw Lily Gardens in Bloom Under Federal Auspices,” The Washington Post, 
June 13th,1939; Katherine Barrett Pozer, “Irresistible Blue, Pink, White, and Yellow Lilies, Lotus, 
Cover 9 Acres at Shaw Aquatic Gardens in Kensington,” The Washington Post, August 7th, 1938. 
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industrial effluents joined organic waste in the Anacostia. Horses too served as 
significant urban polluters, as their waste—and sometimes their bodies—were thrown 
into rivers and washed further downstream.322 In the late-nineteenth century, the 
Anacostia River experienced increasing loads of both industrial pollutants and sewage. 
These problems persisted after the Second World War, and Kenilworth Courts residents 
would soon find the river unsuitable, more or less, for recreation. The construction of 
networks of roads and highways in the Anacostia watershed ensured that oil, lead, and 
other noxious pollutants would be swept off of impermeable surfaces in the event of a 
rainstorm and into the many tributaries carrying water into the Anacostia. Helen Fowler 
conducted tours of her lily ponds mere feet away from a river that was slowly losing its 
ability to sustain the range of life that it had in the past.  
 Four years after acquiring part of Fowler’s land, in 1942, the National Park 
Service granted some of the property it owned along the Anacostia River to the District 
of Columbia, to be used as a municipal dump. Once opened, there was no barrier between 
the dump and the surrounding neighborhood. Records show that access to the Dump was 
fairly easy for local residents and children from Kenilworth Courts would often visit the 
landfill to scavenge for usable items.323 This also meant that trash and any run-off from 
the landfill could easily infiltrate the Anacostia River, since the only barrier between the 
landfill and local bodies of water was the artificial berm created by the trash piles left by 
the city.324  
The decision to build the dump along the banks of the Anacostia made sense for 
planners at the time. Business owners and municipal planners had long seen the river as a 
suitable sink for industrial and organic effluents. The Potomac Electric Power Company’s 
(PEPCO) Benning Road Power Plant was another local nuisance. Opened in 1906, the 
Benning Road Power Plant “provided Pepco's first system-wide electricity supply to the 
                                                        
322 John R. Wennersten, Anacostia: The Death and Life of an American River (Baltimore: The 
Chesapeake Book Company, 2008), 72-87. 
323 Bob Levey, “For Growing Youths, Treasures in the Trash,” Washington Post, September 2nd, 2004. 
324 US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, “Health Consultation: 
Kenilworth Park Landfill—Southside NE Washington, DC,” (Atlanta: Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry) January 23rd, 2006, 2, 
https://www.nps.gov/nace/learn/management/upload/2006-ATSDR-Health-Consultation.pdf 
(accessed May 28th, 2020). 
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District of Columbia and nearby Maryland suburbs.”325 The plant was powered by coal, 
and posed a long-term threat to the health and welfare of the local residents. Furthermore, 
the plant was located at the southernmost point of what would eventually become the 
Kenilworth dump.326 Until the 1940s, racial covenants dictated that African American 
residents of the Kenilworth neighborhood would have to live closer to the marshy 
sections of the Anacostia, and therefore the heavy industry and sanitation infrastructures 
located there.327 Even after the era of restrictive covenants, white privilege worked to 
restrict people of color to the least desirable environmental surroundings east of the 
Anacostia.328 Black land, in turn was devalued in comparison to white land. Large 
developers like the NCHA would therefore have an easier time acquiring black 
neighborhoods for housing construction. Most white communities were located in the 
highlands further east, as discussed in subsequent chapters. The banks of the Anacostia 
and the river itself became sacrifice zones, or a series of discrete areas selected to take on 
the bulk of environmental nuisances and dangers so that the rest of the City of 
Washington could enjoy the fruits of development. African Americans had to make their 
homes on the peripheries of those areas. 
 
Building the Dump: Balancing a City’s Sanitation against the Cleanliness of a Black 
Neighborhood, 1942-1957 
 
 The Kenilworth dump operated as an open-burn landfill immediately after it 
opened in 1942. This meant that the city hired trash haulers to dump waste in the landfill 
and burn it each afternoon. Kenilworth had not yet experienced the population growth 
that other neighborhoods on the opposite side of the river had seen. It was relatively 
                                                        
325 PEPCO, Inc., “Decommissioning the Benning Road Power Plant Factsheet,” Benning Service Center 
http://www.benningservicecenter.com/benning-power-plant-closure/factsheet.aspx (accessed April 
21st, 2019). 
326 See figure three. The Benning Road Power Plant was not close enough for residents of Kenilworth 
Courts to see from their neighborhood. Its siting, however, indicates the extent to which 
Washington’s planners and sanitation engineers considered the Anacostia to be an ideal location for 
the more noxious elements of the urban metabolism. 
327 For more on the rise and decline of legal racial covenants, see Michael Jones-Correa, “The Origins 
and Diffusion of Racial Covenants,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001): 541-
568. 
328 For a comprehensive theorization of white privilege and environmental racism, see Laura Pulido, 
“Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in Southern California,” 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90, no. 1 (March 2000): 12-40. 
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lightly populated until the NCHA decided to build a new public housing complex there. 
Still, there was a community in Kenilworth. The District of Columbia decided to extend 
sanitary infrastructures deep into that community, turning it into the city’s primary 
dumping ground. This reputation, and function of the neighborhood, would continue into 
the 1960s and 1970s.  
 That Washington’s sanitation engineers opted to use the former Army Corps 
dredging site as an open burn dump makes sense, considering the long history of the river 
being used for such related activities. The dump opened in 1942, well after improvements 
in sanitation technologies enabled cleaner methods of disposal for communities close to 
landfills and dumps. In his seminal work on the history of sanitation in cities across the 
United States, Martin Melosi traces how the shift from miasmatic to bacteriological 
theories of disease transition encouraged urban reformers to consider filth as a nuisance 
that could be dealt with through technological fixes.329 This shift enabled engineers to 
take responsibility for sanitation, rather than public health experts.330 Engineers were 
prone to take a piecemeal approach to urban sanitation, simplifying a complex range of 
causes and potential solutions to mounting urban waste into simpler questions about how 
to safely dispose and contain the garbage, pollution, and organic wastes produced in US 
cities. In the bacteriological era, waste management became a simplified problem to be 
alleviated in strictly technological ways, rather than a metropolitan problem to be dealt 
with holistically. 
 This is not to argue that engineers ineffectively dealt with mounting urban wastes 
or failed to provide some solutions to dirty and cluttered urban areas. Rather, the shift in 
sanitary management from public health officials to engineers failed to address a culture 
of consumption and waste in the United States. Therefore, it was incumbent upon 
engineers to build landfills that were capable of containing ever-increasing amounts of 
waste safely, without threatening urban land, air, or water. According to Martin Melosi, 
the first sanitary landfill, that is a landfill that contains waste below a cover and keeps it 
fairly isolated from the surrounding environment, was built in Fresno, California, in the 
                                                        
329 Martin Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform, and the Environment: 1880-1980 (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1981), 81. 
330 Ibid., 84. 
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1930s.331 Workers dumped garbage in trenches and covered it with a few feet of dirt. This 
solution had advantages over simply leaving waste in the open. Vermin could not reach 
the garbage under the soil and odors from the wastes were reduced, alleviating the 
nuisances faced by local communities.332 Engineers worked to continue refining sanitary 
dumping practices, thereby reducing the incentive for communities to work to reduce 
overconsumption and its attendant wastes. 
 The Fresno model was adopted by other cities across the US over the course of 
the next two decades. Even very small cities that lacked the revenue and renown of the 
nation’s capital, such as Lake Worth, Florida, were able to marshal the appropriate 
resources and expertise to begin using sanitary landfills by the mid-1940s.333 Los Angeles 
had adopted the dump, compact, and cover method for some of its landfills in the 
1950s.334 The fact that Washington continued to use the Kenilworth Dump into the 1950s 
and 1960s is therefore significant. In the capital of the United States metropolitan 
engineers balked at applying proven methods of cleaner and less odious waste disposal. 
Kenilworth Dump continued to accept incinerator ash and household and commercial 
refuse, which workers burned daily in large pits until 1968.   
 The District of Columbia brought about a significant envirotechnical change in 
the Kenilworth neighborhood. Its sanitation engineers looked across the city and decided 
that the community would be a suitable location for Washington’s primary dumpsite. 
Kenilworth became invisibly connected to neighborhoods across the District of 
Columbia. The trucks that picked up trash in Georgetown, Capital Hill, and elsewhere 
almost always finished their days at Kenilworth, where their hauls were burned adjacent 
to a growing residential community. Whereas residents in other neighborhoods did not 
see their connection to Kenilworth, the envirotechnical system was all too obvious for 
those living in Kenilworth, who contended with the mounting waste from more 
prosperous parts of the city.  
                                                        
331 Martin Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform, and the Environment, revised edition 
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332 Andrew Fairbanks, et al., “Talking Trash: A Short History of Solid Waste Management in Florida,” 
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 Furthermore, sanitation engineers had built this new envirotechnical system. They 
were the individuals responsible for choosing the site, routing the trucks, and figuring out 
where to burn the waste. In the 1960s, the relative power of those sanitation engineers 
was greater than that of the NCHA. While the latter was able to build homes, the ultimate 
authority over the envirotechnical landscape of Kenilworth rested with the sanitation 
engineers. As in the previous case studies, in the case of Kenilworth Courts, the NCHA 
set in motion a new envirotechnical system, but did little to respond to the environmental 
obstacles that emerged from it. The Authority did little to fight the continued operation of 
the dump, or the placement of incinerator ash near its homes. These two consequences of 
the sanitary infrastructure near Kenilworth Courts would impinge significantly on the 
health and welfare of the NCHA’s tenants. They suffered the brunt of the environmental 
burdens produced by the District of Columbia’s sanitation system, and found little 
support from the institution that had chosen that location on which to build their homes. 
Once again, the NCHA’s inability to respond to envirotechnical obstacles at a public 
housing site—this time, because of the power imbalance between the sanitary engineers 
and the NCHA’s leadership—resulted in greater environmental burdens for its black 
residents. 
 By the 1940s and 1950s, despite the presence of the dump, the Kenilworth 
neighborhood was moderately populated. Although the neighborhood was integrated, 
African American residents suffered the brunt of environmental nuisances. White 
residents generally lived in the uphill and drier sections of the neighborhood, while 
settlement patterns forced African Americans towards the marshy, low-lying sections of 
the neighborhood, closer to Helen Fowler’s lily ponds, the Anacostia, and of course the 
Kenilworth Dump. In fact, the site that would eventually be home to Kenilworth Courts 
was predominantly African American even before the complex was built.335 Despite the 
hardships that black residents of Kenilworth endured as a result of their less-than-
desirable surroundings, they built a thriving community and were engaged in the affairs 
of the neighborhood at large near the banks of the Anacostia River. 
 Kenilworth residents did not stand idly by as the Dump was zoned for their 
neighborhood. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, the Kenilworth Citizens’ 
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Association actively petitioned the city government to site the city airport on the empty 
land where the dump was planned. Kenilworth residents thought of air travel as a novelty 
during this period, and hoped that the siting of the airport would bring commerce to their 
neighborhood. Instead, residents received the city’s open burn dump. The National Park 
Service issued a permit for the dump in 1942.336  
 The dump immediately proved to be a nuisance for residents of Kenilworth. 
Trucks streamed into the site daily, adding to the amount of garbage burned every 
afternoon. According to Joe Lapp, who compiled a brief history of the neighborhood for 
the Washington Humanities Council,  
 
Living close to the dump was not a pleasant experience. The dark smoke rising 
from piles of smoldering trash became an infamous landmark visible from 
around the city. When the wind shifted just right, the smoke and smell invaded 
nearby neighborhoods and houses. Residents tell of fresh laundry on the line 
suddenly black with soot and of houses turning from a freshly-painted white to a 
dirty gray. Caolivia Herron remembers large pieces of newspaper ash falling 
from the sky at her grandparents’ house on Douglas Street, about three-quarters 
of a mile from the dump.337 
 
From the outset residents of Kenilworth complained about the siting of the dump and the 
smoke and odors it produced. Only four months after the Dump began operations, in late 
fall, local resident Mason T. White published the following letter to Washington’s Board 
of Commissioners:  
 
The District Commissioners are very sensible gentlemen, but I still contend that a 
hint to the wise is sufficient. They have placed the new dump on the lowlands 
just a little west of Kenilworth—a very excellent idea, since it will rid this 
marshy land of mosquitos and render it suitable for parks and building. Let us 
hope it becomes a lovely spot to add to the already beautiful Nation’s Capital. 
The Capital City is spending thousands of dollars for the protection of its 
inhabitants against the possibility of air raids. It is a known fact that when we 
have blackouts the people by law are compelled to turn out their lights or black 
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out their windows, and all lawbreakers are liable to fines. I do not think it 
reasonable nor justifiable to impose fines for little errors when the District 
Commissioners let that dump burn through the night like a volcano. I believe 
sensible citizens will agree with me when I say that there should be a law to 
compel the extinguishing of all bonfires at dusk. And last but not least, the dump 
is an irritating nuisance when the wind is blowing from the northwest.338 
 
White’s comments provide a description of the early operation of the dump. It was a 
noticeable nuisance in the neighborhood soon after sanitation workers started using it. 
His wry tone draws attention to the visibility of the fires at the dump, tying operations 
there to larger concerns about the security of his neighborhood during the Second World 
War. Washington’s sanitary services created at best a nuisance and at worst a public 
health problem for nearby residents.  
 
Public Housing, a Landfill, and a Park: Building and Managing Kenilworth Courts, 
1957-1980 
 
 In 1957, fifteen years after the NPS transferred the dumpsite to the District of 
Columbia, the National Capital Housing Authority signed a contract to begin building 
Kenilworth Courts. The site selected had long been part of the African American 
neighborhoods of Kenilworth. As mentioned above, those areas were swampy and low-
lying, as opposed to the uphill neighborhoods claimed by white residents. African 
Americans also contended with the bulk of the environmental burdens lining the 
Anacostia River, not to mention the polluted river itself. Thus, while it might have 
seemed appropriate to the NCHA to construct a public housing complex meant primarily 
for African American renters in a black neighborhood, in fact the selection of that site 
would do more, in the long run, to maintain historical patterns of environmental injustice. 
Residents of Kenilworth Courts, like those in the surrounding neighborhood, would have 
to deal with the nuisances posed by the nearby dump. The polluted environment 
significantly shaped the development of the public housing program in Kenilworth. 
                                                        




 For the two decades or so prior to the opening of Kenilworth Courts, the 
neighborhood had experienced significant demographic shifts. Kenilworth was 
increasingly becoming predominantly African American. Taking advantage of low-
interest rate mortgages, government subsidized housing finance, and the large-scale 
development of housing tracts in the suburban counties of Washington, DC, Kenilworth’s 
white residents rapidly moved away. By December of 1953, only 28 students attended the 
white elementary school in Kenilworth.339 Although Kenilworth Courts was initially 
integrated, it quickly changed to reflect the neighborhood dynamics in the 1950s and 
1960s.   
 The NCHA built Kenilworth Courts with a mix of two, three, four, and five 
bedroom apartments contained in two-story walkup, semi-detached structures.340 That 
type of physical organization was meant to accommodate families of various sizes, who 
were being moved from urban renewal projects that were unfolding in other parts of the 
city. In the end, Kenilworth Courts contained about 420 units. The complex opened and 
began accepting tenants in 1958 and 1959. Initially, Kenilworth Courts was considered a 
model for public housing across Washington, DC, and—perhaps by implication—the rest 
of the country. The Washington Urban League selected Kenilworth Courts as a site for a 
demonstration project that centered on finding suitable safe, decent, and sanitary homes 
for residents of Washington displaced by urban renewal.341 In 1958, the Executive Board 
of the National Capital Housing Authority gave both the Ambassador from Morocco and 
Ahmed Bargach, then the Governor of the Casablanca District, a tour of Kenilworth 
Courts.342 In 1961, along with Greenleaf Gardens, the Arthur Capper Dwellings, and the 
Kelly Miller Dwellings, the NCHA chose Kenilworth Courts to host an open house, 
where the general public could tour public housing complexes and view the conditions 
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that the NCHA provided to low-income renters across Washington.343 The NCHA 
initially had high hopes for the Kenilworth Courts housing complex. Within ten years, 
however, the Kenilworth Courts housing project clearly fell short of John Ihlder’s vision 
for properly decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the nation’s capital, as the Dump 
continued to burn on most days, attracting vermin and sending smoke and loose trash 
across nearby streets and lawns. 
 By the mid-1960s, however, the region’s sanitation engineers began taking note 
of the antiquated methods of waste disposal in the nation’s capital. In 1967, the Surgeon 
General of the United States, William H. Stewart, called a conference in Washington to 
discuss solid waste management for the city and the surrounding counties. At the time of 
the conference in November of 1967, the representative of the Army Corps of Engineers 
for the District of Columbia’s Board of Commissioners and the Secretary of the Interior 
had decided to shutter the Kenilworth dump. They hoped to convert the dump into “a 
sanitary landfilling demonstration for community improvement.”344 Apparently, the 
health and wellbeing of the local community were on the mind of the Surgeon General, 
who wrote the forward to the proceedings. Stewart wrote that “[t]he Kenilworth Dump 
has long been an ugly, enormous, burning pile of solid waste, befouling the air of our 
nation’s capital with great plumes of smoke. It has been a menace to health in 
Washington, D.C. and its environs.”345 Stewart’s remarks are worth noting: 
 
 Metropolitan Washington has a unique burden. Our mantle of smoke from 
smoldering refuse is more than a local nuisance. The dirt and refuse in our alleys 
is more than a local disgrace. This is the nation’s showcase city. The millions 
who come here should find a model environment. Instead, when they look behind 
our monuments, they see something less… Some of these hazards relate to the 
familiar public health problems of communicable disease, the problems 
associated with filth, rats, and vermin which we now how to control but can 
never overlook…Others are newer, less completely understood, harder to handle. 
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These stem from the increasing quantity and variety of chemicals released into 
the air from many sources including the imperfect burning of solid wastes. Every 
year we are learning more about the damage done when we breathe this kind of 
air, day in and day out. Everything we learn makes control of this kind of 
pollution increasingly urgent.346 
 
Stewart here repeats the refrain that reformers like Ihlder had brought up over the 
preceding decades. Washington, according to Stewart, was a model city, and the fact that 
it contained an open-burn dump near a large river, two sizable parks, and a residential 
neighborhood was inexcusable. In fact, the location of the dump was less forgivable for a 
city like Washington, which was meant to provide an example of proper waste disposal 
and a livable environment to the rest of the nation.  
 Other speakers at the conference emphasized the particularly noisome 
environmental conditions that residents of Kenilworth Courts faced. Richard Prindle, then 
the Assistant Surgeon General and the Director of the Bureau of Disease Prevention and 
Environmental Control, discussed at length the public health crises afflicting those who 
lived near the Kenilworth Dump, including residents of Kenilworth Courts.  
 
Too often, however, refuse disposal operations are open dumps—festering scars 
on the landscape. Flies, rats, and other disease-carrying pests find large quantities 
of food, a favored breeding medium, in the piles of exposed refuse. The polluted 
drainage from open dumps is an additional insult to ground and surface water 
supplies in the area. The characteristic foul odors, produced by decomposition, 
together with the smoke created by open burning, are often identifiable for 
miles.347  
 
By the late-1960s, Kenilworth Courts was situated nearby a polluted river and an open 
burn dump. Police officers tied the unsanitary conditions inside and around the 
Kenilworth Courts complex to a range of social ills, in some cases claiming the 
cockroaches that infested the Kenilworth Courts buildings were attributable to the 
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frequent crimes committed in the vicinity of the public housing project.348 The public 
health problems that the dump posed threatened the health and welfare of residents of 
Kenilworth Courts. By the late-1960s, the Kenilworth neighborhood was a sacrifice zone, 
turned into a blighted and stinking section of Northeast Washington. 
 By providing sanitary engineers and public health officials with an opportunity to 
speak, the Surgeon General’s Conference on Solid Waste Management for Metropolitan 
Washington drew greater attention to the distinct set of public health problems that the 
dump posed to nearby residents. As a result of this conference, the sanitation engineers 
present decided that the city ought to build a new incinerator and discontinue the practice 
of burning solid waste at Kenilworth dump by the end of 1967. However, the city could 
not find a contractor to handle the disposal of trash elsewhere in the city and the deadline 
lapsed. Dumping and burning continued past January 1st, 1968, when operations were 
supposed to stop and the process of turning the landfill into a demonstration project for 
dump reclamation was meant to begin.349 
 It took a tragedy for the Kenilworth Dump to finally close. On February 15th, 
1968, Kelvin Tyrone Mack, a seven-year-old boy from the southern end of the 
Kenilworth neighborhood was scavenging through the dump. This was a frequent 
practice for young children in the neighborhood. Garbage trucks streamed into the dump 
throughout the morning, depositing solid waste that would be burned in the afternoon. 
Children from the neighborhood and indeed Kenilworth Courts and the surrounding 
neighborhood would comb through the deposited material, searching for salable items or 
useful objects, such as bicycle equipment that could be used for repairs. While Mack and 
his friends were playing near a trash fire, the winds shifted unexpectedly, picking up the 
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flames about ten to twenty feet into the air. Mack and his companions ran from the site. 
Mack fell, and his clothes caught on fire as his companions ran further.350 Sadly the 
young boy found himself trapped in the flames as sanitary engineers performed their 
daily work burning the solid waste by dousing it with gasoline.351 Outraged, by the 
incident, “[o]fficials of the Greater Washington Citizens for Clean Air expressed 
condolences…to the boy’s family and sent a letter to Mayor Washington urging an 
immediate end to open-end burning at the dump.”352 Washington promptly did so, in 
order to avoid further accidents at the site. 
 The closure of the Kenilworth Dump posed a predicament for the Washington 
region’s sanitary engineers. Without a new, modern incinerator in the Washington area, 
how was the metropolis supposed to dispose of its waste? The Kenilworth Dump had 
been a reliable space to dump trash, but was there another option? After a brief debate, 
Washington’s sanitary engineers decided to discontinue using the Kenilworth area as a 
dumping ground for the rest of the city and surrounding counties’ solid waste. However, 
the landfill would still accept ash from local trash incinerators.  
 The incinerator ash served a greater purpose: the Kenilworth landfill would 
become a demonstration project for the creation of new parkland from old trash dumps. 
Incinerator ash, once properly deposited and tamped down, could be used to landscape 
the site. This method had proven effective in reclaiming landfills prior to Kenilworth. At 
the 1967 conference of sanitation engineers, Frank R. Bowerman, then the Vice President 
for Development at the Aerojet-General Corporation highlighted some of the “simple but 
effective techniques that [he] helped develop in using sanitary landfilling for the 
construction of parks, golf courses, and botanic gardens in Southern California.”353  No 
longer would the Kenilworth Landfill stand as a polluted mound on the banks of the 
Anacostia. Rather, the landfill would be filled, capped, covered in topsoil, and landscaped 
in order to produce a park worthy of its position on the banks of the Anacostia in the 
nation’s capital. 
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 Before the landfill was transformed it was mapped and divided into five sections. 
Each section would contain different materials and would be filled in different 
increments. Area “E” was directly across from the Kenilworth Courts public housing 
complex. According to planning documents, Area E was to receive six hundred cubic 
yards of ash residue per day, six days per week, for several weeks. The residue was to be 
delivered while still smoldering. Once deposited, it would be quenched and compacted to 
six inches each day.354 Having faced the odor, uncleanliness, and health concerns posed 
by the open fires at the now-defunct Kenilworth Dump, tenants of Kenilworth Courts 
were now asked to shoulder the burden of the region’s incinerator ash in their backyards. 
Since the ash was not quenched when it was delivered and was still smoldering, it is 
likely that some of it would also be carried by the winds to their homes. 
 The Kenilworth Courts public housing complex’s residents faced many economic, 
social, and political barriers in opposing the depositing of incinerator ash. For one thing, 
many residents were living in poverty, working long hours in order to support themselves 
and their families. For another, Kenilworth Court residents found themselves physically 
segregated and isolated not just from other parts of Washington, but even from much of 
the Kenilworth neighborhood as well. This physical arrangement was not conducive to 
the forging of strong ties to the community that could be used as political leverage 
against the dumping of incinerator ash. For another, the residents of Kenilworth Courts 
rented, but did not own, the homes in which they lived. As evidenced in the case of the 
Marshall Heights and Barry Farm homeowners’ resistance to plans put forward by the 
NCPPC and NCHA, property owners could sometimes gain small victories over planning 
agencies.355 Finally, there were no local government officials to appeal to, nor did the 
tenants have federal representation. The only recourse was to try to bargain with often 
                                                        
354 United States Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service, Kenilworth Model Sanitary 
Landfill: Interim Report on Solid Waste Demonstration Project, Dec. 1967-Jan. 1969, Environmental 
Control Administration, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1969), 2-5. 
 
355 The literature on environmental justice has shown that property owners often have leverage over 
local administrators that renters do not. Love Canal protestors, for example, used tax and mortgage 
strikes to bring attention to their plight. In that case, renters were left out of the community’s 
demonstrations. See Elizabeth Blum, Love Canal Revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in Environmental 
Activism (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008). 
 
186 
unresponsive or antagonistic metropolitan agencies. Sometimes, this was done 
successfully.356 Often, it was not. 
 Apart from the tactical barriers they had to surmount to challenge the incinerator 
ash, African American residents of Kenilworth Courts suffered from longstanding 
ideological connections that tied black communities to unclean spaces. In his 2015 
monograph Clean and White: A History of Environmental Racism in the United States, 
historian Carl Zimring traces the long history of how environmental factors have shaped 
historical perceptions of race and racial inequalities.357  Zimring describes how the 
scientific approaches to waste management that began to emerge towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and the racial categorizations and precise hierarchies that also 
developed in that period associated non-white races with dirt and unsanitary 
conditions.358 For policymakers and planners, historical connections between non-
whiteness and unclean spaces may have delayed their drive to act. After all, to the 
sanitation engineers the Kenilworth neighborhood had served its purpose as a trash bin 
for the rest of the city. Their primary concern was with the appearance of smoke on the 
banks of the Anancostia.  
 Zimring’s argument helps explain why the first location selected for the ash was 
nearly adjacent to Kenilworth Courts. Residents of the complex faced a few years of 
dumping and landscaping—beginning with the plot directly across from their homes—as 
crews under the supervision of local sanitary engineers, the National Capital Parks and 
Planning Commission, and the National Park Service worked to turn Kenilworth dump 
into a model demonstration landfill site. Dumping would not cease until the early-1970s, 
which meant that Kenilworth Courts tenants faced months during which trucks carrying 
incinerator ash and refuse from other parts of the city ran down the Kenilworth Avenue 
Freeway to deposit their loads on the site near their homes.359 
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 When dumping finally did end, the Kenilworth Park contained about four million 
tons of “raw refuse, incinerator ash, and other burned residue, had an average depth of 25 
feet, and covered an area of about 145 acres.”360 Operations at the Landfill left an 
enduring mark on the residents of Kenilworth Courts, not only in terms of their 
immediate surroundings, but also on their health and wellbeing. In 2007, the Department 
of Health and Human Services, while acknowledging that it does not assess health issues 
as related to exposure pathways in the past, did go as far as to write that “the 25+ yrs of 
burning/ash disposal [sic] has in all likelihood led to exposures of those who resided near 
the landfill and of employees working at Kenilworth Park Landfill.”361 When considered 
with the amount of time that residents of Kenilworth Courts faced refuse burnings, the 
particular set of health issues that tenants faced become clear.  
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Above is the cover image for an instructional photographic essay on solid waste management produced by 
the Environmental Protection Agency. It shows sanitation engineers involved in the process of dumping 
trash prior to covering it with incinerator ash. From U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Burn, Bury or 
What?” Filmscripts on Solid Waste Management (Washington: Environmental Protection Agency, 1972), 




 The primary envirotechnical obstacle that residents of Kenilworth Courts faced 
stemmed from the siting of the complex. Unlike at Lincoln Heights and Barry Farms, 
however, the residents of Kenilworth Courts did not contend with erosion or flooding as 
much as they dealt with air pollution from the nearby dump. Still, the NCHA clearly 
engendered a good deal of environmental injustice by choosing the site. It was limited by 
its financial situation, but the Authority still purchased the site and subjected its residents 
to years of environmental nuisances like smoke, soot, and ash. The NCHA could do little 
to rectify this situation. Throughout its history, while it did not contend with a centralized 
municipal government, it did have to deal with other agencies that sometimes worked at 
cross-purposes. The NCHA found that it was not, in fact, the administrator of the 
envirotechnical regime at Kenilworth Courts. The sanitation engineers operated the 
collection, transportation, dumping, and burning of trash at the site. Although the 
operation of the envirotechnical system created environmental problems for nearby 
residents, they were not the primary concern of the sanitation engineers who administered 
the system. 
 
Decent, Safe, and Sanitary? The Legacy of Environmental Injustice at Kenilworth Courts 
 
 “All I want is for everyone here to live in a decent, safe, and sanitary community, 
not in misery”, said Kimi Gray in 1980.362 Gray, had long rented from the NCHA. Over 
the course of the previous fifteen years, Gray had witnessed the deterioration of what 
would be her final home, Kenilworth Courts. The nearby Kenilworth Landfill had 
plagued the complex until 1968, three years after Gray moved into an apartment in the 
complex. During her remaining years at Kenilworth Courts, Gray would dedicate her life 
                                                        




to the notion that residents of public housing units deserved the right to live in, as she put 
it, a decent, safe, and sanitary community.363 
 Gray was well positioned to speak on the deteriorating nature of Kenilworth 
Courts and the rest of the city’s public housing stock. She had been raised in units owned 
by the NCHA, and finally made Kenilworth Courts her permanent home in 1965.364 Her 
years in Kenilworth were, for the most part, spent cramped in small apartments with her 
five children. Despite the hardships she endured, Gray became both a local and national 
expert in the affairs of public housing residents. In 1980, she received Congressional 
approval to form the Kenilworth-Parkside Resident Management Corporation, which 
granted residents of Kenilworth Courts the right to run their own complexes. In her 
neighborhood, Gray was known to most of the community as a watchdog and advocate, 
protecting the interests of her neighbors and working to build pathways towards 
economic advantages, such as a college preparatory program called “College Here We 
Come.”365 A 1978 article in the Washington Post stated that “Kimi Gray… is something 
of an institution at Kenilworth Courts, off Kenilworth Avenue in the far reaches of the 
city’s Northeastern quadrant. From her yellow, plastic-covered arm chair she keeps her 
fingers on the pulses of the project and its 3000 or so people.”366 Gray’s work continued 
into the 1980s, as she “patrol[led] the Kenilworth-Parkside development like a mother 
bear circling her cubs. Her voice erupt[ed] out of her slow-moving body like a volcano: 
one moment soft and low, the next exploding in a shout, the next dissolving in deep, rich 
laughter. Sitting at her desk or behind the wheel of her ubiquitous van, wearing her 
jewelry and her bright yellow dresses, she br[ought] the full force of her personality to 
bear on everyone who crosse[d] her path.”367 Nationally, Gray pioneered and promoted 
the tenant self-management approach to public housing, which prompted quicker repairs 
and more efficient financial management in public housing across the country. 
 Gray’s obituary, published a few days after her death on March 1st, 2000, noted 
that “[w]hat [Gray] saw was hopelessness. The maze of unkempt streets, lack of city 
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services, and private enterprises left many in Kenilworth feeling isolated from prosperous 
neighborhoods in Northwest Washington.”368 No wonder, then, that Gray emphasized the 
importance of providing a “decent, safe, and sanitary community.” For too long she and 
her neighbors had suffered from deteriorating urban infrastructures. Her activism and 
enthusiastic work in the Kenilworth neighborhood was often centered on rebuilding 
features of the urban environment in order to bring about decent, safe, and sanitary public 
housing. In 1986, for example, Kimi Gray seethed at the architectural firm hired to repair 
the aging Kenilworth Courts. As reported in the Washington Post, during this meeting, 
“[a]s they unfolded their sketches and presented their plans, Kimi's anger grew. Where 
were the plans for a new heating plant? What about the underground water pipes that kept 
bursting?”369 In a 1990 interview, Gray referenced the sorry state of the domestic and 
community environment in Kenilworth Courts. “Our conditions were deplorable. I mean, 
roofs were literally caving in, trash pickup was outrageous[.]”370 She had spent most of 
her life in the insalubrious conditions offered to some of the poorest residents of 
Washington DC. 
 Kimi Gray lived in the neighborhood that planners like Ihlder had built. She 
witnessed the deterioration of the land and water around Kenilworth Courts, and sought 
to direct public housing in a way that would provide more than just a shelter for residents. 
Furthermore, in Gray’s mind, public housing was symbolically connected to the long 
shadow cast by slavery.  “I want to own the plantations[,]” Gray stated in a 1980 profile 
for the Washington Post. “[R]epeating for emphasis,” Gray continued, “[y]es, the 
plantations. That’s what public-housing communities are, aren’t they?”371 Gray saw in 
her home not a grandiose symbol of the successes of the United States’ approach to 
housing the urban poor, but rather a chance to rectify past mistakes, and an opportunity to 
repair some of the historical wrongs committed against African Americans. These 
modern plantations, according to Gray, had been built and managed by whites. They 
physically segregated black residents in unsanitary places far from the downtown core. 
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At least, Gray hoped, through her efforts she could build something more habitable 
through tenant action.  
 Indeed, Gray was able to marshal her tenant organization to make some basic 
improvements in the landscape. She made sure that trash was collected more frequently, 
which reduced litter and vermin in the immediate surroundings of Kenilworth Courts. 
Her maintenance workers responded far more quickly to cracked plaster, drainage 
backups, and other structural issues than the NCHA had previously. By 1993, Katherine 
Boo, a reporter for The Washington Post was describing Kenilworth Courts as “a model 
of innovation[.]”372 Kenilworth Courts was a model of innovation in large part because it 
awarded basic control over housing and its surroundings to the tenants themselves.373  
 In assessing whether or not Kenilworth Courts met housing planners’ ideals of 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing, it is important to consider the complex in relation to its 
surrounding environment. This means considering longstanding patterns of 
environmental racism in the Kenilworth neighborhood. The story that emerges from this 
historical analysis reveals that Kenilworth Courts did more to maintain patterns of 
environmental injustice than to address and reverse them. Patterns of unequal land 
distribution that had been common in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were 
repeated in the site selection for Kenilworth Courts. Black residents of the complex 
contended with the smoke, soot, and ash from the Kenilworth dump. Those patterns were 
physically built into the landscape as the NPS constructed Kenilworth Park, which was 
intended not for nearby residents who had suffered from decades of environmental 
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injustices, but rather for residents from far-flung, and wealthier parts of the District of 
Columbia, who had contributed their own trash to the neighborhood for years and years.  
 
Conclusion: Kenilworth Courts and the Postwar Envirotechnical Landscape  
 
 Upon its completion, National Capital Housing Authority executives expected 
that Kenilworth Courts would serve as a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling for low-
income residents of Washington, DC. It possessed modern amenities, appliances, and was 
considered a jewel of the housing program in the nation’s capital. Foreign dignitaries and 
local politicos were invited to tour the facilities and see what public housing agencies in 
the United States could accomplish. 
 Yet the existence and operation of the Kenilworth dump undermined housing 
planners’ pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. The fact of the matter was that as 
late as 1980, Kimi Gray stated that Kenilworth was not decent, nor safe, nor sanitary. The 
streets of her community were littered with trash, city services failed to accommodate the 
needs of Kenilworth residents, and the legacy of the Kenilworth dump remained long 
after it was turned into a park. 
 The story of Kenilworth Courts emphasizes the physical nature of environmental 
injustice. Justice demands equality, but this clearly was not achieved in the history of 
sanitation in metropolitan Washington. The city’s sanitation engineers administered a 
system that allowed the streets in more economically prosperous section of Washington 
to stay clean. Simultaneously, Kenilworth became dirtier and dirtier, as trucks streamed 
along the Kenilworth Freeway and deposited their loads nearby Kenilworth Courts and 
other sections of the neighborhood. Physically Kenilworth was connected to the 
infrastructures that Washington’s sanitary engineers built to manage its waste. Yet the 
process of waste disposal itself made these connections invisible. Residents threw out 
their trash and perhaps saw trucks empty their bins once or twice a week, but after the 
truck left their view, their waste was left their mind. As the invisible administrators of the 
sanitary system, engineers accrued significant power over the metropolitan landscape, 
controlling the boundaries, expansion, operation, and closure of landfills and dumps. The 
story of Kenilworth Courts shows what happened to those communities that did not 
benefit from the invisibility of waste, but instead dealt with its disposal in visible and 
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tangible ways. For most residents of Northwest Washington and other parts of the city, 
Kenilworth was far removed, perceptively. It was across the Anacostia, in some corner of 
Northeast that had nothing to offer for visitors except a major dump.   
 Yet even after Kenilworth Park was opened, its design served to further distance 
the Kenilworth neighborhood and its public housing complex from residents on the other 
side of the river. The engineers did not build the park with residents of Kenilworth Courts 
in mind. This is apparent in the design of the park itself. First, a chain link fence runs 
around the perimeter of the Kenilworth Aquatic Gardens. The only entrance is on a paved 
road that lacks sidewalks for cyclists or pedestrians. The road ends, of course, at a 
parking lot before the welcome center in the front of the Aquatic Gardens. Kenilworth 
Park sprawls out beyond a large tree line that obscures most of the residential areas to the 
east of the park. One long gravel drive runs around the perimeter of Kenilworth Park 
before branching on to the main bike path along the bank of the Anacostia, far from the 
homes and public housing complex in the residential area of Kenilworth. Finally, while 
the Kenilworth Park and Aquatic Gardens runs along the east bank of the Anacostia, the 
National Arboretum can be found just across the river, on the west bank. The placement 
of these parks, their lack of integration with the surrounding neighborhood, and the long 
history of the erasure of the communities east of the Anacostia serve to further distance 
Kenilworth Courts from the minds of more prosperous Washingtonians. When they drive 
to Kenilworth Park or the Aquatic Gardens, residents from other parts of metropolitan 
Washington might encounter the complex briefly, as they pass through the area after 
exiting the Kenilworth Avenue Freeway, but they quickly reach their destination: the 
oasis of green that runs along the eastern bank of the Anacostia. When they leave their 
vehicles or briefly dismount their bicycles to take in the scenery of this sequestered 
Washington park, visitors from other parts of the city stand on over two stories’ worth of 
their own historical refuse that was dumped, burned, compacted, and landscaped as 
residents of Kenilworth Courts took in the fumes and the odors and the unsightliness of 
the operation.  
 The story of Kenilworth Courts shows how a simple question of siting could lock 
in conditions that undermined housing reformers’ pursuit of decent, safe, and sanitary 
conditions for low-income residents of Washington. Once considered by executives of 
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the National Capital Housing Authority to be the crowning achievement of their program, 
the Kenilworth Courts complex quickly deteriorated as the dump to its west grew in size. 
In the postwar period, the NCHA was restricted in the types of sites it could choose. 
More of eastern Washington, D.C. had been developed. In turn, the NCHA looked to 
some of the places that had not yet been extensively built up. Kenilworth Courts, located 
nearly adjacent to a dump, was one such place. This was still an envirotechnical obstacle 
tied to siting, but unlike the shifting terrains of earlier complexes, Kenilworth Courts 
suffered from the operation of a nearby envirotechnical system. The NCHA could do 
little to challenge the sanitation engineers who operated the dump, because the engineers, 
in turn, were at a loss for places to dispose of mounting waste in the District of Columbia. 
Siting still mattered greatly for the postwar project in Kenilworth, and the obstacles of the 
location—the smoke and fumes—endangered the residents of that complex. 
 The story of Kenilworth Courts is also a clear case of how environmental injustice 
arose from the envirotechnical obstacle of siting. Even before the NCHA built its 
complex there, black residents had been restricted to the same spots near the marshy 
banks of the Anacostia River. By siting Kenilworth Courts in that location, the NCHA 
both maintained older forms of environmental segregation and amplified their 
consequences for the hundreds of families brought to that location. Furthermore, the 
NCHA chose a location in Kenilworth that sanitation engineers had chosen to provide for 
the cleanliness of other parts of the city.  
 Siting in the postwar context posed slightly different types of obstacles than 
during the Second World War. The NCHA no longer had wide-open spaces on which to 
build. Instead, it had to contend with other agencies that had carved out their own parts of 
the metropolitan landscape. In the case of Kenilworth Courts, the NCHA decided to build 
a complex nearly adjacent to a large dump. While the buildings there did not deteriorate 
as quickly as the wartime projects, residents still suffered from the nearby operation of a 
different envirotechnical system. The two systems were incompatible, given their 
proximity to one another. But the NCHA never challenged the ability of the sanitation 
engineers to continue burning trash. Instead, it left its tenants to deal with the smoke and 
ash. Kenilworth Courts was not decent, safe, or sanitary because it was sited too close to 
an open burn dump.   
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 Even after Kenilworth Park was built, questions about environmental injustice 
remained. The park was not built with the interests of local residents in mind. It instead 
served as a retreat for the wealthier residents of other parts of Washington, who were 
unaware of its history. In the end, it was the residents of Kenilworth Courts themselves 
who tried to bring about decent, safe, and sanitary conditions in their small section of 
northeast Washington. Kimi Gray’s tenant management organization was indeed 
somewhat successful in doing so—repairs were handled more quickly and rents collected 
more successfully under her leadership—but the obstacles that they faced in their 
surroundings were difficult to surmount. In the end, the envirotechnical obstacles of the 
Kenilworth site undermined housing planners’ ability to bring about their vision for 






Cracks in the Façade, Smoke from the Highway: Sheridan Terrace and the Many 
Obstacles Posed by Siting 
 
 By the end of the 1950s, the National Capital Housing Authority had succeeded in 
laying the groundwork for the development of eastern Washington, D.C. During the 
planning process for Barry Farms in 1940 and 1941, the NCHA confronted the fact that 
private developers and the City of Washington had long struggled with the difficult 
terrain around the planned site. Sewer lines, roads, water pipes, electrical wires and other 
such infrastructures that were vital for decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings were scarce in 
much of the region. The NCHA would help extend those infrastructures into eastern 
Washington by modifying the landscape and erecting large housing complexes across the 
region. From sites like Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights, and Highland Dwellings, the 
infrastructures necessary to support housing developments could be extended further into 
the region. 
 In the years following the construction of wartime developments across 
Washington, the population of the part of the city east of the Anacostia and Potomac 
Rivers grew dramatically. In 1940, 51,839 people resided east of the rivers, which was 
7.8% of the entire District of Columbia population.374 By 1950, the region’s percentage 
of the total city’s population increased to 19%, at 151,810 residents.375 The population 
increased again in 1960, to 182,120 people, or almost 24% of the District of Columbia 
population.376 Clearly over a short period of time eastern Washington, D.C. grew from a 
less-populated section of the city separated by a large river into an urbanized place in its 
own right. 
 With the increasing numbers of people moving to eastern Washington, D.C. came 
changing racial demographics as well. In 1940, at the start of the NCHA’s work in the 
region, white residents constituted about two-thirds of the total population in eastern 
Washington, D.C., and black residents counted for about one-third. The ratio of black-to-
                                                        
374 DCGISopendata, “Census Tracts-1940,” Open Data DC, https://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/census-
tracts-1940 (accessed May 15th, 2020). 
375 DCGISopendata, “Census Tracts-1950,” Open Data DC, https://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/census-
tracts-1950 (accessed May 15th, 2020). 
376 DCGISopendata, “Census Tracts-1960,” Open Data DC, https://opendata.dc.gov/datasets/census-
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white residents remained much the same in 1950, but by 1960 black residents constituted 
54% of the regional population while whites accounted for 46%.377 Furthermore, by the 
1960s, whites were heavily clustered in the southern tip of Southeastern DC as well as 
neighborhoods adjacent to suburban communities in Prince George’s County.  
 The demographic shifts taking place in eastern Washington, D.C. from the 1940s 
through the 1960s are important for two reasons. First, by the time later complexes like 
Kenilworth Courts and Sheridan Terrace were built, there was less and less suitable land 
available. Private developers, the NPS, and various metropolitan agencies had taken 
control of much of eastern Washington in order to build profitable developments, or to 
provide amenities for new neighborhoods. This explains in part why Kenilworth Courts 
was built next to a dump, and why Sheridan Terrace—the subject of this chapter—was 
built in an old streambed next to a major parkway. 
 Second, the NCHA was instrumental in white flight. Public housing historians as 
well as urban historians more generally accept that local and federal policymakers, as 
well as real estate interests, drove the racialization of metropolitan space in the postwar 
period. Black families were locked out of the generous federal aid policies that promoted 
suburban homeownership.378 Suburban politics, in turn, became oriented around 
protecting a sense of property ownership and rights that were products of housing 
policies that favored whites. Within cities, the NCHA was one agency among hundreds 
across the country that carved metropolitan spaces into distinct racial niches.379 Even if 
its leadership had good intentions, it still participated in a program that devalued black 
land and encouraged whites to move further into the suburbs. This meant that the NCHA 
played a role in the dramatic transformation of the suburban environment that was 
captured so well by Adam Rome in The Bulldozer in the Countryside. Suburban 
environmental changes and urban environmental changes were inextricably linked as 
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projects like the NCHA’s public housing construction restructured metropolitan along 
racial lines. White communities moved to the suburban ideal en masse as black families 
were subjected to the severe envirotechnical obstacles of public housing complexes.380 
 Sheridan Terrace was built in one of the last open spaces available for large-scale 
development in eastern Washington, D.C. Construction began in 1957 and would last for 
about three years. It was located next to Suitland Parkway, a major road connecting the 
suburban communities of central Prince George’s County—as well as Andrews Air Force 
Base—to downtown Washington, D.C. The entire complex was built in a long line of 
what counted as high-rises for the District of Columbia. Each building was about six or 
seven stories tall. The southern end of the complex abutted a sizable hill, which was 
likely once a wooded ravine along the bank of Stickfoot Creek. The creek, which ran 
along the northern edge of what would become the Barry Farms complex on its way to 
the Anacostia had been covered during sewer construction in the second decade of the 
twentieth century.381 
 Sheridan Terrace’s history shows that siting still mattered in the postwar period. 
With few places left to build, the NCHA once again chose a site that was prone to air 
pollution, as cars rumbled along the adjacent parkway at all hours of the day and night in 
and out of downtown Washington, D.C. Furthermore, because it sat on a terrain that 
sloped downwards towards what was once a creek, the complex was located both at a low 
elevation and in a space where water from the hills to the east would fall during heavy 
rainstorms. In addition to the problem of air pollution, the NCHA would also have to 
contend with a building sliding during construction and grading issues.  
 The history of Sheridan Terrace reveals that the NCHA continued to confront 
environtechnical obstacles pertaining to siting in the postwar period. The NCHA was 
constrained both by institutional pressures—the RLA continued to displace residents who 
                                                        
380 Kenneth Jackson provides a social and architectural history of the suburban ideal in his seminal 
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Oxford University Press, 1985). 
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Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1917, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, 147. 
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were in need of housing—as well as the unavailability of space.382 The residents who 
were displaced by those activities needed somewhere to go. Not willing to displace even 
more people by building over extant communities as it had done during the Second 
World War, the NCHA instead found what little suitable land it could. In the end, the 
NCHA would be unable to sufficiently address the envirotechnical obstacles at Sheridan 
Terrace, which rendered its housing indecent, unsafe, and insanitary, and threatened the 
physical health of its tenants. 
 
Building Sheridan Terrace: The NCHA Once Again Confronts the Topography of Eastern 
Washington, D.C., 1956-1960 
 
 From 1956 through 1957, the NCHA began to rapidly expand its housing 
program, letting contracts for six projects, including Sheridan Terrace, which would add 
1421 new units to the city’s housing stock. The housing was long overdue, since ongoing 
urban renewal projects across the city—and especially those in Southwest Washington 
and the Adams-Morgan neighborhood, had displaced thousands of residents. Pressure 
from the Redevelopment Land Agency and other city offices to rehouse displaced 
residents mounted throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Sheridan Terrace and Kenilworth 
Courts, built in the same year, were part of the NCHA’s attempts to ease the housing 
crunch. 
 The first contracts for construction at Sheridan Terrace were let on November 
13th, 1956.383 The NCHA was apparently unable to find an appropriate contractor for the 
project because during a meeting on March 26th, 1958, James Ring, then serving as the 
director of the NCHA, mentioned that a round of contract bids had been advertised once 
again in December of 1957.384 Ring stated that the contracts were for building 183 units, 
spread throughout eleven buildings, “on a hilly site on Sheridan Road between Howard 
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and Pomeroy Roads.”385 The site was fairly uneven, since it sat in a narrow valley that 
had been carved by Stickfoot Creek. At the southern end of the complex was a seventy-
foot embankment, a legacy of Stickfoot Creek’s original course. Of course, this was not 
the first time that the NCHA committed to a project on the hilly terrain of eastern 
Washington, D.C. It had contended with the envirotechnical obstacles that siting posed 
since the 1940s. 
 The NCHA executive board had reason to be wary about the site on which 
Sheridan Terrace was going to be built. The board had commissioned studies of the site 
in the past. During the war years, the USHA shielded the NCHA from such careful 
attention to the landscape by blocking the District of Columbia’s intervention. Even 
though its contractors at Lincoln Heights and Barry Farm suggested that outside advisers 
should have been recruited, wartime housing demands outweighed judicious study of the 
landscape. Furthermore, the NCHA no longer had federal power behind its efforts to 
build housing, and had to cooperate with various agencies working in the District of 
Columbia. It also had to conform to the city building code. For Sheridan Terrace the 
NCHA was willing to take the time and resources to investigate the site and learn more 
about the environmental features that were not immediately apparent, such as soil quality, 
hydrology, and topography.  
 The NCHA’s decision to hire an outside expert was prompted by the District of 
Columbia Department of Licenses and Inspections. Months after the NCHA filed a 
permit for construction on July 3rd. 1957, the DCDLI questioned the design of two 
buildings located at the north end of the site that would be supported on concrete 
caissons. Because of the slope of that part of the site, the DCDLI worried that the soil 
might prove unstable and the shifting weight of the building above might shear the 
caissons, which would let water into the foundations as they were being laid.386 In other 
words, if the soils shifted, they might bring the base of the structure with them, while the 
caissons would stay in place. Even a little slippage had the potential to fracture the 
caissons, contributing to flooding within the buildings.  
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 The executive board enlisted Dr. Edward S. Barber, “a well-known soil 
mechanics engineer.”387 Barber’s recruitment showed that the NCHA had a better 
working relationship with the municipal government by the 1950s. In some of the 
NCHA’s Second World War-era developments, the city government asked the NCHA to 
let municipal inspectors access its properties, which the Authority refused with the 
backing of the USHA. In those instances, the District’s Board of Commissioners had 
expressed similar concerns about the viability of large-scale construction projects, given 
the rolling terrain in eastern Washington, D.C.  
 Barber found that the northern end of the project area was suitable for the 
apartment buildings that the NCHA hoped to construct. “[I]n his opinion,” Ring reported 
to the NCHA executive board, “there was no danger of slippage at the north end of the 
site that would endanger those buildings that were to be constructed on concrete 
caissons[.]”388 But, upon investigating the southern end of the project, beneath the 
terraced hill to the east, Barber concluded “there was some evidence of slippage at the 
southern and more hilly portion of the site.”389 In his investigation of the Sheridan 
Terrace plot, Barber observed that some slippage may have occurred, which could 
threaten the buildings with future flooding.  
 Barber offered some recommendations, which the NCHA did its best to take up. 
He suggested that the land to the east of the buildings on the southern end of the slope 
should be re-graded to a 2.5 percent slope, which was less steep than the original grade. 
This meant that the NCHA would have to re-grade the land under its control that faced 
the formidable embankment next to the southernmost dwellings. Furthermore, Barber 
suggested that the basements in those complexes should be fashioned out of reinforced 
concrete, rather than cinderblock as was initially intended.390 Concrete would prove more 
resistant to water, and allow less of it to penetrate the complexes at the base of the hill 
while providing a sturdier base. 
 The NCHA took Barber up on his recommendations, even though it meant that 
the agency had to purchase about ninety additional feet of clearance in the direction of 




390 Ibid. Poured concrete is more resistant to outside pressure from soil and water. 
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the large embankment. At the time of Ring’s report, the NCHA had three of the five 
homeowners who would be affected willing to sell to the agency, while suggesting little 
difficulty in acquiring the rest of the property from the two remaining owners. There was 
some concern from a “Mr. Nolan” who served on the NCHA executive board. This was 
likely a misspelling of John Nolen Jr.’s last name. In 1958, when this meeting took place, 
Nolen served as the Director of the National Capitol Planning Commission, the successor 
agency to the NCPPC.391 Nolen “cautioned that, once a slope is disturbed, it opens up to 
the seepage of water and presents a problem of continuous maintenance.”392 The NCHA 
had firsthand experience with that problem dating back to the early 1940s, when, during 
the construction of Barry Farms, heavy rains disturbed an embankment at the head of a 
cut that the contractors had made. The disturbance damaged a wall that belonged to the 
St. Elizabeth asylum.393 The record does not indicate that Nolen received a response from 
the rest of the board about his concerns.  
 As was the case for the Second World War era homes, the District of Columbia 
licensing office raised concerns about the ways that the landscape could influence the 
structural stability of the complexes. Since the end of the Second World War, however, 
the NCHA had been willing to allow outside inspectors and experts to view their projects 
and suggested changes to the building methods in order to reduce the likelihood of 
structural damage. Apart from Sheridan Terrace, this new approach was evident in the 
case of Valley Green, which was built about six years later.394 In 1964, the NCHA’s 
executive director noted that there were erosion problems at Valley Green that affected 
the stability of the housing stock, and suggested that the cost of remediating the 
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landscape should be accounted for in the budgeting for that project.395 Despite the 
attention that the NCHA gave to these issues, however, the agency would continue to 
face structural deterioration that stemmed from the envirotechnical obstacles inherent to 
the sites that it chose.  
 Sheridan Terrace began accepting residents in December of 1959. Although 
construction on the entire complex was not yet complete, with some buildings on the 
southern end of the property still being built, the NCHA was eager to begin collecting 
rents from the completed buildings in the north. The board debated having an opening 
ceremony, but some considered the event to be fairly unimportant. Executive Director 
James Ring disagreed, claiming, “the opening at Kenilworth Courts proved of 
outstanding worth.”396 Ring convinced the board of the need to have an opening 
ceremony, although a small one “because of the limited facilities in the area.”397 
Ultimately, the executive board decided to hold an opening ceremony at ten in the 
morning on December 11th, 1959.398 
 The opening ceremony did not mark the end of construction troubles at Sheridan 
Terrace. Poor coordination with the District of Columbia Department of Highways meant 
that the NCHA was unprepared when the city suddenly modified Sheridan Road. The 
road ran along the western side of the complex, and was an access route to local roads for 
cars travelling in the westbound lanes of Suitland Parkway towards downtown 
Washington. Anticipating increased traffic from the Parkway, the City of Washington 
decided to re-grade and widen Sheridan road. Their efforts left “a 14-foot vertical 
embankment that ran 300 feet along the front of the project, rendering 16 units unsafe for 
occupancy”, according to The Washington Post.399 Sixteen housing units that once 
abutted Sheridan Road were now completely inaccessible to tenants, who could not be 
expected to scale a fourteen-feet-tall embankment. The NCHA now had to find 
temporary homes for the displaced residents. 
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 Members of the NCHA Executive Board were understandably upset about the 
impromptu re-grading, which took place adjacent to the structures that Barber warned 
might be susceptible to slippage. Any disruption to the grade threatened to add to the 
cost, effort, and time taken to re-grade the eastern edges of southern Sheridan Terrace. 
Furthermore, the mistake might have been avoided, but apparently the Highway 
Department had misplaced an important map that showed the grades for the area that the 
City of Washington and the NCHA had already agreed on.400 Furthermore, the NCHA 
had the Highway Department’s assurance that re-grading, if necessary, would take place 
on the opposite side of Suitland Parkway.401  In response to the construction activity 
undertaken by the city’s Department of Highways, the NCHA quickly erected a fence and 
retaining wall, meant to secure the perimeter of its complex and prevent erosion from the 
new embankment.402    
The disputed re-grading is difficult to see today. There is a culvert at the southern 
end of the complex, where Pomeroy and Sheridan Roads meet. This may be the legacy of 
the work done by the Department of Highways. In any case, the embankment was the last 
major hiccup in the effort to construct Sheridan Terrace. All of the units would soon be 
open to occupancy. 
 
Celebrating Sheridan Terrace: Architectural Innovation in the Postwar Period 
 
 On New Year’s Eve, 1961, architect Joseph Miller said of Sheridan Terrace that 
“the best tribute that can be paid to Sheridan Terrace is that it doesn’t look like public 
housing.”403 Miller was quoted during an awards ceremony for fifteen public and private 
housing developments selected by the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade for their 
architectural distinctiveness. The Board of Trade was a prominent and powerful 
association of business interests in the nation’s capital. Miller was a member of the 
architectural firm Brown, Chapman, Miller, and Wright. His firm was to share the award 
                                                        
400 Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States to the US House of Representatives, 
“Report on Audit of the National Capital Housing Authority (NCHA) Fiscal Year 1960,” Washington, 
US GPO, 1961, 55. Available online at https://books.google.com/books?id=idIjAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA36-
PP33&lpg=RA36-PP33&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed November 29th, 2019). 
401 Ibid., 56. 
402 Ibid. 




with Max Wertheimer, who owned the building company Wertheimer Construction 
Corporation, and Walter E. Washington, then serving as the Executive Director of the 
National Capital Housing Authority. During the awards ceremony, Miller highlighted his 
designs, which included grilled wall blocks to prevent an institutional aesthetic and to 
keep drying laundry from the sight of motorists on Suitland Parkway, light-colored 
bricks, and “a number of foot bridges that extend from near the top of a sloping hill to the 
upper stories of the apartments.”404 
 
 
Screenshot from the article referenced above. Luther P. Jackson, “New Garb Wins Housing Award,” The 
Washington Post, Times Herald, January 1st, 1962.  
 
On the surface, then, Sheridan Terrace appeared to conform to the conditions of 
the surrounding area. Miller even appeared to accommodate the variations in the 
elevation of the site by building pedestrian bridges from the top of the steep hill to the top 
floor units. Indeed, the Washington Post continued to praise the Sheridan Terrace 
Housing Development through the early 1960s. In September of 1962, The Washington 
Post covered the twenty-fifth anniversary of the nation’s first housing renewal program. 
Reporter Edward Cowan interviewed Marie McGuire, who then served as the 
Commissioner of the PHA. McGuire had high praise for Sheridan Terrace. She stated that 




the complex was “one of the outstanding architectural achievements in the 25 years of the 
low-rent housing development program.”405 McGuire also noted that “[t]he 183-unit 
project on Sheridan [road SE] illustrates the importance of landscaping and site 
selection.”406  
 McGuire was understandably proud of the recent work that her agency had done 
to support local housing authorities like the NCHA. But she likely did not know about the 
longer history of the site, and the many envirotechnical obstacles that the NCHA 
encountered as it transformed the site and built on top of it. During the construction 
process itself, the NCHA was informed of evidence of slippage occurring underneath its 
buildings because of the shifting land. Sheridan Terrace was built in a former creek bed, 
wedged in between a major traffic conduit and a steep embankment. Of course, what 
McGuire and other administrators could not have anticipated at the time were the slow 
forces of environmental change taking place at the site. Water flowed underground, 
contributing to shifting soils that invisibly threatened the stability of the building. The 
surrounding landscape was not a static feature of the Sheridan Terrace complex, but was 
instead an active and forceful agent of historical change. Environmental factors like the 
soil and water of particular locations undermined reformers’ pursuit of decent, safe, and 
sanitary dwellings by slowly degrading the very foundations, walls, floors, and ceilings 
of public housing units. Those forces would continue to exert damage on Sheridan 
Terrace as it was lauded for its innovative design and aesthetic beauty.  
 The press heaped more praise on Sheridan Terrace in an article from December of 
1962 and again in 1965. The 1962 article, titled “Public Housing Gets its Second Wind,” 
compared the “handsome” Sheridan Terrace to the “drab projects [that] are all ‘decent, 
safe, and sanitary[.]’”407 The “Second Wind” to which the article’s headline referred were 
architects’ attempts to make the projects look less institutional than the first few 
complexes had been. The 1965 article, titled “GAO Really Has a Pile to Pick to Pieces 
Now” covers the General Accounting Office’s investigation into the finances of the 
National Capital Housing Authority. The reporter Wolf von Eckard, art and architecture 
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critic for The Washington Post, was skeptical about the intentions of the GAO, 
comparing the NCHA’s program, which came in at its low budget, to the extreme 
expenditures of the Architect of the Capitol as it worked on the new Sam Rayburn 
Congressional Office Building.408 The substance of the GAO concerns was that the PHA, 
and by extension the NCHA, put “greater emphasis on the environmental and esthetic 
aspects of housing rather than on the promotion of economy.”409  
 
 
An image of one of the buildings in the Sheridan Terrace complex, published in The Washington Post. This 
building was towards the southern end of the complex. Wolf von Eckardt, “Public Housing Gets its Second 
Wind,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, December 9th, 1962. 
 
 Of course, what von Eckard, McGuire, and the accountants at the GAO saw was 
the completed structures. Whether celebrating or bemoaning the cost of the buildings, 
observers of Sheridan Terrace saw only the finished buildings, and, with the exception 
perhaps of McGuire, did not know about the extensive landscaping that went into 
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construction in such a hilly part of the city, or of the problems that the NCHA faced as it 
tried to build lasting housing in Southeast Washington. And, invisibly, the terrain 
underneath Sheridan Terrace continued to shift, stressing the structures and threatening 
their undoing.  
 It is important to reiterate, of course, that Sheridan Terrace was not one of the 
wartime projects. Although all of the buildings were intended to be permanent features of 
the eastern Washington, D.C., urban landscape, there was an apparent stylistic and 
material difference between the wartime projects like Lincoln Heights, Barry Farms, and 
Highland Dwellings, and the later projects like Kenilworth Courts and Sheridan Terrace. 
Without the PHA breathing down the necks of the NCHA executive board members, but 
with a great deal of funding still in place, housing planners were free to experiment with 
modern designs and try to make public housing look like its private counterparts. But no 
matter how much the NCHA planners tried to make public housing look appealing, the 
fact of the matter was that they were still stuck building in some of the least desirable 
sites in the city, much as they had been during the Second World War. Kenilworth Courts 
was built nearly adjacent to an open burn dump. Sheridan Terrace was built at the bottom 
of a former creek bed. After just thirty years Sheridan Terrace went from a critically 
renowned symbol of housing planners’ ability to lift the city’s poor out of poverty to a 
“stairway to hell.”410 The envirotechnical landscape of public housing had much to do 
with that transformation. 
 
Suitland Parkway: Eastern Washington, D.C. Opens For Development 
 
 As builders worked to re-grade the landscape and erect apartment buildings on the 
site that the NCHA chose, as residents moved in to their new homes, and as the invisible 
forces of soil and water continued to shape the terrain and environment in and around 
Sheridan Terrace, cars continued to rumble along the adjacent parkway. Cars rushed past 
Sheridan Terrace on their ways to and from downtown Washington, D.C. everyday and 
night. The Parkway was more than a source of noise pollution. Car exhaust and lead 
emissions would spew from hundreds of tailpipes everyday as commuters went back and 
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forth from their homes and offices. As suburban developments proliferated in central 
Prince George’s County during the 1950s and 1960s, the Parkway would become busier 
and busier. Due to its proximity to the Sheridan Terrace site, its history matters. Suitland 
Parkway was a major envirotechnical obstacle—a feature of the site that the NCHA 
found difficult to control—that undermined the health and wellbeing of the NCHA’s 
tenants at Sheridan Terrace.  
 Suitland Parkway was first proposed in 1937 to aid in Washington’s defense by 
connecting the Bolling Air Base with the Camp Springs Army Air Base, which has since 
been renamed Andrews Air Force Base.411 The proposed route of the Parkway would run 
over what was once Stickfoot Creek.412 Mentioned in the first chapter, Stickfoot Creek 
once swelled as summer and autumn rains ran from the hilly highlands of eastern 
Washington, D.C. into the creek, which swept through small farms on its way to the 
Anacostia River. The creek was largely covered, however, during the 1910s, as public 
health officials worked to expand sanitary infrastructure into the rough terrain east of the 
rivers.413 
  Construction would have to wait, however, until the federal government provided 
ample funds for defense purposes during the Second World War. The District of 
Columbia insisted that the federal government pay for the parkway because its Board of 
Commissioners did not expect the road to significantly increase the tax base for Southeast 
Washington, which limited the city’s desire to take on the debt necessary to finance the 
project.414 The Parkway was eventually planned and built in 1943 and 1944.415 The final 
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course of the Suitland Parkway followed a sinuous route through the District of 
Columbia. 
 Despite the sparse residential density of eastern Washington, D.C. in the 1940s, 
the National Capital Parks and Planning Commissioner at the time, Gen. Ulysses Grant 
III, was concerned about the highway construction affecting nearby homes. He noted that 
proper housing was needed, especially given the population surge as a consequence of 
wartime planning, for “people of small income.”416 He worked to ensure that few 
residents would be evicted along the course of the parkway, and that those who were 
would be spared until the last possible moment. Ultimately, however, utilitarian logic 
prevailed during the construction process. The planners behind Suitland Parkway agreed 
that, despite the pending evictions, the road would justify itself by serving “nine war 
housing projects immediately adjacent totaling 4000 units, of which more than 3200 are 
family dwellings.”417 Between 1941 and 1943, through the efforts of the NCHA and other 
federal agencies, the rate of development and population increased dramatically in 
Southeast Washington. After the NCPPC completed Suitland Parkway in 1944, 
expanding residential and commercial areas in the District of Columbia placed some 
pressure on the roadway, which saw an increase in traffic during the 1950s and 1960s.418  
 Along with the traffic came invisible polutants such as lead. Reports about the 
dangers of lead had circulated since the pioneering work of public health scholar Alice 
Hamilton. Hamilton had emerged as a key figure in the history of urban reform through 
her involvement in the Settlement Movement, but she also contributed significantly to the 
public’s understanding of the hazards of lead. In 1910, at the first National Conference on 
Industrial Diseases, Hamilton presented her findings, which showed that younger 
individuals were more susceptible to lead poisoning than adults. Furthermore, she pointed 
out that lead entered the body through inhalation and swallowing, rather than through the 
skin.419 
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 The industry responded to those concerns with a fifty-year advertising campaign 
to try to convince the public that lead was safe, while conducting its own tests that 
demonstrated the opposite.420 Although intrepid reporters and activists initially focused 
on the dangers of lead paint in homes, attacks on lead in gasoline grew in the 1950s and 
1960s. Clair C. Patterson, a geochemist who had worked on the Manhattan Project began 
sampling polar ice cores during that period, revealing that the amount of lead captured 
there increased drastically after the expansion of the tetraethyl lead marked between 1940 
and 1965. Patterson was one of the first lead researchers to emerge outside of the small 
group of lead toxicologists who had primarily relied on industry support.421  
 The lead industry resisted what became increasingly obvious to the general public 
and reform-minded politicians. In the late-1960s, the automotive industry found that the 
introduction of the new catalytic converter, which was meant to reduce pollution by 
converting carbon monoxide to carbon dioxide and water, was rendered less effective by 
leaded gasoline. Major automotive manufactures began to abandon the lead industry, 
which initiated its decline.422 In 1971, William Ruckelshaus, the first EPA administrator, 
named lead a threat to public health.423 Between 1976 and 1996, leaded gasoline was 
phased out in favor of unleaded gasoline. Over the same period there was a ninety percent 
drop in children’s average blood-lead level.424  
 For the first fifteen years of its operation, the exhaust from hundreds of cars 
driving along Suitland Parkway blew towards the windowsills of residents in Sheridan 
Terrace, endangering the adults, and especially the children, who lived there. The noise 
of the roadway would have been an obvious nuisance. The pollution would have made it 
harder for residents to breathe, and likely contributed to poor health outcomes at the 
complex. But lead too was an invisible danger. It accumulated in the bodies of the 
children, teens, and adults at the complex, possibly creating disorders and conditions that 
would plague them for the rest of their lives. This was a significant envirotechnical 
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obstacle to the health and welfare of residents of the NCHA, and it was caused by the 
Authority’s choice of siting. That envirotechnical obstacle greatly increased the 
environmental burdens borne by residents of Sheridan Terrace. 
 
Crumbling Brick: The Rapid Decline of Sheridan Terrace, 1966-1974 
 
 In September of 1966, Walter Washington found himself once again touring some 
of the dilapidated buildings managed by the National Capital Housing Authority. This 
was an important, though difficult part of Washington’s job.425 He spent much of his 
tenure at the NCHA trying his best to fix the increasingly obvious holes in the upkeep 
and maintenance of NCHA properties. On September 29th, 1966, Washington heard from 
fifteen tenants at Sheridan Terrace for three hours. Among their concerns were “rooms 
too hot or too cold [and] falling plaster.”426 There were no minutes kept of that meeting, 
so it is not possible to determine the exact items discussed, but what is most telling about 
the article that covered the meeting is that it was published just a year-and-a-half after 
von Eckard’s piece lauding the appealing nature of Sheridan Terrace. Furthermore, 
Washington was meeting with Sheridan Terrace residents who had a litany of concerns 
about their building’s quality just four years after it won an award from the Board of 
Trade and just five years after it was finished. Although built to last, the apartments had 
quickly deteriorated. What happened? 
 After construction ceased, neither the NCHA nor the City of Washington paid 
further attention to the exterior structural stability of the Sheridan Terrace complexes. 
Indeed, it could be that given the inconsistent elevations of the different buildings at the 
complex, continued settling occurred well after construction was finished. This could 
account for the cracking and deterioration of the plaster on the walls of some of the 
complexes. Of course, other factors influence the stability of plaster walls. Flooding from 
abandoned units—partially determined by the NCHA to be a product of erosion—
contributed to at least some of the deterioration of the plaster.427  
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 Given that the NCHA’s outside expert indeed found evidence of slippage, and 
that the DCDLI was concerned about slippage throughout the complex, it may well be 
that Sheridan Terrace was built on a site that was not conducive to the construction of 
large apartment buildings. Cracks on walls can appear when houses settle, and houses 
that are built on clay soils are especially susceptible to this type of cracking. During rainy 
periods, clay soils expand as they hold more water, and contract as the water becomes 
scarce during dry seasons.428 Furthermore, plaster retention can also be affected by loud 
noises, such as nearby highway traffic.429 Furthermore, a 1975 soil study of the District of 
Columbia revealed that Sheridan Terrace sat on top of “well-drained soils that are 
underlain by unstable clayey sediment”.430 Barber’s recommendations may have shored 
up the buildings’ stability in the short-term, but it may have been possible for long-term 
damage to the buildings as a result of the unstable surrounding environment. Sheridan 
Terrace was, after all, built directly beneath a large edifice, in a former creek bed, and 
next to an important thoroughfare through Southeastern Washington. Siting, furthermore, 
and the environmental features of various sites, played significant roles in the history of 
other housing complexes. 
 It appears that the location in which Sheridan Terrace was built was not properly 
suited for the complex without investments in building techniques and materials that 
could withstand the environmental constraints at that location. It is unclear how much the 
NCHA actually knew about the quality of the soils at the site or the state of knowledge 
about how to engineer solutions to those problems in the early 1960s, but what is clear is 
that the NCHA chose to simply re-grade the site, which still allowed water to flow to its 
lowest point towards the southern end of the complex.  
 Meanwhile, throughout the rest of the 1960s and into the 1970s, Sheridan Terrace 
deteriorated. This process would continue into the 1980s, despite Mayor-Commissioner 
Walter Washington’s 1972 promise to halt “the physical and social deterioration of Far 
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Southeast … within four years.”431 Washington made this promise during a bus tour of 
the Southeastern quadrant of the city. Kirk Scharfenberg, the reporter who covered that 
event for The Washington Post, wrote that “[o]ne of the first scheduled stops on 
yesterday’s bus tour was the Sheridan Terrace public housing units. The old Department 
of Human Resources bus…shifted into a low gear to climb the hilly terrain that typifies 
the Far Southeast.”432 During the ride up, raising his voice to be heard above the roar of 
the bus engine, a reporter asked Washington about vacancies at Sheridan Terrace, and he 
replied that with some improvements, he hoped to fill the ground-floor units soon. 
Washington proudly admitted that the vacancy rate at the complex was down to twelve 
percent, from a high of eighty-six percent the year before.433  
 Mayor Washington’s hopes went unrealized. The City of Washington, lacking the 
funding to fix the NCHA’s large housing stock on its own, could only support patchwork 
efforts to improve living conditions for residents. Some relief, however, came in the 
summer of 1974, when the Department of Housing and Urban Development made a 100 
million dollar effort to improve the public housing stock in the District of Columbia and 
thirty-five other municipalities. Washington expected to receive about two million dollars 
of that package.434 James G. Banks, then serving as the executive director of the NCHA, 
promised that the federal dollars would be spent on “simple repairs, erosion control, and 
management-tenant relations studies” at Highland Dwellings and Sheridan Terrace, along 
with eight other projects that the NCHA deemed to be the most troubled.435  
H.R. Crawford, then the Assistant HUD Secretary, had a few words to say about 
the disbursement. His primary concern was that “[w]e cannot correct the physical 
structures which were built[.] We can only work with these structures, improve them and 
provide the kind of management and service support that will not further add to the 
physical depreciation and deterioration of the buildings and frustrations of their 
inhabitants.”436 Although somewhat vague, Crawford seemed to understand there were 
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some deficiencies with the buildings as they were constructed. Thus, at its foundation, 
public housing might have been unfixable, but the problems could be alleviated through 
patchwork maintenance. What Banks failed to capture in his comments, however 
reasoned they might have sounded, was that a persistent problem in the history of public 
housing in eastern Washington, D.C. was the role of the varied topography and 
hydrology. While difficult terrains with changes in grade might be surmountable 
problems, many of the public housing complexes that were built used unsuitable 
materials and disregarded the potential role of rolling terrains and running water in 
damaging those materials. So, the problem of public housing could not be solved solely 
through patchwork fixes as, for example, was attempted at Lincoln Heights, but rather 
through a wholesale reconstruction of the sites in order to mitigate envirotechnical 
failures. 
It is clear from the record that Sheridan Terrace was structurally unsound, given 
the prevailing hydrology, topography, and soil type of the area where it was built. It may 
also be that the constant stream of automobiles up and down Suitland Parkway added to 
the stresses on the interior walls and ceilings. They almost certainly threatened the health 
of the complex’s residents. These problems were apparent to visitors and tenants alike, 
but could not be wholly fixed, because they were tied to the actual building site itself. 
Thus, the public went from seeing Sheridan Terrace as an example of modern public 
housing for low-income renters to a deteriorating and somewhat vacant complex in the 
span of just nine years, representing one of the most dramatic declines in housing 
stability in the history of the NCHA.437  
 
Conclusion: Sheridan Terrace and the Legacy of Siting in Eastern Washington, D.C. 
 
 Sheridan Terrace was built in a creek bed. Stickfoot Creek had been buried and 
drained since the 1910s in order to make way for first a sewer line, then Suitland 
Parkway. At the time it was built, metropolitan planners considered the Parkway to be a 
vital conduit for defense-related vehicles going from Andrews Air Force Base to the 
Bolling Naval Air Station. The creek bed offered a cheap and easy space to acquire for 
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the purpose of building the road. By the 1950s, the roadway was an obvious benefit to 
commuters from eastern Washington, D.C. and the suburbs further afield. Those 
commuters brought with them noxious exhaust fumes carrying lead particles, which 
might not have been as devastating to the NCHA’s tenants had they not been provided 
with a complex that was adjacent to the Parkway. 
 The NCHA, however, was constrained in its choice of sites. With a diminishing 
budget but a mandate to house the hundreds of families being evicted from urban renewal 
sites, the NCHA was in a double bind. Eyeing affordable land on which to build housing 
in the 1950s as population density in eastern Washington, the NCHA settled on a slice of 
property owned by the NPS. That site ran in a narrow strip adjacent to Suitland on one 
side, and a massive embankment on the other side. The entire slice of land also ran 
downhill on a slope from north to south. Eventually, the natural flow of water at that site, 
acting in conjunction with the soil quality and the rumble of cars on the Parkway might 
have contributed to noticeable plaster deterioration and decay within the Sheridan 
Terrace apartments.  
 In no way could a situation where plaster fell on the heads of young children be 
called decent, safe, or sanitary.438 James Ring, only the second executive director of the 
NCHA, had worked with John Ihlder for decades, and was brought on early in the ADA’s 
efforts. Ring spoke reverently about Ihlder, and worked to uphold his vision. Yet, the 
environmental factors at Sheridan Terrace conspired to undermine the decentness, safety, 
and cleanliness of the complex within less than a decade of its completion. This 
represented a significant environmental burden for the African American tenants of 
Sheridan Terrace. All the while they also contended with deteriorating surroundings and 
flooding. The NCHA’s inability to adequately respond to those envirotechnical 
obstacles—which were consistent with the quality of the Sheridan Terrace site—is what 
fostered the emergence of that landscape of environmental racism.  
 Sheridan Terrace shows that the problems of poor siting persisted into the postwar 
period, but sometimes in a different form. The obstacles that siting posed were not unique 
to Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights, or Highland Dwellings. Just prior to the Second World 
War, the Lanham Act granted the NCHA funding on par with what was needed to 
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dramatically reshape the landscape of eastern Washington, D.C., and a mandate to finally 
build housing on a massive scale for the city’s growing population. And of course, the 
NCHA sent out appraisers who documented ravines and changes in grade on the 
properties it considered. Even though contractors wrote about flooding delays, 
deteriorating materials, and structural damage at the time of construction, population 
pressures and the need to house wartime workers were of the utmost importance. The 
federal government was breathing down the necks of the NCHA’s executive directors. 
But what was the excuse for NCHA planners in the 1950s? The war was over, previously 
scarce materials were more abundant, and there was simply more time to plan. Indeed, 
the NCHA exercised due diligence by following the DCDLI’s instructions to send an 
outside observer. But when that observer reported back that the southern buildings 
exhibited evidence of slippage, the NCHA continued with the project anyway. Once 
again, institutional pressures and decreased funding provided the environment with more 
agency, and it exerted a great deal of pressure on the stability and healthfulness of the 
Sheridan Terrace complex. 
 Sheridan Terrace remains in the memory of many residents of the District of 
Columbia as an example of the failures of mid-century public housing. Yet, those 
residents tend to explain the failures as stemming from city administrators, or criminals, 
or the drug epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s, or mass incarceration, or a litany of other 
issues. But, to its very foundation, siting of Sheridan Terrace proved to be a significant 
obstacle to its success. Its deterioration was built into its foundations, and the decay that 
the residents suffered was exacerbated by the smoke, exhaust, and poisons emanating 






Envirotechnical Obstacles, Environmental Injustice, and the Environmental Legacy 
of the National Capital Housing Authority’s First Decades 
 
 On April 18th, 1993, Katherine Boo, a reporter for The Washington Post published 
an article about Sheridan Terrace. Titled “Stairway to Hell: Squalor and Squatters in 
D.C.’s Worst Project,” the article was featured on the front page of the opinion section of 
the paper. On the left-hand side of the column the paper’s illustrator anthropomorphized 
the Sheridan Terrace complex as a skeleton made from brick and iron. In the article, Boo 
described how residents suffered from broken plumbing, deteriorating plaster, and vermin 
that took advantage of the state of disrepair to scurry from unit to unit. She placed the 
blame for the state of things at Sheridan Terrace on the failed managerial culture, which 
did little to inspire a sense of connection or community between the live-in managers and 
the residents of public housing.439 
 Boo’s assessment helps explain why the public housing stock of the District of 
Columbia continued to decline during the 1980s and 1990s. The problems she identified, 
however, were evident much earlier than that. The first years and decades of the National 
Capital Housing Authority’s program were marred by structural instability, erosion on its 
grounds, flooding, fire, and pollution. The history of the NCHA in eastern Washington, 
D.C. was not so much a fall from grace as an inability to get a truly effective public 
housing program off the ground.  
 
Public Housing and Changes in the Landscape 
 
 It helps to consider the NCHA’s efforts as more than just an attempt by a local 
housing authority to erect housing. Rather, the NCHA built a new envirotechnical system 
in eastern Washington, D.C. In the early 1940s, the NCHA confronted a rugged, hilly, 
and tree-lined landscape. It would not be enough for the NCHA to simply put up housing; 
it had to build out the sewers, water pipes, roads, and wiring to support public housing 
complexes. John Ihlder wanted to provide modern housing with all of its associated 
amenities to the NCHA’s tenants. His vision was not restricted to the domestic space 
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itself, but in fact to the surroundings in which homes stood. He carried his Progressive 
vision for proper housing in the proper surroundings into his work in eastern Washington, 
D.C. Since the communities that the NCHA built on lacked many connections to 
infrastructures that could provide modern amenities, the NCHA would have to furnish 
them itself. 
 Furthermore, the NCHA committed itself to large-scale housing construction 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s. During the Second World War, the FPHA mandated 
that the NCHA provide housing for defense industry workers, in addition to the work that 
the Authority had already been doing during to rehouse families evicted from alley 
dwellings. After the war, the RLA partnered with the NCHA; the housing authority 
would be responsible for building homes for the thousands of residents displaced by 
urban renewal. The pressures on the NCHA to build housing on a large-scale shaped the 
size of its complexes throughout the 1940s and 1950s.  
 The NCHA’s desire to build modern projects on a scale that could accommodate 
the need for housing among Washington’s low-income residents meant that it would have 
to dramatically transform the landscape of eastern Washington, D.C. Its efforts to grade 
the hilly terrain, remove trees, fill ravines and gullies, and terrace its plots were part of 
the development of a new envirotechnical system in the region. The NCHA tried to build 
an envirotechnical system that would secure the long-term health and welfare of low-
income tenants in decent, safe, and sanitary housing. By altering the landscape the 
Authority hoped to achieve just that goal. But the history of the NCHA’s efforts does not 
show that this was a straightforward process. Because an envirotechnical system is 
constituted by intertwined nature and artifice, the environment often influences the 
outcome of the technological development of a landscape. The system is neither wholly 
artificial nor natural, but is instead both. Environmental pressures can constrain the 
designs and achievements of a human-built landscape, just as technological or 
infrastructural developments change the appearance of a “natural” landscape. As the 
system develops, it remains dynamic. Environmental and human-built components of the 
system can work together in unexpected ways. When the NCHA heard about flooding, 
erosion, fires, and structural deterioration in and around its buildings, it encountered 
some of the unexpected obstacles that emerged within the envirotechnical system. 
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 The public housing complexes were the property of the NCHA, which was 
responsible for construction, maintenance, and operations. The NCHA, then, served as 
the administrator of the envirotechnical system. It attempted to respond to any obstacles 
in the way of decent, safe, and sanitary housing that emerged during the lifetime of its 
buildings. The NCHA’s ability to address obstacles was constrained, however, by 
political and economic circumstances. With the passage of the Lanham Act in 1940, the 
NCHA received millions of dollars in low-interest loans from the USHA expressly for 
housing construction. This would allow John Ihlder to test his ideas about planning and 
building public housing on a large scale. However, the NCHA did not have much time to 
prepare for the construction process. The promise of increased funding was tied to very 
tight time constraints; the NCHA would have to build quickly as defense workers flooded 
into the District of Columbia.  
 A clear pattern emerged during the Second World War, which would partially 
determine the fate of some of the earliest NCHA properties. In Barry Farms, Lincoln 
Heights, and Highland Dwellings, the NCHA ignored parts of the District of Columbia 
building code.440 The building code required the District of Columbia’s inspectors to visit 
the sites and ensure that there was appropriate drainage, that roads and surfaces were 
graded correctly, that the materials used were appropriate, and that the structural design 
of the buildings was suitable for inhabitants.441 The NCHA was able to avoid the typical 
inspection process for buildings in the District of Columbia because the USHA argued 
that a project of national importance did not have to be overseen by a local authority.442 
 The USHA gave with one hand and took with the other; it provided the resources 
necessary for the NCHA to pursue Ihlder’s vision for large urban neighborhoods that 
appeared similar in nature to middle-class communities. It also, however, constrained the 
NCHA in its ability to address envirotechnical concerns at the time that those 
communities were being built. The NCHA’s contractors wrote to the Authority, 
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describing the complicated interactions between rainfall, soil, drainage, and the materials 
used during construction. Some managers requested the presence of outside experts to 
monitor the site and ensure it could properly hold the structures that the NCHA desired. 
But the USHA circumscribed the NCHA’s ability to test and investigate its plots at the 
time of construction.   
 The construction process at the wartime projects gave rise to two major 
envirotechnical obstacles: those pertaining to siting, and those related to the materials that 
the NCHA used. The consequences of those envirotechnical obstacles are catalogued 
below. What was important about them was that the NCHA’s ability to respond to those 
obstacles was conditioned by political and economic factors. Ultimately, the NCHA was 
able to do little to fully address those obstacles. This meant that the envirotechnical 
system became unstable, and ultimately did not fulfill the NCHA’s goal of decent, safe, 
or sanitary housing. At moments when the administrative power of the NCHA was 
diminished, the environment impinged more strongly on the stability of the wartime 
public housing structures. The movement of soil and the flow of water continued to erode 
the foundations, walls, roofs, and grounds of public housing complexes. The NCHA, 
under pressure to build quickly and ignore inspection procedures that might have ensured 
the longer-term stability of its complexes, could do little to effectively respond to the 
envirotechnical obstacles at its sites. The envirotechnical system, therefore, did not 
operate as the NCHA intended. 
 In the postwar period, political and economic factors continued to undermine the 
NCHA’s ability to effectively administer its public housing program, which left room for 
the emergence of significant envirotechnical obstacles. For one thing, the NCHA found 
that the government support that had been readily available during the Second World 
War dried up. This was part of a national trend. While extolling the virtue of low-income 
housing programs in the Housing Act of 1949, which endeavored to build 810,000 units 
of housing by 1955, in fact Congress kept the actual appropriations for public housing 
low.443 For the NCHA, gone were the low-interest loans from the USHA. Instead, the 
Authority received an annual appropriation from Congress, which allocated a small 
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amount for the maintenance and operation of existing stock.444 Expansions would have to 
be funded through bond issuances. 
 At the same time, however, the District of Columbia began to plan several large 
urban renewal projects. Under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, the 
NCPC became responsible for urban renewal planning. It enlisted the help of the RLA to 
carry out urban renewal activities—including the demolition of many existing homes—in 
twelve sections of the city between 1955 and 1972.445 The NCHA was a partner in urban 
renewal as it began to build housing to accommodate the displaced residents. In the 
1950s, then, the position of the NCHA was different than it had been during the war. The 
Authority was expected to build homes for thousands of displaced residents with a far 
more restricted budget. Once again, its ability to effectively administer the 
envirotechnical system of public housing was constrained by institutional politics.  
 Amidst the changing bureaucratic context the NCHA continued to pursue siting 
for public housing. By the late 1950s, however, eastern Washington, D.C. was no longer 
a low-density semi-agricultural community. In part through the NCHA’s past efforts to 
expand sewerage, power, gas, water, and roads in the region—along with those of the 
NCPPC and the NPS—the region had urbanized rapidly. The NCHA no longer had a 
wealth of land to build on; it had to make due with what was available. In two cases—
Kenilworth Courts and Sheridan Terrace—the NCHA selected sites that were adjacent to 
major nuisances. For Kenilworth Courts, the nearby Kenilworth dump spewed smoke, 
ash, and soot towards residents’ apartments. In Sheridan Terrace, the noise and exhaust 
from the major roadway in front of their property endangered the health and welfare of 
residents. Furthermore, built in a former creek bed at the base of a large embankment, 
Sheridan Terrace experienced problems related to erosion and flooding, much as the 
wartime complexes had. 
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 The political and economic situations that the NCHA faced in the 1940s and 
1950s greatly shaped its ability to administer the envirotechnical system that it had built. 
Ultimately, the NCHA offered inadequate responses to the envirotechnical obstacles of 
siting and materials. This left more room for environmental forces to undermine the 
quality of life and structural integrity of public housing complexes in the eastern portion 
of the District of Columbia. As smoke spread across Kenilworth Courts and Highland 
Dwellings, and as the ground moved and flooded in Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights, and 
Sheridan Terrace, the NCHA’s properties deteriorated and degraded. 
 
Envirotechnical Obstacles: Distinguishing Between Siting and Materials 
 
 Barry Farms, Lincoln Heights, Kenilworth Courts, and Sheridan Terrace all 
exhibited some of the problems associated with siting. The term siting here refers to two 
things. First, the NCHA made significant changes to the sites that it chose in order to 
support public housing. Second, siting also refers to the location of public housing 
complexes, and their proximity to environmental nuisances, which is more relevant to the 
postwar complexes. Public housing changed the appearances and functions of the places 
where it was located; it was also shaped by the surrounding landscape. 
 Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights were two of the earliest projects that the NCHA 
built in eastern Washington, D.C. The Authority encountered a rolling and moderately 
forested landscape, with plenty of gullies and ravines. In order to build housing on the 
scale it intended, the NCHA would have to first level the terrains and take out many of 
the trees. In both cases, the modified landscape was terraced to the best of the 
contractors’ ability.  
 The builders encountered several problems while landscaping the sites. At Barry 
Farms, for example, heavy rains eroded a cut in the slope towards the higher point of the 
complex. The cuts had been made in order to accommodate new housing. In October the 
slope began to collapse, which damaged property belonging to St. Elizabeth’s hospital. 
This set back work at the site as contractors hastily built a new drainage system in order 
to mitigate flooding.446 Similarly, at Lincoln Heights, heavy rains in July delayed 
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foundation construction.447 All of the District of Columbia is prone to severe 
thunderstorms during the summer and fall. 
 As noted above, the NCHA did not allow the District of Columbia to perform the 
required building inspection while the wartime projects were being built. So at Lincoln 
Heights, the site manager encouraged the NCHA to bring in outside experts, even if they 
were not officially working for the District of Columbia. The manager was concerned 
about the ability of the soil to handle the buildings’ load, soil shrinkage as a consequence 
of changing water levels, and the placement of buildings towards the peak of the grade at 
the site.448 He explicitly compared the landscape of Lincoln Heights to that of Barry 
Farms in his letter to the higher officials in the NCHA.449 
 After work was completed, both Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights faced 
envirotechnical obstacles pertaining to their siting. In October of 1976, for example, the 
manager for the Barry Farms complex revealed that the position of the complex on a 
sloping hill meant that water would flood towards the site’s lower points. When that 
happened, it penetrated the gas lines, which cut off fuel for heating and cooking at the 
complex.450 Furthermore, according to another manager of the complex, ““there’s a lot of 
flooding; water bangs up against the buildings and the structures begin to sink and 
rot[.]”451 Since the 1960s residents had voiced concerns about plaster deteriorating and 
floors warping within their units. Backed-up plumbing and poor quality sinks also 
contributed to the mess at Barry Farms.452 
 At Lincoln Heights the relationship between flowing water and soil movement 
was more apparent to residents and visitors. A Public Housing Authority inspector who 
toured the site in 1952 and 1953 encountered badly eroded slopes that were desperately in 
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need of new retaining walls and a proper drainage system. Heavy rains had ruined large 
portions of the greenspace that the NCHA had created in 1944 and 1945.453 Of course, 
some of the retaining walls had cracked anyway in response to the movement of soil and 
water underneath the site.454 Residents of Lincoln Heights would continue to contend 
with broken sidewalks, cracked walls, flooding and erosion through the 1960s and 1970s. 
 In the postwar period, siting remained a concern. Although Sheridan Terrace 
exhibited some of the same problems as the wartime projects due to its position at the 
bottom of a ravine that had been carved long ago by Stickfoot creek, the postwar 
complexes grappled far more with the problem of proximity to environmental nuisances. 
The NCHA and other city agencies had been successful in spurring development in 
eastern Washington, D.C. This meant, however, that when it came time for the NCHA to 
begin housing the residents displaced by urban renewal, there was scant open space left. 
Kenilworth Courts was sited nearly adjacent to an open burn landfill, which sent soot and 
ash towards the complex. A retrospective study by the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry revealed that indeed residents of Kenilworth Courts were likely exposed 
to dangerous substances.455 Sheridan Terrace dealt with a similar problem. Its proximity 
to Suitland Parkway meant that residents had to contend with automobile exhaust and the 
pernicious poison of the mid-twentieth century, lead. The envirotechnical obstacle of 
siting refers to two slightly different things in the wartime and postwar eras. Still, the 
NCHA’s choice of sites and the modifications thereto spurred environmental problems 
that the Authority was not fully equipped to rectify. 
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A photograph of trash being burned at the Kenilworth dump, c. 1960. Note the close proximity of 
homes in the background. Oliver F. Atkins Photograph Collection, George Mason University, 
“Massive Fire at the Kenilworth Dump,” February, 1952; 
http://images.gmu.edu/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?lunaMediaId=GMUDPSdps~1
5~15~11660~100333 (accessed March 12th, 2020). 
 
 
 The envirotechnical obstacle of materials refers to the degree to which the 
manufactured parts of the envirotechnical system acted as the builders intended with the 
environment. In an ideal situation, the materials that the NCHA used would withstand 
environmental pressures and secure the long-term structural integrity of the complex. 
Unfortunately for the NCHA, during the Second World War critical materials were in 
short supply, and the NCHA ended up building Lincoln Heights and Highland Dwellings 
with materials that were not suited for their environments.456 In Lincoln Heights, the 
envirotechnical obstacles of materials manifested primarily as leaking roofs and walls. 
                                                        
456 Barry Farms was built with similar materials but the textual evidence for their failure is less 
comprehensive than that for Lincoln Heights or Highland Dwellings. 
 
227 
Since timber was in short supply, Lincoln Heights was built with gypsum boards coated 
in bitumen. Heavy rains in July of 1945 had damaged some of the roofs, and the 
contractors were concerned about falling through.457 In a 1952 site visit, the same PHA 
inspector noticed that the flashings on the roofs of some of the buildings at Lincoln 
Heights had corroded; he recommended coating the roofs with additional bitumen.458  
 Highland Dwellings experienced much more severe and violent consequences 
from the environmental obstacles posed by poor materials. Built with only an asbestos 
sheet between the dwellings and with wooden gutters (rather than sheet metal), Highland 
Dwellings suffered from a series of fires between 1942 and 1964. While not every year 
bore witness to a fire, Highland Dwellings contended with far more fires—and deaths—
than any of the other wartime or postwar projects. The NCHA did not use the fires as a 
chance to petition for more funding for repairs, and it only began to attempt to retrofit the 
complex in 1961, after years of deliberation.459 By that point, the complex had gone from 
being all white to over two-thirds black, as integration prompted white families to move 
further into their racial enclaves. 
 Due to a changing mandate, pressures from other bureaucracies, and a decline in 
funding after the end of World War Two, the NCHA was unable to sufficiently address 
the envirotechnical obstacles in and around its public housing complexes. While the 
NCHA had built a new envirotechnical regime over the old agricultural communities of 
eastern Washington, D.C., ultimately environmental forces—the soil, water, air, and 
terrain—worked against the NCHA’s plans for decent, safe, and sanitary housing. Those 
environmental forces, in turn contributed to several environmental burdens on the 
NCHA’s tenants. Out of the difficult envirotechnical obstacles of the NCHA’s program 
came the problem of environmental racism. 
  
Environmental Racism in the NCHA’s Properties 
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 Environmental racism refers to the disproportionate number of environmental 
nuisances located in communities of color. The NCHA properties were clearly full of 
such burdens, and lacking in many amenities such as parkland, clean water, and clean air. 
The NCHA’s public housing program exacerbated the environmental burden on black 
communities, even though it was established to provide decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing.  
 Most obviously, the NCHA furnished homes that were susceptible to decay and 
deterioration. Furthermore, it concentrated hundreds of black families into homes that 
either declined in quality precipitously during the first decades that they were in 
operation or complexes located near environmental burdens. The NCHA’s inability to 
fully confront the envirotechnical obstacles of its complexes meant that dwelling units 
experienced falling plaster, warping floors, and holes in the walls. In addition to 
contending with the dangers posed by collapsing materials, the structural deterioration 
provided plenty of room for rats to scurry throughout the complexes. Residents at both 
Barry Farms and Lincoln Heights expressed concerns about rats slinking through their 
homes in the 1960s. According to the tenants, they took advantage of the numerous holes 
throughout the buildings to move from room to room.460 At Highland Dwellings, 
however, there was little in the record that revealed that residents suffered from vermin 
running freely. The problem seems to have been limited to the two African American 
complexes built during the Second World War. Of course, the residents of Highland 
Dwellings contended with other problems stemming from the envirotechnical obstacles 
of the materials the NCHA used. Furthermore, as the complex became predominantly 
African American after 1953, the NCHA continued to drag it feet on providing the 
appropriate fireproofing, and the flames continued to burn at the Highland Dwellings.  
 But there is also a spatial dimension to the pattern of environmental racism within 
the NCHA’s projects. For one thing, the housing complexes that were intended for black 
residents were often built in black neighborhoods. This was an outcome of the fact that 
black land was devalued relative to white land. When the NCHA built an envirotechnical 
regime on the site of the former agricultural communities worked by African American 
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families, it was also building on the cheaper, hillier, and more sensitive land that whites 
disregarded. African American families had built farms that conformed to that landscape. 
The NCHA modified the landscape in pursuit of an envirotechnical system that could 
support public housing. However, because it was unable to adequately confront the 
envirotechnical obstacles of the sites, the NCHA ended up concentrating hundreds of 
families in black enclaves that degraded and deteriorated over time. Thus the 
envirotechnical obstacles that the NCHA encountered contributed to the problem of 
environmental racism in Washington, D.C.  
 By the late 1950s, as open space was increasingly difficult to find in eastern 
Washington, the NCHA decided to build on sites that were in close proximity to 
significant environmental nuisances. Kenilworth Courts was built close to a sizable 
landfill, while Sheridan Terrace operated adjacent to a major roadway (which itself had 
contributed to the development of eastern Washington, D.C.). During the wartime period, 
then, the NCHA maintained the traditional patters of environmental injustice that had 
relegated African Americans to poorer quality land on environmentally sensitive sites. It 
moved hundreds of families to locations and homes that deteriorated because the 
Authority could not adequately address the envirotechnical obstacles of the sites. In the 
1950s, the NCHA amplified the environmental injustices for its tenants by furnishing 
new projects near obvious environmental nuisances. The spatial dimensions of the 
NCHA’s public housing program represented both a continuation and intensification of 
the environmental injustices that impoverished black families suffered in the District of 
Columbia. 
 Furthermore, public housing was a significant force in the segregation of 
metropolitan space by race. The NCHA’s role in that history is much like that of other 
public housing authorities. By expanding the stock of public housing in urban spaces, the 
NCHA participated in the shoring up of racial boundaries. In Washington, D.C., African 
Americans were mostly provided with homes in the Southeast quadrant or in section of 
Northeast on the opposite side of the Anacostia River from downtown. Throughout the 
1960s, many whites moved out of public housing and their old neighborhoods and into 
the burgeoning suburbs across the District of Columbia border. African Americans, who 
were locked out of the generous federal housing programs that emerged after the Second 
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World War, were stuck living in deteriorating public housing complexes or found homes 
in the subpar private housing market. Neither situation was ideal. But the NCHA’s 
inability to provide decent, safe, or sanitary housing was especially disappointing. 
Limited to certain parts of the city with high concentrations of public housing, African 
American families found little support from the agency that was specifically built to 
remedy their situation.461 
 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the NCHA simultaneously repeated traditional 
patterns of environmental segregation in eastern Washington, D.C. and amplified them by 
concentrating hundreds of families on or near environmentally sensitive sites. The 
Authority repeated traditional patterns by building in places that had long been given 
over to African Americans because whites considered them less valuable. It amplified 
those patterns by concentrating hundreds of families in those same environmentally 
sensitive sites. It also brought hundreds of families into new building locations, which 
were closer to some of the sanitary, and transportation infrastructures that generated 
environmental injustices throughout the metropolitan region.462 This narrative shows that 
the racialization of space in the postwar metropolis by public housing construction had 
environmental consequences as well. The NCHA’s actions maintained forms of 
environmental injustice—which provided marginal lands for black families—while trying 
to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing. The Authority also built new complexes 
near the noxious features of a part of the city that rapidly became a black enclave in the 
1950s and 1960s.463 
 Who would be an advocate for the tenants of the NCHA as they faced these 
envirotechnical obstacles? The tenants looked to each other to build resilient 
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communities. Kimi Gray, for example, organized a tenant management program that 
stemmed some of the deterioration at Kenilworth Courts. With the support of her 
neighbors she pushed back against repair plans that ignored the problems that tenants had 
long faced. Like the individuals that Rhonda Williams profiled in The Politics of Public 
Housing, Gray received a political education as she assessed the quality of her apartment 
and realized that together, her community could remediate, in part, their local 
environment.464 Similarly, the Band of Angels at Barry Farms pressured Walter 
Washington to provide funds for upkeep and maintenance within their dwellings. The 
deterioration of public housing, and the environmental pressures the residents 
experienced, helped provide a way to organize and protest. In that way the environment 
was an agent of political change. 
 The tenants of the NCHA, however, faced a difficult situation. The paradox of life 
in Washington, D.C. was that although the federal government was very close at hand, 
residents did not have representation at that level. Nor, until 1973, did Washingtonians 
have a local government. Although it is true that in most cases local governments were 
willing to disregard the concerns of public housing tenants in order to avoid the ire of 
conservative white voters and real estate interests, the tenants of the NCHA had very 
little recourse to place political pressure on the NCHA. They did, however, eke out some 
victories. Kimi Gray built a successful tenant management organization. The Barry 
Farms Band of Angels was able to directly pressure the leadership of the NCHA to 
provide crucial repairs.465 Those victories coincided with a major change in the 
leadership of the NCHA. After James Ring retired in 1960, the NCHA was no longer 
controlled by the first generation of planners. Ihlder and Ring had built their careers 
during the Progressive and New Deal periods, when aloof, paternalistic urban planning 
was commonplace. Walter Washington, who took the housing authority’s helm in 1960, 
proved that he was willing to visit the NCHA’s properties and meet with tenants. Thus by 
the 1960s public housing residents had learned how to press their claims directly to the 
Authority. Washington, however, was constrained by a dwindling budget. He would not 
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be able to marshal the resources to successfully overcome the envirotechnical obstacles 
of the NCHA’s siting and the materials used in the wartime projects.  
 The federal government—which tenants could directly appeal to when asked to 
testify—only intervened in its management practices, and even then did so rarely. 
Furthermore, federal legislators were not responsible to the tenants of Washington, D.C. 
as constituents. The NCHA avoided the constraints of direct political oversight from the 
municipal government for about forty years, from 1934 until 1973. This meant that the 
NCHA’s leadership was far more insulated from political concerns than many of its 
counterparts in other cities. Congress was not often willing to exercise direct oversight 
over the NCHA, nor did it do so for the other planning agencies to s significant extent. 
Rather, planning, renewal, and housing construction proceeded from a confederation of 
the NCPPC, RLA, and NCHA. Most of the NCHA’s constraints came from institutional 
demands, such as when the FPHA and RLA encouraged new construction projects. When 
Congress decided to reduce appropriations, as it did beginning in 1945, the NCHA was 
limited in the number of projects it could take on as well as its ability to repair older 
complexes. Because the NCHA was ostensibly overseen by the federal government, 
however, both the NCHA and its tenants were in unique positions, relative to other 
housing authorities. 
 
Envirotechnical History in the Metropolitan Setting 
 
 The history of public housing fits within an envirotechnical framework. Although 
the natural features of the landscape of public housing might have been less readily 
apparent than in the case of a major hydraulic system or a carefully managed forest, there 
were clearly environmental forces at work throughout the history of public housing. 
Those environmental forces intertwined with the manufactured components of public 
housing in ways that were not completely anticipated by the managers and planners in the 
NCHA. Ultimately, environmental forces exercised a great deal of agency within and 
around public housing in eastern Washington, D.C. throughout the last sixty years of the 
twentieth century.  
 Human and natural forces interact in complex ways in envirotechnical systems. 
Physically, human technologies in such systems blend with nature. But the politics of an 
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envirotechnical system can also shape how the hybridized space functions.466 This was 
clearly the case for the NCHA. Although it did not have to contend with a strong 
municipal or state government, like most other housing authorities, the NCHA’s work 
was instead largely constrained by the priorities of the federal government and 
metropolitan agencies. During the war the federal government pressured the NCHA to 
build housing quickly and shielded it from the Board of Commissioners. In the late 
1950s, as urban renewal proceeded apace, the NCHA was brought in as a partner to the 
process and asked to produce housing for the displaced residents. Furthermore, Congress 
began to scale back appropriations soon after the war was over.467 These factors meant 
that the NCHA was unable to respond to envirotechnical obstacles on its sites, which 
meant that the “natural” forces of soil and water flows, as well as air currents, contributed 
significantly to the decline of its properties. 
  The envirotechnical framework is an appropriate method by which to study and 
analyze the changing landscape of cities in the United States. As with many 
envirotechnical histories, the regime that the NCHA tried to build was constrained and 
shaped by the interests and needs of other agencies.468 Although the NCHA had direct 
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control over its properties, and benefited from the absence of a true local government, it 
still contended with the politics of urban development in the postwar period. Even though 
the NCHA had a clear mandate to build decent, safe, and sanitary housing, its outcomes 
were shaped as it conflicted with other agencies about the development and appearance 
of the metropolitan landscape. The USHA instructed the Authority to ignore the District 
of Columbia building code during the Second World War. The RLA and the NCPPC 
shaped the limits of what the NCHA could achieve by charging it with new construction 
in the postwar period. The Department of Sanitation held sway over the landfill close to 
Kenilworth Courts. Much as in the case of any other envirotechnical system, different 
agencies and powers held different ideas about how the urban landscape should function 
and what it should be used to accomplish. They all played a part in the development of 
the NCHA’s envirotechnical regime. Ultimately, the NCHA was a relatively weak 
administrator over its envirotechnical regime because it could not push back against the 
forces that shaped its construction program. Nor could it resist the steady forces of 
environmental change at its sites.  
 The envirotechnical approach opens the door for further investigation of 
metropolitan change in the postwar period. It accounts for the human and institutional 
limits to bringing about changes in the metropolitan landscape, while not losing sight of 
the environmental forces that those institutions had to contend with. The NCHA found 
itself in a precarious position, wedged between bureaucracies that insisted that it build 
without proper examination of the landscape during the war or without adequate funding 
after, and an ever shifting and changing local landscape in and around its complexes. 
 
Metropolitan Environmental History and the History of Public Housing 
 
 The postwar American metropolis underwent extensive and dramatic 
environmental changes over a relatively short period of time. For the most part, scholars 
interested in the suburbs or road construction have written that history.469 The 
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environmental history of public housing adds to that literature by centering the changes 
that slum clearance and urban renewal brought to the metropolitan landscape. The 
environmental history of public housing reveals that fire, pollution, infrastructure 
development, and changing landscapes were important features of postwar environmental 
history in cities. 
 The history of urban renewal has largely been left to historians of planning and 
design. While they have done an exceptional job exploring the political, social, and 
economic limits of mid-century city planning, far less ink has been spilled about the 
environmental consequences of that process.470 It is high time for metropolitan 
environmental historians to take on that significant postwar project. As demonstrated in 
the case of the ADA and the NCHA, local authorities did much to change both the 
appearance of cities as well as their infrastructural networks, hydrologies, and 
topographies. Urban renewal and alley rehabilitation displaced thousands of people from 
longstanding city neighborhoods. In Washington, many of those families migrated east of 
the rivers, which saw an increase of 130,000 people between 1940 and 1960.471 The 
NCHA needed to act quickly to house many of those displaced residents. The Authority’s 
successes and failures shaped the experiences and lives of thousands of individuals. It 
also created new racialized spaces throughout the metropolitan region, which included 
various types of environmental burdens and amenities. In this analysis I have only been 
able to briefly comment on the many environmental components of urban renewal, but 
the subject offers several avenues for exploration. A focus on the history of the physical 
landscape during urban renewal provides for a deeper understanding of the environmental 
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legacy of renewal programs, their effectiveness, the natural constraints to agencies’ goals, 
and the consequences of the programs for different local communities. 
 Public housing history also benefits from closer attention to the question of siting. 
Most historians of the subject acknowledge that siting mattered. As D. Bradford Hunt 
succinctly put it in Blueprint for Disaster, “[l]ocated largely in black ghettos, public 
housing perpetuated racial segregation and symbolized second-class citizenship.”472 The 
siting of public housing, however, has wider implications than the segregation of space 
and residents’ lack of access to schools, churches, and other social amenities. 
 The choices that the NCHA made about where to build housing shaped the larger 
outcomes of its public housing program. The Authority pursued decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing, but the operation of the envirotechnical system at its complexes reversed the 
NCHA’s intended outcome. The environment played a key role in the history of public 
housing. It undermined the foundations, walls, and roofs of the wartime complexes. 
Smoke, soot, and ash from dumps and roadways harmed the health of the Authority’s 
tenants. Even after the war, when the NCHA allowed for outside experts to investigate its 
property, the environmental features of the Authority’s sites undermined the stability of 
its buildings and the quality of life for its tenants. The envirotechnical system itself 
created obstacles that the NCHA was hard-pressed to overcome. I assert that in addition 
to political conflicts, economic constraints, and bureaucratic infighting, the landscape 
itself—and the environmental features it contained—played an extremely significant role 
in shaping the history of decline in the NCHA’s housing stock. The NCHA could not 
achieve the stipulation of the 1937 US Housing Act that called for decent, safe, and 
sanitary housing. The environment was too strong a force with which to contend. 
 This dissertation builds on some of the work that public housing historians have 
done on siting. There is general agreement within the field that public housing played an 
important role in segregating metropolitan space in the twentieth century, along with 
restrictive housing covenants, redlining, and federal housing programs that incentivized 
white homeownership. Although public housing historians disagree on the primary forces 
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behind this segregation, it is clear that whites and blacks were separated into enclaves 
throughout the metropolitan region in the postwar period.   
 As mentioned above, the segregation of metropolitan space had significant 
consequences for African American families. In Washington, D.C., as many whites 
moved into new communities around the city and in the suburbs, and urban renewal 
continued apace, hundreds of African American families were relegated to the very 
public housing complexes that had spurred, in part, white flight. While white families 
enjoyed the benefits of cleaner air and water, black families in public housing contended 
with a deteriorating dwelling space, eroding greenery, and polluted air. Suburban 
commuters contributed to the plight of residents of Sheridan Terrace as they drove along 
Suitland Parkway to work. The District of Columbia balanced the cleanliness of 
prosperous neighborhoods against the deterioration of Kenilworth Courts. Black families 
lost access to their homes in urban renewal areas and on the farms in eastern Washington, 
D.C. as the NCHA worked to integrate the region into the city’s infrastructural networks. 
Yet they could not flee to the cleaner neighborhoods available to whites. They would 
remain in the new racial enclaves built in part by the NCHA. Those racial enclaves both 




 This dissertation is, at its core, an examination of one important reason why the 
National Capital Housing Authority was unable to construct decent, safe, or sanitary 
housing. The envirotechnical obstacles that it encountered—the sites and the material 
components of public housing—were too significant, and the NCHA too financially and 
politically constrained by other agencies and the federal government, to sufficiently 
overcome those obstacles. During rainy months in Washington, D.C., water flowed down 
the hillsides of eastern Washington, D.C., seeking its lowest point. All the while it took 
with it some of the topsoil, which expanded and contracted in wet and dry seasons. 
Sometimes, the water gathered in low points of the complexes, or behind buildings, 
where it damaged vital infrastructure or rendered foundations, floors, and retaining walls 
unstable. Sometimes, the water flowed through holes in the roofs or basements of the 
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buildings, threatening their stability from inside. All the while, the NCHA was unable to 
marshal the funds to stymie those environmental forces.  
 Sometimes, it was not water but air that undermined the NCHA’s complexes. At 
Highland Dwellings, the proximity of the dwellings to each other, combined with the use 
of materials that were insufficiently fireproof, aided the spread of flames, causing 
damage, death, and grief among residents. At Kenilworth Courts and Sheridan Terrace, 
smoke and exhaust threatened to create local public heath crises, whether or not the 
NCHA had known at the time the full consequences of the proximity of its complexes to 
sources of pollution. 
 These factors contributed to an environmental justice crisis in several of the 
NCHA’s properties. The number of burdens that public housing residents endured as a 
result of the Authority’s inability to adequately address the envirotechnical obstacles at 
its complexes showed how unable the NCHA had been to achieve its goal of decent, safe, 
and sanitary housing. In the end, the environment itself was a significant force that 
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